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ABSTRACT 
 
The Olympic Games represent an unparalleled fast-track urban development 
opportunity for Olympic host cities. Taking the premise that the transformational effect of 
the Olympics has a potential to drive long-term urban sustainability, this thesis examines 
how Olympic host cities can use the Olympic planning process to transition to a more 
sustainable model of urban development. Presenting the case of the Vancouver 2010 
Olympics, this thesis draws planning lessons for Sochi 2014 and other future Olympic host 
cities and discusses policy implications for the International Olympic Committee. The City 
of Vancouver’s systematic efforts to integrate sustainability principles in Olympic planning 
created sustainability co-benefits exceeding the initial sustainability commitments of the bid 
book. The development of the Olympic Village generated a massive amount of urban 
sustainability learning by the City planning staff, thus majorly accelerating sustainability 
policies in the areas of energy efficiency, green building, district energy, urban design and 
agriculture. Taking advantage of an unprecedented opportunity to experiment with the 
“urban laboratory” of the Olympics, the City fostered improved citizens’ perception of 
public space and transit, which gave rise to a sustained increase in transit ridership, walking 
and biking after the Games. The City was able to achieve these outcomes through 
integrating the Games into its long-term urban development strategy, strategic sustainability 
thinking and visioning, principled approach to planning, building partnerships with key 
stakeholders and leveraging resources from senior levels of government, ensuring that the 
interests of the organizing committee and city entrepreneurs do not dominate the planning 
process, engaging and consulting with community groups and educating the citizens. Lasting 
sustainability legacies of the Vancouver Olympics arose from a highly collaborative, 
inclusive and coordinated process involving all levels of government, multiple City 
agencies, private sector, VANOC, community groups and citizens. The applicability of the 
policy lessons learned from Vancouver’s case is questionable in developing countries, 
authoritarian regimes and cities with little to no previous experience in urban sustainability. 
The IOC should play a more active role in preventing sustainability debacles in these policy 
contexts.  
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1.1 Contradictions between the Olympics and Sustainability 
 
Back in 1987, the famous United Nation’s Brundtland Report defined sustainable 
development, which has become the world’s biggest policy preoccupation for decades to 
come, as development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs.” (The United Nations General Assembly, 
1987). Later the concept of sustainable development was refined to mean one that “has three 
components — economic development, social development and environmental protection — 
as interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars.” (The United Nations General Assembly, 
2005). In other words, sustainable development is a pattern of growth in which the use of 
resources takes into account carrying capacity of natural systems, while caring about the 
most acute social challenges such as poverty, disenfranchisement and inequality. 
Furthermore, since the interaction between global exponential economic growth and finite 
natural resources is inherently problematic, environmental ecologists suggested that 
sustainable development can be achieved in a “steady state economy” (Meadows et al., 
1972; Daly, 1991). A concept developed by Herman Daly, a steady state economy is 
characterized by a fundamental difference between economic growth, which presupposes the 
quantitative increase in material consumption and population, and economic development, 
featuring the qualitative improvement in people’s well-being due to increased quality of 
goods and services, better technology and moral values (Daly, 1991).  
Given this definition of sustainable development, the Olympic Games phenomenon 
is at odds with its key principles. Inherent contradictions between the Olympics and 
sustainability arise from the spatial, financial and temporal concentrations the Games 
involve. With regards to these concentrations, Paquette et al. writes, ““the Games are hosted 
in a 2-week period, are situated in a specific area, and accumulate operating and 
infrastructure costs in the billions of dollars” (Paquette et al., 2011) These facts make “the 
size-impact ratio striking” (Kaspar, 1998). The enormous inflow of investments, influx of 
hundreds of thousands of visitors, concentration of venues and real estate developments for 
the sake of a short-term festival for the rich not only overstretch the carrying capacity of the 
urban milieu and the natural environment of Olympic host cities, but also engender inequity 
in benefits distribution and thus spark social tension and resentment (Furrer, 2002). 
Furthermore, organization and planning of the Games under severe deadlines often prevent 
host cities from developing long-term urban policy tailored to the needs of host communities 
(Frey et al., 2008).  
In addition to the spatial, financial and temporal concentrations the Games give rise 
to, they are at odds with the no-growth principle of sustainability formulated by Herman 
Daly. Not only do the Olympic Games grow in size, costs and degree of spectacle, they also 
proliferate rapidly around the world, especially in developing countries, whose cities are less 
familiar with sustainability values and less adept in implementing them in the Olympic 
planning. According to Paquette et al., since 1972, the year when UNEP launched its 
environmental awareness efforts, the Summer Olympics have grown to include 201 nations 
(39% increase), 10,500 athletes (32% increase), 28 sports (28% increase), and 302 events 
(43% increase) (Paquette et al., 2011).  
From the point of view of sustainable development, it would make far more sense to 
hold them in one and the same place, equipped and designed specifically for this event (R. 
Moscovich, personal communication, January 13, 2012). Instead, the IOC tacitly promotes 
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“Olympic business” around the globe in the disguise of a benevolent sports and peace 
ambassador. Chasing the Olympics and other sports mega-events has become a whole 
industry in itself served by numerous consultancy, media and PR companies — an industry 
of place competition. Cities compete with each other for capital, tourists, residents, media 
attention, and global recognition. Thus, the Olympic Games engender not only the growth 
and proliferation of Olympics-related activities, but also the growth of their host cities’ 
economies and population, which contradicts Daly’s concept of a steady state economy.   
Furthermore, if one considers opportunity costs of staging the Olympic Games, the 
ideals of sustainability become even more distant. Shaw laments the fact that billions of 
Olympic dollars in Vancouver could have been spent providing affordable housing units, 
new enterprises aimed at job creation for local residents, healthcare and health research, 
combatting global warming, and arts and culture (Shaw, 2008, pp. 192-193). In other words, 
these things, rather than the Olympics, can really contribute to greater sustainability.  
Given the inherent incompatibility of the Olympic Games with the values of 
sustainable development, some authors believe that the true goal of incorporating the 
sustainability principles in planning and staging of the Games is just minimizing and 
offsetting inescapable negative impacts, as opposed to increasing sustainability per se 
(Paquette et al., 2011; Kaspar, 1998). From this perspective, for the sake of greater global 
sustainability, we should abandon the whole idea of the Games once and for all or have them 
in the same place all the time to minimize new construction.  
The fact that there are some irresolvable contradictions between the notion of 
sustainable development does not mean the Olympic movement1 and host cities haven’t 
improved their practices to address sustainability issues over time. As public concerns about 
global sustainable development challenges have mounted, the Olympic movement and host 
cities have felt increasingly compelled to engage in the global sustainability debate. In 
response to the United Nation’s sustainable development imperatives, they have extended 
their efforts to protect the environment, cater to the needs of local communities and boost 
local economic development. The section below takes a brief look at the historical evolution 
of sustainability discourse in the Olympic movement and the progress that has been 
achieved by Olympic host cities. 
 
 1.2 The Evolution of the Sustainability Theme in the Olympics2 
 
The Olympic Games set out as a festival of sport and culture promoting peaceful 
international society, universal fundamental ethical principles, harmonious human 
development and so on (The International Olympic Committee [IOC], 2011b). For a very 
long time these principal goals of the Games took precedence over other global concerns, 
such as global environmental degradation and extreme poverty in many areas of the world. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The three main constituents of the Olympic Movement are the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the International 
Sports Federations (IFs) and the National Olympic Committees (NOCs), the Organizing Committees of the Olympic 
Games (OCOGs), the national associations, clubs and persons belonging to the IFs and NOCs, particularly the athletes, 
judges, referees, coaches and the other sports officials and technicians. (The Olympic Charter, 2011) 
2 See the full timeline in Appendix 1: “The Emergence and Evolution of Sustainability Discourse in the Olympic 
Movement”   
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The Olympic Games organizers showed little consideration for the problems of uncontrolled 
growth, pollution and displacement of the poor created by the Olympic construction. 
This pattern started to change in 1964, when the local residents of Tokyo raised 
concerns about pollution from large-scale Olympic developments in the city (Holden et al., 
2008). In a 1972 referendum, Colorado citizens said “no” to hosting the Olympics, fearing a 
big surge in government spending and city population, influx of tourists in the post-
Olympics period and ensuing environmental destruction (Holden et al., 2008; Sports-
Reference, 2000). However, this public outcry found no response from Olympic organizers. 
Not until the early 90s, after the release of the Bruntdland report in 1987 and the Earth 
Summit in Rio in 1992, did the Olympic family started talking about the need to ensure the 
environmental quality of their events. The 1994 Lillehammer Games marked a turning point 
towards a greener Olympics (Holden et al., 2008). They were underpinned by a solid 
environmental planning and communications program including conservation of a nearby 
bird sanctuary, green design features of some venues, environmental clauses in contracts 
with suppliers and contractors, and others (Essex, 2011).  
Lillehammer’s pioneering experience compelled the IOC to formally recognize 
environment responsibility as the third pillar of its operations in 1994 and partner with 
UNEP (Holden et al., 2008). Five years later the IOC extended its environmental protection 
focus to the concept of sustainable development by adopting the Olympic Movement’s 
Agenda 21, based on understanding that long-term environmental health is impossible 
without ensuring social equity and economic development, both particularly geared to meet 
the needs of disenfranchised and minority groups. Olympic Agenda 21 serves “as a useful 
reference tool for the sports community at all levels in the protection of the environment and 
enhancement of sustainable development”(The International Olympic Committee, 1999). 
The beginning of the 21st century was marked by the IOC’s requirement to incorporate 
environmental considerations in all Olympic bids (Holden et al., 2008).  
Responding to the growing environmental awareness of the Olympic community, in 
the 2000s, host cities integrated increasingly sophisticated green measures in their bids and 
planning for the Games. Host cities engaged in waste management, water and wetland 
conservation, afforestation and carbon offset activities; used innovative energy efficiency 
technologies, renewable energy solutions and green building strategies; relied heavily on 
public transport systems and environmentally friendly vehicles, etc.  Sydney (2000) is noted 
for shaping the Games around comprehensive remediation and redevelopment of Homebush 
Bay, a severely contaminated and blighted brownfield site outside Sydney’s city center 
(Gold and Gold, 2011b). Beijing (2008) achieved significant improvements in air and water 
quality, as well as public sewage and waste treatment, which was another exemplary 
experience of addressing local environmental issues through the Olympics (Gold and Gold, 
2011b). Salt Lake City’s and Torino’s Olympic developments were subject to rigorous 
environmental management systems (EMS) to monitor and mitigate adverse environmental 
impacts3 (Essex, 2011). The 2002 Salt Lake City Games were certified as climate neutral by 
the UNEP Climate Neutral Network for the first time in the history of the Olympics. On top 
of a carbon emissions management system (aka HECTOR, HERitage Climate TORino), 
Torino introduced environmental sustainability procurement criteria for suppliers, as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The EMS developed by Torino Organizing Committee (TOROC) was later awarded ISO 14001 status.  
 
13 
a system of recognition for sponsors demonstrating environmental commitments, both of 
which were later emulated by many events organizers across the globe (Essex, 2011). 
While the sophistication and comprehensiveness of Olympic environmental planning 
has been growing, in the past two decades host cities have been paying strikingly less 
attention to Olympics-related social concerns, such as failure to involve and benefit 
disenfranchised local community groups, urban slums renewal and gentrification, rising real 
estate prices, and displacement of the underprivileged. Even after the adoption of Olympic 
Agenda 21, social sustainability was not on the radar screen of the Games organizers until 
the very recent experiences of Vancouver and London. Sydney 2000 was the first Olympic 
organizer to use the Games as a celebration of Australia’s multicultural identity and 
aboriginal cultural heritage. The city was able to ease frictions with aboriginal groups by 
involving their community leaders, changing the prevalent negative and stereotypic 
representation of indigenous peoples and thus significantly expanding Olympic constituent 
support.  Building social cohesion, spreading prosperity, regenerating depressed and 
outlying districts and developing their identity were among the main goals of the 2000 
Strategic Plan for Torino (Essex, 2011). However, despite these early accomplishments, 
Beijing 2008 was a major step backwards on the way towards Olympic social sustainability. 
Suffice it to say that at least 1.5 million people were displaced due to Olympic-related urban 
redevelopment (COHRE, 2007).  
Planning for Olympic legacies evolved as another sustainability-related theme in the 
Olympics movement. The legacy rhetoric, which will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section, was shaped by both successful and troublesome experiences of dealing with the 
outcomes of hosting the Olympics. On the one hand, the Olympic Games history include 
examples of remarkable positive legacies of the Olympics. For instance, the 1992 Barcelona 
Games left a rich heritage of revitalized outer limits of the old nineteenth century city. 
Athens 2004 benefitted from the transformation of the city center, creation of pedestrian 
routes connecting major archeological sites, and improvements in public transportation 
network (Gold and Gold, 2011b). Torino (2006) saw a profound transformation from a old 
industrial city, known as “Italian Detroit” (Rosso 2004 as cited in Essex, 2011) to a post-
industrial tourist and tertiary businesses destination with reinstated urban centrality, 
significantly improved public realm, transportation infrastructure and new leisure attractions 
(Essex 2011). In terms of economic benefits of the Olympics, the Los Angeles Games of 
1984 remain exemplary: the Games ended with a surplus of $225 million and contributed an 
estimated $2.4 billion into the Southern California’s economy (Gold and Gold, 2011b). On 
the other hand, the Olympic movement has seen disasters such as the 1976 Montreal Games, 
leaving the legacies of the infamous Montreal Olympic Stadium, which still doesn’t have a 
main sports tenant, and Montreal-Mirabel International Airport, originally envisioned as one 
of the world’s largest airports and later on abandoned as passenger airport, and a $1.5-billion 
debt, which took Quebecers 30 years to repay (“Quebec’s Big Owe Stadium Debt Is Over”, 
2006).   
Having learnt its “big owes”4 and “white elephant” lessons and recognizing potential 
of the Olympic Games to breathe new life into its host cities, the IOC convened the first 
international symposium on the legacy of the Olympic Games in 2002 (De Maragas et al., 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Montreal’s Olympic Stadium was nicknamed “Big Owe”, or “Big Mistake” due to the financial distress it caused the 
Province of Quebec.  
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2003). The IOC held that “the Games bring with them a social responsibility to ensure that 
the organizing cities leave a positive legacy” and that “the IOC is dedicated and committed 
to ensuring that its legacy is the best possible one” (Rogge, 2003). In the same year, the IOC 
incorporated the positive legacy guiding principle in the Olympic Charter, encouraging “the 
Organizing Committees of the Olympic Games5 (OCOGs), public authorities in the host 
country and the persons or organizations belonging to the Olympic Movement to act 
accordingly” (the IOC, 2011b). Importantly, the IOC incorporated the same guiding 
principle in its “Manual for Candidate Cities” and the Host Party Contract, a tripartite 
contract among the IOC, the selected host city and the local organizing committee. From 
2002 onwards, Olympic organizers started placing a greater emphasis on legacy planning in 
their preparatory activities (Furrer, 2002).   
Finally, in order to help Olympic host cities better understand and monitor the 
impacts of the Olympics and plan for the Games that are better integrated into long-term 
balanced urban development and leave positive legacies, the IOC launched the Olympic 
Games Global Impact Project (OGGI) (Holden et al., 2008). The project evaluates the 
effects of the Olympics on the host city, region and nation based on 126 economic, 
environmental and social indicators measured four times – at the very beginning of the 7-
year planning process, in the run-up to the Games, during the event itself, and two years 
after it (Holden et al., 2008). To date, four Olympic organizing committees have joined the 
project - the Vancouver, Beijing, London, and Sochi ones. The IOC also established the 
Olympic Study Commission, whose responsibility is to advise host cities on how to control 
the enormous costs, size and complexity of the Games and give recommendations on how to 
plan for the Games in a more efficient and streamlined way (Furrer, 2002).  
 
 
 1.3 Thesis Question  
 
The recent trends in Olympic planning demonstrate that the Olympic Games are 
quickly moving forward along the path to greater sustainability, constantly improving from 
one host city to the next one. Despite the clashes between the Olympics and the principles of 
sustainable development, recent Olympic host city experiences suggest that it is possible to 
reap urban sustainability benefits from staging the Games. As many authors have argued 
(e.g. Gold and Gold, 2011, Furrer, 2002, Frey et al., 2008, Tziralis et al., 2006, etc.) and as 
the examples of Los Angeles, Barcelona, Sydney, Torino, Beijing and other Olympic host 
cites have demonstrated, the Olympics can galvanize urban regeneration, bring 
environmental benefits and boost local economy. Tziralis et al. (2006) write, “The size of 
the Olympic event and the activities needed for the preparation and hosting of the Games are 
able to act as a catalyst for urban redevelopment, enabling changes that might normally take 
several decades to complete”. This suggests that the same logic can be applied to urban 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The Organizing Committees of the Olympic Games (OCOGs)  - organizations responsible for the organization, day-to-
day management and implementation of the Olympic Games. OCOGs are formed by National Olympic Committees 
(NOCs), to which the IOC entrusts its Olympic mission in the country of the host city. Their executive bodies include the 
IOC members in the country; the President and Secretary General of the NOC; members representing, and designated by, 
the host city; representatives of the public authorities and other leading figures. OCOGs function on a temporary basis and 
dissolve after the Games are over.  OCOGs comply with the Olympic Charter, the contract entered into between the IOC, 
the National Olympic Committee and the host city (Host City Contract) and the instructions of the IOC Executive Board. 
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sustainability transformation. For Olympic host cities, the Games represent a life-time 
opportunity to attract international attention, unprecedented financial resources from upper 
levels of government, investment from corporate sponsors and businesses, to develop new 
policy and planning approaches, to implement expensive, long-term infrastructure projects – 
all of which can lead to greater post-Olympic urban sustainability. The transformational 
effect of the Games has a potential to turn host cities into more environmentally healthy, 
socially equitable and economically developed communities. However, it is only through a 
purposeful, forward-looking, strategic and carefully crafted planning process that desired 
sustainability outcomes may be achieved as a result of an extremely complex 7-year 
Olympic planning period.  
Taking the premise that i) a well-thought and systematic incorporation of 
sustainability principles in the Olympic planning process is paramount for achieving 
sustainability outcomes on the ground and ii) the Olympics can be a catalyst of long-term 
urban sustainability transformation in host cities, this thesis studies how Olympic host cities 
can use the Olympic planning process to achieve lasting sustainability outcomes beyond the 
Games. More specifically, this thesis discusses planning process for ensuring sustainability 
in the Olympics; governance and management practices enabling long-term sustainable 
outcomes; decision-making process leading to sustainability legacies; potential challenges 
and pitfalls on the way to sustainability legacy, and the ways to overcome them.  
 
 
1.4 The Case of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games 
1.4.1 Case Study  
 
This thesis is based on a case study of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games 
and discusses the following aspects: i) Vancouver’s recent experience of integrating 
sustainability agenda in planning for and hosting the 2010 Winter Olympic Games; ii) the 
outcomes of the 2010 Games and any lasting urban sustainability legacies have been 
achieved; and iii) how the city made these outcomes possible from the point of view of 
planning practices and governance set-up. It is particularly interesting to analyze the 2010 
Vancouver Games, because they dramatically raised the bar in integrating the principles and 
values of sustainable development in preparation and delivery of the Olympic Games for 
future host cities and the Olympic family. Announced in 2003 as the world’s first 
Sustainability Games (Holden et al., 2008), the 2010 Vancouver Olympics began a new, 
post-modern era of the Olympic Games, marking their transition from “green” to 
“sustainable”, i.e. paying equal attention to social justice as to environmental protection 
associated with the Games. Vancouver’s Inner-City Inclusivity Commitment Statement and 
the policies that it compelled the City and VANOC to develop and implement, has set new 
standards for addressing social equity concerns in the Olympics. 
Equipped with the case study findings, in conclusion, I discuss how this experience 
can be applied in Sochi 2014 and other future Olympic host cities and what lessons, in terms 
of both good practices and failures, they can learn from Vancouver, given the differences in 
governance models, level of economic development, environmental values, record of 
achievements in sustainability, civil society engagement in decision making and so on, 
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between the countries. Furthermore, I analyze how the IOC can improve its policies and 
operations to prevent future host cities from staging economically, environmentally and 
socially irresponsible Games.  
I limit my analysis to the City of Vancouver proper (“the City”), leaving two other 
host municipalities, Richmond and Whistler, as well as Metro Vancouver outside the scope 
of this thesis. The analysis of the Olympic legacies will thus be limited to the geographical 
area and jurisdiction of Vancouver proper. In my analysis I focus specifically on the City’s 
efforts to plan for greater post-Olympic urban sustainability. I will be discussing other 
Olympic planning stakeholders, such as the IOC, the 2010 Bid Corporation6, Vancouver 
2010 Organizing Committee (VANOC)7, the Province of British Columbia, the Federal 
Government of Canada and others only from the point of view of their relationships with the 
City and how their interactions affected sustainability outcomes. Similarly, I focus 
specifically on those sustainability outcomes that result directly or indirectly from the City’s 
actions.  
 
1.4.2 Method  
 
In putting together the case study, I have used the City policy documents and reports 
by other Olympic stakeholders (VANOC, the Olympic Village developer, etc.) and 
secondary literature on the Vancouver Olympics. I have also conducted 22 in-person 
interviews with the City officials representing the City Council, Mayor’s office, City 
Manager’s Office, Sustainability Group, Olympic Village Project Office, Planning 
Department, Social Development Department, Engineering Services Department and 
Inspections Services Department. I also spoke with the former City Manager of Whistler; 
the Executive Director for Sustainability, as well as a sustainability officer of VANOC; the 
director of the Impact on Community Coalition (IOCC), a key Olympic watchdog 
community organization; and the Executive Director of 2010LegaciesNow, a non-profit 
created to build Olympic legacies in communities across the Province of British Columbia8. 
Keeping in mind that sustainability means different things to different people and 
stakeholder groups, in all my interviews I asked what my interviewees see as sustainable 
Olympics and its legacy; how, in their view, the Olympics changed Vancouver; and whether 
they think Vancouver has become a more sustainable city as a result of hosting the 
Olympics. I inquired about specific mechanisms that, in their view, enabled sustainability 
outcomes; what factors of decision-making and governance were critical for the ultimate 
success of the project; whether and how they were able to control and steer such a 
protracted, multi-stakeholder and enormously challenging process as organizing an Olympic 
Games towards sustainable results.9 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The Vancouver-Whistler 2010 Olympic Bid Corporation was an organization in Vancouver/Whistler that promoted and 
developed the 2010 Olympic Bid. Its Board consisted of influential citizens, businessmen, politicians and sportsmen in 
Vancouver, the Province of British Columbia and Canada.  
7 VANOC was the OCOG that organized the 2010 Games in Vancouver/Whistler.	  
8 See Appendix 2 for a full list of interviewees.  
9 See Appendix 3 for research instruments, including the list of interview questions.  
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1.4.3 Case Study Findings 
 
In terms of environmental sustainability, the 2010 Winter Olympic Games did prove 
to have a transformational effect on Vancouver. The development of the Olympic Village 
has significantly contributed to the City’s urban sustainability learning and improved its 
urban design and planning practices, as well as capacity to develop and implement urban 
sustainability policies. As a result, the City has reconsidered its existing policies and 
regulations with the goal of removing barriers to greater sustainability in the built 
environment, and adopted a whole set of new, more ambitious long-term urban 
sustainability goals within the framework of the Greenest City 2020 initiative. The scale of 
the project was large enough to catalyze transformations in Vancouver’s development and 
construction sector towards more sustainable design and building practices and resulted in 
the involvement of the private sector in the green building policy work conducted by the 
City.  
In the area of transportation planning, the City has seen a sustained increase in transit 
ridership in Downtown Vancouver a year after the Games thanks to a successful public 
transportation experience in the Games-time. The success of the Host City Olympic 
Transportation plan has enabled the City to envision a sustainable transportation future and 
start working towards achieving its ambitious long-term goals. Urban celebrations during 
the Games have improved citizens’ perception of public space, as well as their pedestrian 
and biking experience. Finally, urban environmental sustainability was central to 
Vancouver’s Olympic placemaking strategy and enabled the City to develop its own 
international sustainability brand (VanWynsberghe et al., 2012).  
Importantly, environmental sustainability legacies of the 2010 Olympic Games well 
exceeded Vancouver’s initial bid book commitments, meaning that the City’s dedicated 
efforts to achieve its Olympic sustainability goals have created significant Olympic 
sustainability co-benefits. Thus, being a major 7-year urban planning undertaking involving 
dozens of municipal government staff, the Olympic planning process was capable of 
magnifying the City’s urban sustainability efforts and generate shifts in its values, practices, 
policies and regulations towards more sustainable ones. 
In the case of Vancouver, it proved to be critically important to front-load the 
process of Olympic sustainability planning. As early as the bid conceptualization stage, the 
City got buy-in of the key Olympic stakeholders such as VANOC and senior levels of 
government to include sustainability commitments in the bid book, thus securing a solid 
foundation for its subsequent sustainability planning efforts. To do this, the City used strong 
political leadership to built strategic partnerships with senior governments, while 
emphasizing the need to address local development concerns. To guide its decision-making 
throughout the Olympic planning process, early on in the preparation process, the City 
established and largely managed to live up to important principles, including developing 
lasting legacies, ensuring sustainability benefits, building partnerships, involving 
stakeholders, ensuring public participation, maximizing employee participation, being 
accountable, and creating a positive experience for community.  
Furthermore, the analysis of the Olympic planning process in Vancouver has 
demonstrated that the City managed to ensure sustainable legacies of the Games through a 
highly integrated and coordinated approach to planning, meaningful engagement of 
community stakeholders, public consultation and citizen education. By being visionary, 
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innovative and creative, the City strategically used the Olympic Games opportunity to 
advance its urban sustainability agenda to test its preparedness to a more sustainable future.  
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Chapter 2. How Host Cities Can Plan for 
Post-Olympic Urban Sustainability   
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2.1 The Meaning of Sustainability in the Context of Olympic Games 
2.1.1 Different Visions of Olympic Sustainability  
 
A sustainable Olympic Games is a very new concept. The literature has no consensus 
or clarity about what Olympic sustainability means exactly, how it manifests itself in the 
urban realm, and what is the relationship between the Olympics and urban sustainability. 
Furthermore, sustainability in the Olympics is understood and practiced differently by 
different Olympic stakeholders, both its organizers and potential beneficiaries. In this 
connection, Holden et al. (2011) argue, “local and international actors are giving meaning to 
sustainability in the context of the Olympic Games in different ways, playing 
Wittgensteinian ‘language games’ suited to their scale of operation and particular agenda”. 
The literature suggests that the IOC, OCOGs and host cities take different approaches to 
Olympic sustainability.  
 
2.1.1.1 The IOC  
 
According to Paquette et al. (2011), the IOC regards environmental sustainability as 
its organizational responsibility to reduce negative environmental impacts arising from 
sports events worldwide. Thanks to its overarching environmental sustainability declarations 
and commitments, the IOC's organizational approach to environmental sustainbility 
corrensponds to Raufflet's adaptive Corporate Environmental Management (CEM) model, 
which involves rethinking practices to align an organization with its natural environment 
(Paquette et al. 2011). 
 The Olympic Charter and the Olympic Agenda 21 are the main documents stating 
the IOC’s commitment to the principles of sustainable development. The Olympic Charter 
specifies the IOC’s support for responsible environmental protection and promotion of 
sustainable development in sport as the IOC’s key missions and roles (the IOC, 2011a). 
According to the Charter, it’s the IOC’s task to require that the Games are held accordingly. 
Inspired by the UNCED Agenda 21, and adapted to the characteristics of the Olympics and 
sports movement, the Olympic Movement’s Agenda 21 defines sustainable development 
along the lines of the original Brundtland Report definition: "Sustainable development 
satisfies the needs of the present generation without compromising the chance for future 
generations to satisfy theirs" (the IOC, 1999). The IOC’s Agenda 21 provides some general 
guidance to the members of the Olympic movement on how to integrate the principles of 
sustainable development into Olympic planning. Its approach to sustainability encompasses 
three main themes: 1) improving socio-economic conditions; 2) conservation and 
management of resources for sustainable development; 3) strengthening the role of major 
groups. Using its influence in the world of sports, the IOC appeals to the Olympic 
movement to comply with the Agenda’s main sustainability principles (Samaranch, 1999). 
Thus, being a global phenomenon, the Olympic movement understands its sustainable 
development efforts as having effects on a global scale through policy guidance, awareness 
raising and education. 
In spreading the values of sustainability among international sports society, the IOC 
is also pursuing its self-interests. According to Holden et al., for the IOC, sustainability is a 
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brand that meets societal expectations. It is also a matter of reputation, long-term viability 
and continued relevance of the Games to changing global values. It helps the IOC to 
demonstrate the holistic and comprehensive positive impact of the Games (Holden et al., 
2008).  
Moving from the global to the urban level of Olympic sustainability, the IOC has 
created a number of policy guidelines for Olympic hosts. The Olympic Charter states that it 
is the IOC’s mission to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities 
and host countries. For example, the IOC’s “Manual for Candidate Cities” repeatedly 
mentions post-Olympic use of venues as a significant criterion in the bidding process 
(Furrer, 2002). According to the Charter, the IOC should also control the size and the cost of 
the Games, and encourage OCOGs and public authorities in the host country to act 
accordingly. To do so, the IOC representatives regularly monitor the preparation process, 
making sure that organizers live up to their initial commitments. Realizing that the Games 
have reached a critical size beyond which their sustainability is in serious jeopardy, the IOC 
charged its Olympic Games Study Commission to come up with recommendations on how 
to control the Games’ size, costs and complexity and communicate these suggestions to the 
organizers. Thus, the IOC aims at a more manageable event for host cities to cope with. For 
example, the IOC has already capped the number of sports, events and athletes (Furrer, 
2002).  
The IOC’s Transfer of Olympic Knowledge program (TOK) is designed to support 
cooperation and the exchange of knowledge and best practices exchange among Olympic 
Games organizers in the field of sustainability. Through the TOK program, the IOC 
encourages city authorities and OCOGs to avoid making the same mistakes as their 
predecessors and to plan from a tangible basis, while emulating best practices. The IOC’s 
OGGI project, which has sustainability principles at its heart, helps cities develop a better 
understanding of the Games’ complex impacts and plan Games that are better integrated in 
long-term urban development and leave appropriate legacies (Furrer, 2002). 
Holden et al. (2008) believe that the IOC can encourage Olympic urban 
sustainability through not only inter-city learning and cooperation, but also competition 
amongst would-be host cities. When selecting host cities, the IOC tries to ensure that they 
are capable of meeting world-class sustainability standards and achieving continuous 
improvements in the Olympic events  (Holden et al 2008).  
The literature suggests that the IOC's sustainability policies have little traction. For 
example, Furrer calls the IOC's guiding principle of promoting a positive legacy for 
Olympic host cities “symbolic”. According to Paquette et al. (2011), the IOC's approach to 
sustainability emphasizes many proposed policies, but few to no required standards. Thus, 
very few of the objectives stated in the Olympic Movement's Agenda 21 have been enforced 
(Paquette et al 2011).  
 
  2.1.1.2 OCOGs 
 
As the IOC's franchise units, OCOGs also see delivering sustainability as their 
organizational responsibility (Theodoraki, 2007; Paquette et al., 2011),. Paquette et al. 
(2011) maintain that while the IOC's approach to environmental sustainability reflects an 
adaptive CEM paradigm, OCOGs show an adaptive approach only at the bid stage, slipping 
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into incremental10 and detrimental11 paradigms during the organization and staging phases 
accordingly. Even though at the bid stage, OCOGs do tend to establish environmental 
sustainability strategies, committees, policies and programs, an inadequate amount of 
preparation at the bid stage and organizational discontinuity between the bid and 
organiziational stages12 often result in poor implementation results during the organizational 
and staging phazes. The gap between initial bid committees' environmental pronouncements 
and OCOGs' day-to-day activities can be explained by OCOGs' limited resources, 
capabilities, and structural constraints. OCOGs' failure to comply with the IOC's 
sustainability guidelines can also be explained by the fact that they face no penalties for not 
meeting their own or the IOC's sustainability goals, the implementation of which is not 
legally enforced or overseen by the IOC (Paquette et al., 2011). 
VANOC was the first OCOG to officially adopt sustainability as a guiding principle 
of their operations (Holden et al. 2008). Importantly, it expanded its vision of sustainability 
to include not only the environment, but also social and economic opportunities that 
produced lasting legacies (VANOC, 2010). VANOC came up with its corporate definition of 
sustainability, corporate sustainability mission, vision, values and performance objectives. It 
set and measured key performance indicators (KPIs) to monitor its sustainability progress 
and issued periodic sustainability reports to report on its sustainability achievements and 
challenges to the public (VANOC, 2010). In each report, VANOC provided cumulative 
legacy highlights on each of its performance objectives (VANOC, 2010). Sustainability 
principles were ingrained in both VANOC's strategic long-term planning and daily 
operations, such as procurement, contractual relationships, and sponsorship deals (Coady 
2012, Wilson 2012).  
VANOC defined sustainability as “managing the social, economic and 
environmental impacts and opportunities of our Games to produce lasting benefits, locally 
and globally.” Their mission was “to touch the soul of the nation and inspire the world by 
creating and delivering an extraordinary Olympic and Paralympic experience with lasting 
legacies.” Their vision was “a stronger Canada whose spirit is raised by its passion for sport, 
culture and sustainability.” Sustainability was among VANOC’s core values, along with 
team, creativity, trust and excellence. Its corporate sustainability objectives included: 1) 
accountability; 2) environmental stewardship and impact reduction; 3) social inclusion and 
responsibility; 4) aboriginal participation and collaboration; 5) economic benefits; 6) sport 
for sustainable living. Furthermore VANOC created a new sustainability governance model, 
reporting standards and a sustainable sport event tool kit 
for organizations undertaking major sporting events. (VANOC, 2010). 
 
2.1.1.3 Host Cities 
 
On the one hand, for a host city, the Olympic Games is a burden of hosting a large-
scale one-off event putting enormous pressure on its accommodation stock, municipal 
services and security systems and surrounding natural environment. On the other hand, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 An incremental CEM paradigm presupposes low-level management approach to reduce environmental impact 
11 A detrimental CEM paradigm presupposes that an organization fails to mitigate environmental damage caused by its 
operations and activities.   
12 Bid Committees are replaced by OCOGs after the right to host the Games has been awarded to host cities.  
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hosting the Games is a life-time opportunity to attract massive amounts of investments to 
spend lavishly on the most advanced sustainable technologies and the world’s best 
sustainability experts, to regenerate urban fabric, to rethink its pre-Olympic development 
pattern, and to solve long-standing problems restricting transition towards a more 
sustainable future. Therefore, according to Furrer (2002), Olympic sustainability issues 
should be viewed through the prism of the analysis of the mixture of positive and negative 
effects of the Olympics on a host city and its residents and the long-term implications of 
handling such a legacy.  
Furrer’s (2002) discussion implies that Olympic legacy analysis should go beyond 
the habitual discussion of economic growth and urban renewal opportunities of the Games 
and the burdens of public debt and white elephants. Examination of Olympic outcomes 
should be able to reveal much more subtle, intangible, elusive changes, such as shifts in 
governance models, management practices, government’s approach to decision and 
policymaking, changes in people’s mindset and so on. These intangible outcomes are 
capable of driving long-term sustainability transformations of the host community when the 
economic potential induced by the Olympics is long exhausted (Furrer, 2002). He mentions 
(2002) the following intangible benefits of the Olympics: harnessing and improving skills 
and capabilities among the host community and businesses; opportunity to showcase local 
economy, technological developments and cultural achievements of the host community; 
sense of enthusiasm, community, unity and pride; adoption by host countries of 
internationally accepted practices in areas such as tendering procedures; enforcement of 
laws and regulations; protection of intellectual property; establishment of new 
environmental management and assessment systems; unprecedented cooperation among 
public authorities and between the public authorities and private sector; improved efficiency 
of government bodies, etc. 
Frey et al. (2008) echo Furrer’s findings (2002) in that the Olympic legacy can be 
defined as long-term sustainable legacy and is comprised of both “material factors,” such as 
the effects on employment and the infrastructure and facilities, and “immaterial factors,” 
such as dissemination Olympic values, the increased ability for decision-making and the 
growth of qualified resources, skills and competencies within the hosting area.  
Along these lines, a number of studies are beginning to look at the Olympic legacies 
through the prism of sustainability. A paper by Tziralis et al. (2006) on the sustainability 
impact of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games is “the first attempt to assess the sustainable 
impact of an Olympic event, implementing the methodology shaped by the IOC, namely the 
guidelines of the Olympic Global Impact Project” (Tziralis et al., 2006). The authors (2006) 
found that the 2004 Olympics had a strong catalyst effect on the regional economy, driving 
up employment and spurring the growth of construction and hospitality sectors in a scale 
larger than the overall growth of the national economy. From the point of view of the 
environment, the 2004 Games resulted in a massive upgrade of the urban public transport 
system and road network with an ensuing decrease of atmospheric pollutants (Tziralis et al., 
2006). The study, however, did not touch upon the social equity aspect of sustainability.  
An assessment of the 2006 Torino Olympics on local dimensions of sustainability 
and development by Frey et al. (2008) goes beyond discussing “material” dimensions of 
sustainability and analyses how a responsible Olympic planning process can enhance 
governance and accountability in a host community – the “immaterial” legacy that can 
provide the necessary ground for a sustainable growth of hosting areas over time. The use of 
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pioneering sustainability reporting, environmental  management and the Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA) systems during the planning of the Torino 2006 Games 
significantly improved stakeholder engagement and participation process and dialogue; 
accountability and transparency of government decision-making; community consultation 
process; and relationships among public and private parties and communities. In particular, 
the Olympic planning process with its new sustainability requirements underscored the 
importance of involving territorial stakeholders such as local institutions, practitioners, 
community groups, volunteers and neighboring municipalities, for responsible and 
accountable decision-making (Frey et al., 2008).  
To sum up, an overview of the literature suggests that Olympic sustainability from a 
host city’s perspective is defined by the long-term effects that the Games have on its 
environment, economy and society, both tangible and intangible. For a host city, the notion 
of Olympic sustainability is inextricably linked with the legacies the Games leave behind 
and manifests itself in a bewildering complexity of the interrelationships and tradeoffs 
among the “three E”13 aspects of sustainability. The triple bottom line approach can be used 
to examine the outcomes and evaluate sustainability legacy of the Olympic Games.  
 
 
2.2. How Can Host Cities Plan for Long-Term Post-Olympic Sustainability 
2.2.1 Olympic Legacy Planning 
 
There is a growing understanding among host cities and Olympic practitioners that 
the Olympic legacies need to be planned. Dansero et al. (2003) say, “The Olympic legacy, 
like all legacies, is formed by what the organizers decide to pass down to their heirs. As such 
[…] it needs a will that should be in the form of a detailed program of what the organizers 
want to remain in the territory, in the environment, in people’s thinking process and 
memory”.  
Recognizing the complexity and vagueness of the notion of Olympic legacies, 
Gratton and Preuss offer a useful framework to analyze the impacts of the Games in a more 
structured way (Gratton and Preuss, 2008). This framework offers three dimensions of 
Olympic legacies: 1) the degree of planning involved in achieving certain Olympic 
outcomes (planned/unplanned); 2) the degree of their desirability (positive/negative; 3) the 
degree of their materiality (tangible/intangible). Gratton’s and Preuss’s (2008) framework 
thus suggests that Olympic organizers need to maximize planned positive tangible and 
intangible legacies.  
 Existing literature offers some insights into how the Olympics can be planned in a 
way that leaves meaningful local community development legacies. VanWynsberghe 
defines Olympic legacy planning as the process that enables the creation of legacies, which 
speak back to the issues a city identifies before bidding for the Games and challenges it 
wants to address as a result of having the Games (VanWynsberghe, personal 
communication, January 16, 2012). Dansero et al. (2003) and Gratton and Preuss (2008) 
stress the importance of planning the event from beginning to end, i.e., from the idea 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The “three E” aspects of sustainability include Environment, Economy and Equity.	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discussion and feasibility evaluation stage, through the candidature and construction and 
organization process, and through the event itself, to the post-Games period, when long-term 
legacies materialize. Ritchie (2000) contends that “careful and realistic planning is essential 
in order to realize positive, rather than negative legacies”. He emphasizes the importance of 
imbedding the event in a broader process of city development (Ritchie, 2000). According to 
Ritchie (2000), legacies should be envisioned and planned for through a comprehensive, 
rigorous and visionary process that involves all relevant stakeholders, considering as much 
relevant information as possible. Legacy planning must understand and build upon the 
values of local residents and ensure their broad-based support and desire to “host the world.” 
Olympic event should also be as regional as possible, drawing as many proponents and 
participants as possible and promoting social understanding and community cohesion among 
them. Finally, legacy planning should take into account the fact that community enthusiasm 
quickly dies away and an event gets “cold” once it is over. Therefore, any commitments 
should be solidified prior to the event itself (Ritchie 2000).  
According to Burbank et al. (2001), urban Olympic outcomes are a function of the 
capabilities of local leaders to negotiate satisfactory terms for the host city, to maintain 
alliances over an extended time period, to engage in boundary-spanning activities with the 
goal of influencing private and third-sector decisions, and to obtain resources from state and 
federal governments. It is also important to address questions of access, representation, 
responsiveness and accountability (Burbank et al., 2001). 
 
2.2.2. Social Leveraging of the Olympics 
 
The focus of Olympic planning has recently shifted from a retrospective legacy 
evaluation to a purposeful, intentional and pro-active leveraging of the event to achieve 
desired outcomes. Chalip (2006) discusses sports as an instrument to foster social change 
and value, particularly through a sense of communities and interaction, feeling of 
celebration, enabling solidarity, creating informal social opportunities and so on (Chalip, 
2006). He calles it the “social leveraging” of the Olympics. VanWynsberghe et al. (2012) 
later applied the framework of the social leveraging of sports to government and government 
policy and explored how social change can be galvanized by Olympic-related government 
policies (VanWynsberghe et al., 2012).  
VanWynsberghe et al. (2012) contend that being a powerful opportunity for 
attracting government funding, corporate investment and international attention, the 
Olympics offer a perfect opportunity for various levels of governments to leverage the city’s 
moment on the global stage to achieve specific policy objectives. The authors show how, by 
using the Games as a vehicle, governments attempt to amend, fast-track or generate new 
policies, curriculums, community programs and demonstration projects (VanWynsberghe et 
al., 2012). Importantly, these findings echo the study by Frey et al. (2008) in that the 
Olympics can be used not only as an economic growth generator and urban revitalization 
tool, but also a driver of intangible changes in the society, such as improvements in 
government practices, approach to governance, policy and decision-making and so on. 
These immaterial shifts can prove more important drivers of long-term urban sustainability 
than immediate impacts of the Olympics on the urban economy and physical realm. 
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2.2.3 Planning for Sustainability Legacies 
 
Planning for Olympic sustainability has recently emerged as an important theme in 
the Olympic legacy planning. While there is still a lot to understand about sustainability 
effects of the Olympics and how they can be enhanced, consensus is starting to shape around 
the main Olympic sustainability planning and policy strategies, such as greater inclusion of 
community groups, especially disenfranchised ones; ensuring genuine public participation; 
minimization of environmental impacts and so on.  
Olympic Movement’s Agenda 21 provides some general guidance on the means to 
achieve greater Olympic sustainability. In terms of environmental sustainability, it calls for 
minimization of adverse impacts on the biosphere; conservation of areas and the 
countryside; energy, water and materials saving; use of environmentally friendly 
technologies and green building design techniques; use of local resources; promotion of 
public transport; minimization of waste; etc. It stresses the importance of conducting 
environmental impact assessments prior to launching any Olympic construction projects. 
Under the socio-economic theme, the Agenda 21 addresses important social sustainability 
topics of combatting exclusion and improvement of human habitat. It highlights the 
importance of involving local population in staging the events and making sure that they 
derive socio-economic and health benefits from it. According to the Agenda, Olympic 
Games can and should enable reduction of poverty and inclusion of underprivileged groups 
into sports activities. It calls for designing and building the necessary sports facilities in such 
a way as to “ensure their harmonious integration into the local context” and “providing a 
boost to local housing strategies, not forgetting the poorest members of society”. More 
broadly, the Agenda underlines the importance of inclusion of all interested groups, 
especially indigenous populations, women and the youth and ensuring a democratic process 
of Olympic decision-making (The International Olympic Committee, 1999). 
Furrer’s (2002) analysis of sustainable Olympics suggests that a better combination 
of Olympic benefits and burdens is more likely to happen if certain sustainability conditions 
are met and key contradictions and challenges involved in the Olympic planning process are 
addressed. In terms of sustainability conditions, he discusses six key goals:   
Equality, which means sharing of Olympic risks and burdens, as well as benefits and 
opportunities by the largest number of host-citizens, regardless of their social stratum and 
geographical location.  
Strategic planning, meaning that the Olympics should be used as an opportunity to 
address serious urban and regional challenges and improve the life of all citizens. The 
Games should be integrated in the long-term strategy of urban development  and serve as not 
as a one-off boost, but as a catalyst for long-term activities and improvements.  
Responsible resource management, meaning that financial, social and environmental 
resources must be spent in such a way as to safeguard and possibly improve socio-economic 
integrity, eco-system health and life support systems of the host city and region.  
New form of urban sustainability governance, characterized by integrity and 
transparency of decision-making, accountability in the management of public resources, true 
public consultation throughout the planning process, constructive handling of opposition.  
Sustainability monitoring and reporting as an important aspect of accountability and 
transparency, which helps maintaining dialogue with a diverse audience of the Games, 
including investors, local residents, etc.  
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Sustainable venue design, including two main considerations - planning Olympic 
venues for multiple purposes and long-term use and using temporary infrastructures.  
Risk and impact mitigation, including the use of risk management and adverse 
impact mitigation strategies.  
In addition to Furrer’s (2002) understanding of sustainability conditions, Frey et al. 
(2008) believe that partnerships and social networks are indispensable for long-term 
sustainability of Olympic host cities. They write (2008), “since the possibility of a 
comprehensive positive legacy (e.g., material and immaterial) relies upon a close 
collaboration and a strong synergy between the institutional, economic and social parties, 
only by building a long-termed ‘social network’ can a legacy provide the necessary ground 
for a sustainable growth of hosting areas over time.” The authors underline that 
sustainability is a collective effort and building as many partnerships as possible between the 
private and public sectors, between the government and community and among public 
authorities, reflecting the diverse interests of the actors involved is necessary to ensure it. 
In addition to ensuring that sustainability conditions are met, the controversial and 
formidable character of the Olympic planning process suggests that Olympic planning 
decisions should be informed by and based on the understanding of the opportunities and 
challenges that the Games provide. For example, the concentration of public funds in one 
host city represents a life-time opportunity to solve long-standing issues of insufficient, 
outdated or inefficient urban infrastructure. On the other hand, gigantic spending on venues 
and related infrastructure can be questioned from the point of view of opportunity cost, tax 
burden, intergenerational and regional equity and so on. Spatial concentration of venues may 
be advisable in order to capture economies of scale and serve organizational needs. 
However, spatial clustering is controversial when one takes into account regional equity and 
the needs of local residents. By the same token, fast track development demanded by the 
Olympics can accelerate bureaucratic decisions-making on vital issues, force project off the 
ground, break administrative barriers, contribute to streamlining government procedures, etc 
(Furrer, 2002). At the same time, it can cause unhealthy centralization of power and 
decision-making, which may prevent local authorities from comprehensive community 
consultation, lead to a tokenistic approach to public participation and accountability and 
result in discouragement or complete rejection of any dissent from other Olympic 
stakeholders (Owen, 2001). Hasty preparation for the Olympic Games may be used by city 
entrepreneurs seeking to satisfy their private interests and paying little attention to public 
welfare (Hall, 2006). Furthermore, temporary concentration of the Olympic means that the 
needs of a two-week event might be prioritized at the expense of the permanent and long-
term needs of the host city. If the risks associated with the Olympic planning are properly 
accounted for and hedged against and the Olympic opportunities are captured, the Games 
“can serve as a leverage for positive change, reaping some concrete benefits for the majority 
of residents” (Furrer, 2002). 
  
2.3 Chapter Conclusions 
 
Olympic sustainability is understood and practiced differently by different Olympic 
stakeholders depending on the scale of their operations and mandate. The IOC sees Olympic 
sustainability as an overarching value of the Olympic family, and a matter of its 
international reputation and relevance to a changing global policy agenda. For OCOGs, 
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sustainability is part of their organizational responsibility in delivering the Games and 
managing Olympic operations. For host cities, Olympic sustainability means a better balance 
of Olympic burdens and benefits. Importantly, the equation of Olympic burdens and benefits 
includes not only tangible legacies such as immediate economic gains and urban 
regeneration, physical infrastructure and venues, which are usually cited in the literature on 
the Olympics, but also intangible changes such as improvements in governance structures, 
management practices, local governments’ skills and institutions’ capacity, people’s 
behavior and psychology, development of innovative policies and so on. These outcomes 
have been less explored and understood. A better balance of Olympic burdens and benefits 
can drive long-term urban sustainability transformations in Olympic host cities. 
Good Olympic legacies need to be planned. It takes conscientious and visionary 
planning efforts to host the Games in a way that fosters lasting urban sustainability benefits. 
Olympic host cities should be both strategic and ingenious to take full advantage of a life-
time Olympic opportunity to attract the world’s media and spectator attention, 
unprecedented financial resources from senior levels of government, and funding from 
corporate sponsors and local businesses, and implement expensive, long-term urban 
infrastructure upgrade and construction projects. To arrive at a better mix of Olympic 
legacies, host cities should have a clear understanding of how the Olympics can help them to 
solve existing urban development problems and integrate the Games into a longer-term 
urban development strategy. Olympic legacy planning requires the involvement of all 
relevant stakeholders. Local governments should be accountable to and cater for the needs 
of its constituency while building partnerships with the private sector, securing resources 
from senior levels of government and negotiating favorable Olympic contract terms. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Hosting the 2010 Games proved to be a seminal event for Vancouver. It has touched 
the souls of millions of people in Vancouver and across Canada. The Games have left them 
with a unique feeling of national and community pride, unity and patriotism (Judd, 2011; 
Godfrey, personal communication, January 17, 2012; Fugman, personal communication, 
January 17, 2012; Moscovich, personal communication, January 12, 2012). Indeed, there 
were plenty of reasons for the nation to come together as one: Canada had successfully 
staged the Games; the Canadian National Olympic Team had won the largest number of 
gold medals among other participating country teams; and the National Hockey Team had 
become Olympic champions on home soil.  
 Furthermore, the Games had profound effects at individual and family level 
(Laclaire, personal communication, January 14, 2012; Dewar, personal communication, 
January 13, 2012; Edwards, personal communication, January 13, 2012). For Vancouverites, 
the Olympics was a unique opportunity to get together as a family (Laclaire, personal 
communication, January 14, 2012), educate kids about other countries, cultures and 
languages and motivate them to do sports (Edwards, personal communication, January 13, 
2012). A lot of people changed their lives by getting involved in rewarding volunteering 
projects, trying new occupations, developing new hobbies, skills and career paths (Dewar, 
personal communication, January 13, 2012). In the end, living through the Olympic 
experience made even its opponents support the Games (Godfrey, personal communication, 
January 17, 2012; Fugman, personal communication, January 17, 2012; Laclaire, personal 
communication, January 14,  2012).  
The Olympics changed the physical space of Vancouver. The Olympic Village, built 
on the south shore of False Creek, Vancouver’s last undeveloped valuable piece of land next 
to Downtown, has propelled the development of the whole SEFC area, which will eventually 
become home to 16,000 residents (The Challenge Series, n.d.; The City of Vancouver, 
n.d.(e)). Today, the Village has a 45,000 sq.ft. community center, day-care, public plaza, 
shops, and restaurants (The City of Vancouver, n.d.(h)) (See Figure 3 below)  Vancouver’s 
Convention Center, a 1.1 million sq.ft. (or four city blocks) facility with spaces for meetings, 
banquets, conferences and exhibitions, have strengthened the Waterfront area and nicely 
complemented neighboring Canada Place for convention facility offerings (Vancouver 
Convention Center, n.d.; Xiaonan and Cambell, 2010).  
The Olympics also left a remarkable legacy of newly built and renovated venues 
including Vancouver Olympic Center at Hillcrest Park, a curling and aquatic center facility; 
Britannia Training Venue, renovated to serve as the official training venue for men’s 
hockey; Killarney Training Venue, renovated to serve as the training venue for short-
track speed skaters; Trout Lake Training Venue, upgraded to serve as a training facility for 
figure skaters; Pacific Coliseum at Hastings Park, rehabilitated to host figure skating, ice 
dance and short-track speed skating events. All these venues have been converted into 
vibrant community, sports and recreation centers and are being enjoyed by the community 
(Moscovich, personal communication, January 12, 2012; Edwards, personal communication, 
January 13, 2012).  
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The ‘look-of-the-city’ legacies include numerous public art pieces around key 
venues and locations (Toderian, 2010). Developed as permanent installations, they are now 
integrated into the urban realm, making the City more visually appealing (Toderian, 2010). 
The art installation integrated in the architectural design of the SEFC Energy Center is a 
great example of an inventive and educating use of public art. LED lights, incorporated in 
the utility’s finger-like exhaust stacks, change colors 
following fluctuations in energy demand – from blue in 
times of a low energy demand to red at times of a high 
demand (see Figure 1 on the right )	  (Vancouver Green 
Capital, n.d.) 
The psychological effects and physical legacies of 
the Olympics are just few examples of the profound 
changes created by the Games in the City of Vancouver. 
Some changes were for the worse, some were for the 
better. Some outcomes the City of Vancouver envisioned 
in its bid book and planned, whereas some outcomes 
were unintended. This chapter attempts to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the environmental, social and 
economic outcomes of the Games generated by the City’s 
Olympic functions. In particular, this chapter dwells on 
lasting sustainability benefits of the Olympics or lack of 
thereof.   
  
 
 3.2 Economic Impacts 
 
Long term effects of the Games on the City’s economic sustainability are yet to be 
seen. The economic impacts of the Vancouver Olympics will take years and even decades to 
fully unfold. They will be determined by the long-term balance of economic benefits and 
burdens produced by the Games. Olympic benefits can arise from potentially sustained boost 
of the local economy from increased tourist and visitor spending, larger tax revenues, new 
jobs, capital spending by the three levels of government and VANOC, as well as potential 
business, trade and investment opportunities generated by Vancouver’s international 
exposure. Olympic burdens on Vancouver’s economy will result from the public debt 
incurred by the City to complete the construction of the Olympic Village, as well as 
potentially reduced provincial and municipal financing of other socially important programs 
due to the constraints of their respective budgets stretched by the Olympic spending. Any 
potential long-term economic sustainability benefits of the Games will most likely be 
overshadowed by the financial crisis of 2008 and resulting economic downturn, which has 
been tormenting Vancouver ever since then.  
 
3.2.1 Economic Benefits 
 
The Games’ potential to stimulate economic growth in host cities is arguably a 
raison-d’etre of the Olympics and was therefore an important factor in Vancouver’s decision 
Figure 1 SEFC Energy Center. Source: 
The Center for Sustainable Practice in 
Arts. Retrieved from 
http://www.sustainablepractice.org/  
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to pursue the Games (Meggs, personal communication, February 21, 2012). In the short run, 
the Games injected US$600 million into Vancouver’s economy, raising economic growth by 
0.8% and creating 18,660 jobs  (the IOC, 2011b; Lee and Imprey, 2011). Inner-city 
businesses got $5.7 million in Games-related procurement opportunities (VANOC, 2010). 
According to the IOC, consumer spending in Vancouver and Whistler increased by 48% 
during the Games (the IOC, 2011a). The IOC (2011a) also reports that international visitors 
spent US$115 million on their VISA credit cards during the 17 days of the Games. In terms 
of incremental government spending,14 in 2003-2010 the Games brought US$3.48 billion to 
the entire Province of British Columbia including construction (US$1.26 billion), operations 
(US$1.54 billion) and tourism (US$230 million) (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011).15 One 
could expect that a lot of this spending directly benefitted the City of Vancouver.  
Longer-term economic legacies of the Olympics will arise years after the Games. In 
the long-run, Vancouver might benefit from a potential of sustained increase in the number 
of tourists and leveraged trade and investment relationships. An increase in tourism might 
potentially result from the international exposure Vancouver got from the Olympics. 
Furthermore, a potential for long-term business development have been created by 
municipally-led programs and initiatives showcasing local goods and hosting business 
leaders from all over Canada and the world from a range of sectors such as tourism, energy, 
entertainment, transportation, and media. These initiatives created opportunities for ‘face-to-
face connections between carefully selected senior business decision makers’, which 
‘represent the initial step in a process of relationship building and due diligence which can 
lead to new investments, increased exports and new partnerships’(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2011). For example, Metro Vancouver Commerce 2010 Business program, a strategic, 
broad-based partnership of businesses and different levels of governments in mainland cities 
of B.C., designed to leverage the opportunity of the Games, have produced over US$300 
million in economic benefits and created 2,500 jobs one year after the Games (Western 
Economic Diversification Canada, 2011). 
Still, despite some good outcomes discussed above, potentially due to the economic 
downturn and budget overruns, the Olympics failed to generate economic benefits, which 
had been initially expected and promised to the citizens of British Columbia. The results of 
the 2002 Olympic impact study announced by the B.C. Premier Gordon Campbell suggested 
that the Games would be able to generate up to US$10 billion in immediate benefits for the 
regional economy (InterVistas Consulting Inc., 2002; Mackin 2011). However, in reality the 
Olympics brought only about US$2.3 billion to the Province of B.C. in the period of 2003-
2010, which is only 1.5% of the Province’s 2010 GDP and five times less then what the 
Province originally promised (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011; Mackin, 2011).  
 
3.2.2 Economic Burdens 
 
The Games ended up costing the three levels of government, VANOC and other 
Olympic stakeholders approximately US$6 billion, whereas, according to Vancouver’s bid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Incremental spending is expenditures occurring in B.C. by non-B.C. residents, businesses and levels of government. It is 
considered to be a more meaningful estimation of the extent to which the Games stimulated the economy than gross 
impacts, since it represents spending that otherwise wouldn’t have occurred in the region (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011).  
15 As of now, corresponding data is not available at the municipal level.  
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book, the total non-OCOG (the City, Province and private sector) and OCOG Olympic 
budget was originally slated to be US$1.7 billion (Haddow, 2010; Vancouver 2010 Bid 
Book, 2002). Olympic security was an example of significantly understated Olympic 
expenses. Over US$1 billion was ultimately spent on ensuring safety during the Games, 
while the initial 2002 estimate was a mere US$175 million (Austen, 2010a). Given these 
enormous costs, it is still unclear whether the Games will break even in the medium to long 
run.  
The biggest burden of the Games for Vancouver was a US$ 1 billion public debt, 
which the City had to incur to complete the Olympic Village. The situation around financing 
the Olympic Village was a “perfect storm” (Hiebert, personal communication, January 15, 
2012). The 2008 credit crisis forced the key financier of the Village to pull out of the project 
leaving its developer broke. Over and above the financial crisis, the project was 
experiencing significant cost overruns due to rising construction prices and technical 
difficulties in installing green measures. To avoid the embarrassment of hosting athletes in a 
half-built village, the City had to step in and bail the project out (Hiebert, personal 
communication, January 15, 2012). As a result, what was supposed to be a multimillion-
profit project, turned into a biggest boondoggle in Vancouver’s history overnight (Judd, 
2011). Ironically, it is the city taxpayers that are “on the hook” for this extravagant 
undertaking (Lamy, 2010).  
Despite all the criticisms of the Olympic Village project and its grim prospects, 
things are starting to look better. While at the moment, the City is renting out or sitting on 
most of the most expensive, US$1-2 million condos waiting for the market to recover, as of 
October 2011, the overall development occupancy rate reached 74%, with modest market  
and affordable housing 97% occupied and 91% of commercial spaced leased out (The City 
of Vancouver, 2011). With 40% of market-priced condos yet to be sold, it is unclear whether 
the market will rebound to such an extent, as to allow the city to fully recoup its costs. 
Meanwhile, the amount of funds borrowed by the City for the Village has already been 
reduced to US$446 million from the initial US$1 billion (The City of Vancouver, 2011).  
After the Olympics, Vancouver has seen cuts in the provincial and municipal 
financing of social services such as education, sports, health care and arts (Austen, 2010b). 
For example, in 2010, schools in B.C. were faced with significant funding shortfalls (“B.C. 
Teachers Face Layoffs In Funding Crunch”, 2010). In Vancouver, 800 teachers with less 
than five years of seniority were warned about the possibility of lay-offs (“B.C. Teachers 
Face Layoffs In Funding Crunch”, 2010).  
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3.3 Environmental Impacts 
 
The Olympics has given rise to rapid development of urban sustainability policy in 
Vancouver in the areas of energy efficiency, green design and building, district energy, 
urban design and agriculture, as well as to systematic rethinking of existing legislation with 
the goal of removing barriers to greater sustainability of the built environment. Most of these 
policy initiatives were informed by a great amount of learning acquired by the City from 
developing the Village (Moscovich, personal communication, February 13, 2012), as well as 
a fundamental change of business-as-usual practices in the urban construction domain. 
Furthermore, emboldened by the success of the Olympic Village project, the City has 
adopted ambitious long-term urban sustainability goals and action plans within the 
framework of the Greenest City 2020 Initiative. The implementation of the Host City 
Olympic Transportation Plan has led to a shift in travel behavior of Vancouver citizens 
manifesting itself in a sustained increase in transit ridership the City saw a year after the 
Olympics. An unprecedented Olympic sustainable transportation trial has enabled the City 
to experience, envision and start 
planning for a sustainable 
transportation future beyond the 
Games. Such a major acceleration 
of urban sustainability 
policymaking induced by the 
Games turned out to be much more 
what the City hoped to achieve by 
incorporating environmental 
sustainability considerations in the 
Olympic bid. However, it would be 
erroneous to call these outcomes 
unintended, since they came out 
from the City’s dedicated Olympic 
village planning and design efforts. 
Rather, these are important urban 
sustainability co-benefits of the planned Olympic urban sustainability strategies.  
 
3.3.1 “The Most Sustainable Neighborhood on Earth” 
 
The Olympic Village (see Figure 2 above) was the City’s key sustainability 
commitment included in the bid book. The City promised to develop “a model sustainable 
community” on “land historically used for industrial purposes”. The Village would 
“revitalize this underdeveloped part of the City and serve as a catalyst for sustainable 
community development” (Vancouver 2010 Olympic Bid Book, 2002). The City made a 
commitment to explore innovative renewable energy, water management, green building 
design and urban agriculture technologies as part of the Olympic Village development with 
the view to apply them on a wider scale (Vancouver 2010 Olympic Bid Book, 2002).  
In terms of environmental sustainability aspects of the Olympic Village project, the 
City ended up exceeding the original bid commitments by a wide margin. All its Olympic 
Figure 2 Southeast False Creek Olympic Village. Source: False 
Creek Real Estate. Retrieved from http://faslecreakrealestate.ca 
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venues were built or renovated in accordance with the highest LEED green building 
standards. Several weeks before the Games, the U.S. Green Building Council proclaimed the 
Olympic Village in Southeast False Creek (SEFC OV) the world’s greenest, most energy 
efficient and sustainable neighborhood on Earth. The Village received the highest LEED-
ND cumulative score (The City of Vancouver, n.d.(e)) of all green neighborhood projects 
around the world. 
 
Figure 3 The Olympic Village Plan. Source: The City of Vancouver. Retrieved from 
http://vancouver.ca/olympicvillage/about.htm 
Vancouver’s Olympic Village features a great variety of innovative green building 
and design approaches. Its tight, curbless streets encourage invite more walking and 
encourage strong neighborhood connectivity and integration. The development features very 
urban, mid-rise, mixed-use buildings with strong at-grade expressions and transparent 
circulation systems, such as hallways and stairs, which enliven and animate the streets and 
surrounding public space. The Village is a high-density development (3.5 FAR16), which is 
supported by a district energy system, run by a neighborhood energy utility (NEU) – SEFC 
Energy Center. The system provides space heating and domestic hot water using the 
technology of sewer heat recovery from untreated urban waste water. The system also 
utilizes surplus energy generated by solar thermal modules located on the rooftops of three 
buildings of the Olympic Village (Toderian, 2009b). The first system of its kind in North 
America, it can be readily adapted to other renewable sources, allowing it to keep pace with 
technological process and remain affordable (Vancouver Green Capital, n.d.). The 
development’s passive design measures include green roofs, exterior common spaces, thru-
units and other natural ventilation technologies, etc. Urban agriculture is seamlessly 
integrated into building and public spaces design. Finally, SEFC OV is noted for Canada’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Floor-area ratio 
 
36 
first net-zero multi-apartment residential energy building, which generates as much energy 
as it uses (Toderian, 2009b). 
Indeed, SEFC OV has set new standards for urban environmental sustainability not 
only within the Olympic movement, but also on the global scale. But perhaps more 
importantly for the City of Vancouver, the development of the Olympic Village has become 
a driver of even bolder urban environmental sustainability aspirations of the City. 	  	  
3.3.2 Legacy of Urban Sustainability Policy 
 
Vancouver has always been ahead of its time in North America in terms of urban 
sustainability. Back in the late 1960s, Vancouverites said ‘no’ to American-style freeways 
and urban renewal projects (Toderian, 2009a). As early as the 1970s, when the last industrial 
factory had left the shores of False Creek, the planners and architects of Vancouver 
conceived a residential community “with car-free village squares and bike-filled greenways; 
a place to raise children, with mixed uses and mixed incomes […] It seems so obvious now, 
but was so radical then” (Gordon Price as cited in the Challenge Series). Following Expo 
’86, “Vancouverism”, an urban planning and architectural approach characterized by mixed-
use developments and narrow, high-rise residential towers with commercial uses on the 
ground floor, became a symbol of high-density urban living (Boddy, 2005). In 1990, the 
City issued “Clouds of Change”, a landmark report, which contained measures aimed at 
improving air quality in Vancouver and addressed such issues as emissions, transportation, 
energy and land use. In the 2000s, the City was systematically adopting increasingly stricter 
regulations and improving its policies in the areas of energy efficiency, green building, use 
of public transport, sustainable urban development (e.g. 2005 Climate Action Plan, 2005 
Green Building Strategy, 2008 Ecodensity Plan).  
However, it was the SEFC OV project that have truly revolutionized the way the 
City thought about urban sustainability (Toderian, 2010). SEFC OV project manager says: 
 
We’ve learned an awful lot from SEFC. The City has changed its approach to 
sustainability – because of the learning, we’ve decided to declare ourselves a 
sustainable city. We’ve created an office of sustainability, we have our urban food 
policy which I would suggest came from SEFC, and it was because of SEFC that the 
City of Vancouver became involved in promoting green buildings and the work that 
contributed to the formation of LEEDTM BC and the Canada Green Building 
Council. (Smith as cited in the Challenge Series, n.d.) 
 
 Inspired by the success of the Olympic Village project, the City launched the 
Greenest City 2020 Initiative and issued the corresponding Action Plan. Greenest City 2020 
is a manifesto of Vancouver’s ambition to: 
 
• secure Vancouver’s international reputation as a mecca of green enterprise by 
doubling the number of green jobs and businesses by 2020;  
•  eliminate dependence on fossil fuels and reducing GHG emissions by 33% from 
2007 levels by building more district renewable energy systems; 
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• lead the world in green building design and construction through requiring all 
buildings constructed after 2020 to be carbon neutral in operations and reducing 
energy use and greenhouse gas emissions in existing buildings by 20% over 2007 
levels; 
• make public transport, walking and cycling preferred transportation options;  
• create zero waste; 
• become a global leader in urban food systems, etc. (The City of Vancouver, 
2012).  
 
Given its pre-Olympic sustainability achievements, Vancouver would have probably 
envisioned the Greenest City future and set the above-mentioned targets sooner or later even 
without the Olympic Village project. Nonetheless, the Village has majorly accelerated 
policy development and furthered Vancouver’s sustainability policymaking seven years 
ahead of its time (Moscovich, personal communication, February 13, 2012). Moreover, the 
Greenest City initiative was central to Vancouver’s Olympic place-making and branding 
strategy, potentially enabling the City to maximize benefits from its extensive Olympic 
investments (VanWynsberghe et al., 2012). The sections below take a closer look at specific 
aspects of the Olympic legacy of urban sustainability policy in Vancouver including green 
building, energy planning, urban design and agriculture, and sustainability governance.  
 
3.3.2.1 Green Building 
 
The green building policy work that the City is currently doing is based on a lot of 
learning that came out of the Olympic Village project (Moscovich, personal communication, 
February 13, 2012). It has helped the City to identify existing by-laws that created barriers 
for green building and resulted in 27 by-law amendments, which have improved the overall 
environmental performance of Vancouver's new building stock (The City of Vancouver, 
2009b). For example, after experimenting with floor-space exclusions for passive design 
measures, which removed a serious cash disincentive for developers to install green 
measures, the City is now providing, as part of its innovative policy legacy, height relaxation 
for solar power and green roofs, floor space exemption for better insulation and recycling 
facilities, and space relaxations for solar shading devices (The City of Vancouver 2009; 
Toderian, 2010). The goal of mandatory carbon neutrality of all buildings constructed after 
2020 became feasible after experimenting with the first net zero-carbon building in SEFC 
OV and figuring out technological and economic challenges and possibilities associated with 
it. The City was also able “to do more research and test new things” to further tighten 
Vancouver building code17 (Moscovich, personal communication, February 13, 2012). 
The Olympic Village has also changed the way the City is now approaching new 
developments, especially large-scale ones. For example, in 2008 the City required that all 
rezonings for new buildings above certain size must achieve a minimum equivalent of 
LEED Silver rating. (Moscovich, personal communication, February 13, 2012). In 2011, this 
requirement was raised to LEED Gold. In addition to this, starting from 2008, for all 
rezonings that involve land of two or more acres, the City has required a business case 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The Building Code in Vancouver is stricter than the federal and provincial one.  
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analysis to be conducted by a qualified green energy consultant with the goal of exploring 
the feasibility of campus or district energy systems, incorporation of passive energy 
solutions and urban agricultural opportunities. For new developments, the City has also 
required a sustainable rainwater management plan, sustainable transportation demand 
management strategy, solid waste diversion strategy, as well as a share of non-market, 
affordable housing (The City of Vancouver, 2010b).  
 
3.3.2.2 Energy Planning 
 
SEFC Neighborhood Energy Utility (NEU) is another important Olympic 
sustainability legacy in Vancouver. According to a city engineer in charge of energy 
planning in SEFC, the whole project was possible thanks to the Olympics: SEFC OV 
provided enough demand and load for the neighborhood utility system and energy center to 
be technologically feasible and economically viable. Without the sustainable Olympic 
Village mandate, the city wouldn’t have been able to embark on such a challenging and 
expensive large-scale project.  
Today, the City requires all new developments in SEFC to be connected to SEFC 
NEU. In other neighborhoods, the City requires new rezoning projects and developments to 
be connected to hydronic low-carbon heating systems if such systems are available. In case 
these systems are currently unavailable, all new developments must be designed in such a 
way, as to allow connection at a future date. Currently, most residential houses in 
Downtown Vancouver use electrical heating systems, which are cheaper for developers to 
install, but are three times less efficient than hydronic ones. The new requirement will thus 
be a significant improvement compared to the pre-Olympic business-as-usual practice 
(Haley, personal communication, March 19, 2012).  
On a city-wide scale, Vancouver has committed to transition to low-carbon systems, 
including biomass facilities and legacy steam heat systems. The City is planning to switch 
its existing heat systems from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources (Haley, personal 
communication, March 19, 2012). As part of a citywide district energy study, the City is 
currently estimating thermal energy demand potential, mapping redevelopment areas that are 
suitable for district energy systems, and working with large GHG emitters to explore 
opportunities of switching to low-carbon heat sources (Vancouver Green Capital, n.d.). The 
challenge the City energy planning specialists are faced with now is figuring out ownership, 
operation and financing schemes for district energy systems in high-density urban 
environments, as well as strategies to ensure stakeholder acceptance of such projects18 
(Haley, personal communication, March 19, 2012).  
 
3.3.2.3 Urban Design 
  
According to the City, the SEFC OV project has motivated Vancouver planners to 
explore new forms of urban density. The Village has marked the City’s transition from 
‘Vancouverism’ to lower, human-scaled mid-rise buildings separated by narrow streets, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Local residents have raised concerns about aesthetic and air quality characteristics of biomass plants supporting some 
hydronic heating systems.  
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intimate plazas, parks and public open spaces (Hein, personal communication, February 20, 
2012; The City of Vancouver, 2009b). The Olympic Village has also shifted the way the 
City approaches designs streets. Thanks to the Olympic Village, the City has become aware 
of the importance of giving priority to pedestrians and cyclists over personal vehicles, 
building streets with high quality materials, making streets curbless, tree-lined and capable 
of draining rainwater at the surface (The City of Vancouver, 2009b).  
 
3.3.2.4 Urban Agriculture 
 
According to the City, the Olympic Village has pushed the boundaries of urban 
agriculture showcasing how to integrate urban agriculture and high-density living 
(Millenium Challenge Series, n.d.). In the SEFC OV development, community gardens have 
moved to roof tops gardens and balconies, backyards and streets from parkland plots. It was 
a successful example of putting community health values ahead of expensive real estate and 
overcoming a perception that urban agriculture is impossible in high-density developments 
(Rob Barrs as cited in the Challenge Series, n.d.).  
SEFC OV has also raised the bar of urban agriculture’s community building 
potential. The Community Garden Demonstration project has showed that community 
gardening “is not only about providing little plots for people to garden. Rather, it is a space 
that is programmed with the school, community center and neighborhood for all to use and 
to learn about urban agriculture” (Robin Petri as cited in the Challenge Series, n.d.). 
Furthermore, in the Olympic Village, community gardens were envisioned hand in hand 
with a community kitchen and site plan provision for a farmers’ market (The Challenge 
Series, n.d.).  
Another important urban design achievement of SEFC OV has been showcasing how 
urban agriculture can be beautifully integrated in the design of buildings, parks, gardens and 
plazas which has dispelled the perception of urban agricultural areas as being “weed patches 
with timber retaining walls” (The Challenge Series, n.d.).   
Summarizing urban agriculture experience of SEFC OV, Rob Barrs says: “This 
project has educated the planning, design and building industry to include urban agriculture 
in their projects.” (Rob Barrs as cited in the Challenge Series, n.d.). The next step for the 
City is to better understand how to integrate urban agriculture into closed-loop systems (The 
Challenge Series, n.d.). 
 
3.3.2.5 Urban Habitat 
 
SEFC OV project has been illuminating for the City from the point of view of 
restoring urban habitat (The City of Vancouver, 2009b). Thorough the environmental 
remediation and decontamination of the SEFC site, cleaning of the False Creek waters and 
development of innovative storm water management and urban wetland systems, the City 
has been able to bring wildlife back to Vancouver. In 2009, herring eggs were found on 
Habitat Island – for the first time in the modern era. Eagles and herons have been recently 
found to be roosting in the trees (The Challenge Series, n.d.). Finally, a whale have been 
recently noticed in False Creek next to the Village, which was an ultimate reward for the 
habitat restoration work in SEFC (Moscovich, personal communication, February 13, 2012).  
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3.3.2.6 Green Building Industry Transformation 
 
According to the City, the Olympic Village development with its 1.5 million square 
feet of green building space, has had a transformative influence on Vancouver’s local 
construction, design, architecture and development industries in terms of educating them 
about green building practices and raising their own design and building standards (The City 
of Vancouver, 2009b). All in all, the project has given an innovative green building 
experience to 1,500 construction workers and hundreds of designers and professionals (The 
City of Vancouver, 2009b). In this regard, one of the private sector participants of the 
project says: 
 
This project definitely raised the capacity of the industry locally. With the size of this 
project, there were many contractors and sub-trades involved, so it gave them the 
ability to learn from one another, and the application of these technologies became 
more familiar. Education on how to do these things was definitely part of the project  
(The Challenge Series, n.d.). 
 
3.3.2.7 Sustainability Governance 
 
In the opinion of Moscovich, one of the key outcomes of the Olympic Village project 
has been the establishment of Sustainability Group. Today, it is a branch of the City of 
Vancouver whose responsibilities include climate protection, green building and 
incorporating sustainability principles in all aspects of running and building the city (The 
City of Vancouver, n.d.(j)). The department has 16 full-time staff working on urban 
sustainability every day. It is the backbone of sustainability governance in Vancouver, 
which had not existed before the Olympic Village project started (Moscovich, personal 
communication, February 13, 2012).  
The City reports that the experience of developing the Olympic Village has fostered 
collaboration between the City, developers, builders, residents, community organizations 
and designers (The City of Vancouver, 2009b). Local building and development industry 
continues to be at the table with the City’s Sustainability Department as it is working out the 
way towards becoming the Greenest City by 2020 (Moscovich, personal communication, 
February 13, 2012).  
The City’s approach to urban sustainability design and planning has also 
significantly improved as a result of the Olympic Village experience. The Olympic 
requirements of excellency and quickness has enabled the City to adopt a highly integrated 
approach to planning and design, while ensuring as much constructive community 
engagement and peer review as possible (Toderian, 2009b). Toderian (2009) writes, “at the 
end of the day we had many observations and learnings that have helped with the continuous 
improvement around our design review process”. In Hein’s view, the Olympic Village has 
shown a potential for a place-based design tailored to the specific features of the 
development and its context, as opposed to the standard process of rezoning application 
review (Hein, personal communication, February 20, 2012).  
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3.3.3 Sustainable Transportation 
3.3.3.1 Olympic Transportation Experiment 
 
The sustainable transportation legacy of the Olympics has turned out to be over and 
above Vancouver’s original commitment to run the Games based on “a sustainable, multi-
modal transportation system in which the use of the automobiles will be actively 
discouraged.” (Vancouver 2010 Bid Book, 2002). The lasting urban sustainability outcomes 
of the Games include a sustained increase in transit ridership, a great amount of learning 
acquired by the City from the Olympic transportation experiment, and the establishment of 
ambitious long-term sustainable transportation development goals.   
Vancouver’s Olympic sustainable transportation strategy built upon the City’s 
previous efforts to develop a sustainable transportation system. In 1997 the City adopted the 
2021 Transportation Plan, which included measures such as limiting overall road capacity to 
the 1997 level, providing more comfortable walking and biking environments, increasing the 
provision and use of transit, and calming traffic in the City’s neighborhoods. As a result, by 
2007 the City had seen the number of walk trips increase by 44%, bike trips by 180% and 
transit trips by 20%. The number of cars entering Vancouver fell by 10% over the 1997 level 
(The City of Vancouver, 2006b). 
The Host City Olympic Transportation Plan (HCOTP), which was entirely based on 
sustainable transportation modes and integrated multi-modal solutions and heavily restricted 
private car use and parking during the 17 days of the Olympics, took the Vancouver’s 
sustainable transportation achievements further. The Games-time statistics demonstrated an 
overwhelming public preference for sustainable modes of transport: compared to the average 
2009 levels, the number of trips to Downtown more than doubled, vehicle trips reduced by 
almost 30%, and single occupancy trips dropped by over 40%; 61% of trips to Downtown 
were made by sustainable modes of transport compared to 43% in 2009; during peak 
periods, almost 80% of all visitors took transit, cycled or walked to Downtown during the 
Games (The City of Vancouver, 2010c). For the City, this was an outstanding success in 
terms of delivering on its Olympic bid commitments.  
A gigantic spike in transit ridership (a 250% growth in the Games-time and 19% 
growth in 2010 compared to 2009) was not just a temporary, Olympic-related phenomenon. 
In 2011, the City saw a 5% increase in transit use over the abnormal 2010 (Laclaire, 
personal communication, February 14, 2012). In other words, the Olympic sustainable 
transportation experiment has brought about a longer-term shift in the travel behavior of 
Vancouverites. The Olympics have made people experience transit differently. Laclaire 
describes the positive energy on trains and buses, lots of smiling faces, spontaneous singing 
of the Canadian hymn, citizens mixing with visitors from around the world and sharing their 
experience and so on (Laclaire, personal communication, February 14, 2012). This new 
experience has demonstrated that transit can be a powerful social interaction and 
community-building driver, not just a means of getting around.  
A sustained growth in transit ridership and a change in public perception of transit 
and other sustainable modes of transport can thus be considered key long-term sustainable 
transportation legacies of the Games in Vancouver. Back in 2002, at the bid 
conceptualization stage, the City probably could not have envisioned such stellar outcomes. 
However, as the preparation for the HCOTP went forward, the City became hopeful about 
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the potential of the Olympic transportation trial to create long-term sustainability effects. 
Laclaire says:  
 
The experience was exactly what we hoped, that people would experience the city in 
a way where it was moving a lot more people with less cars and that would be the 
lesson. We kept thinking of the Olympics as an example to create a legacy. And now 
that we have this example, and that people have lived through it and experienced it 
here, they are now believers, whereas before they didn’t see how that was possible. 
Having had this experience, people could see that it was ok living without a car. 
(Laclaire, personal communication, February 14, 2012) 
 
Staging the Olympics has generated other important urban sustainability co-benefits. 
The event has turned out to be opportune to gauge Vancouver’s readiness for a more 
sustainable transportation future. Brent Toderian called the Olympic transportation plan 
“North America’s largest traffic trial ever.” (Toderian, 2010). According to Toderian, 
HCOTP has demonstrated the potential of the entire mobility system transformation, as well 
as the powerful effects of mode shifts, while also dispelling many urban car-dependency 
myths. (Toderian, 2010). The Host City Transportation Monitoring system, which was 
designed to track the progress of the Olympic transportation strategy, ended up providing 
previously unavailable, valuable data for the post-Games evaluation and analysis. Shortly 
before and during the Games, the City conducted detailed venue surveys and counts at a 
number of Downtown entry points on all major bridges, roads and transit systems for all 
modes of transport. After the Olympics, the City is now carrying out detailed “Downtown 
Screenline” counts of ridership on all modes of transport every year. This data is extremely 
helpful in developing future sustainable transportation policies (Laclaire, personal 
communication, February 14, 2012).  
The amount of learning generated by these data collection efforts, as well as the 
“can-do” attitude developed by the City as a result of living through the Olympic 
transportation experiment, have enabled it to develop a new long-range transportation plan 
with targets up to 2040. Toderian (2010) describes it as follows:  
 
[This trial] gives us a special snapshot picture of a potential future for our city as we 
continue to move rapidly to more sustainable modes of travel. As we work toward an 
updated transportation plan for the downtown and broader city, the massive 
amounts of data, and the general change in perception and attitudes from this 
temporary transformation, may end up being the most powerful legacy from these 
Olympics. I strongly believe nothing will ever be the same in how we perceive traffic 
and movement in our city after this. 
 
3.3.3.2 Canada Line   
  
Canada Line of the Metro Vancouver Transit System is a brand new line connecting 
the heart of Vancouver Downtown with Vancouver International Airport, the Olympic 
Village and Municipality of Richmond. It comprises 12 miles of track and 16 stations, with 
three additional stations to be built in the future (Wikipedia, n.d.(a)). 
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There are different views on whether the construction of Canada Line should be 
considered an Olympic infrastructure project. Critics of the project believe that Canada line 
was built specifically for the Games to make Olympic venues easily accessible for tourists, 
increase the profile of the Vancouver airport and meet the needs of frequently flying local 
businessmen, rather than the City poor (Shaw, 2008). The City counters this argument by 
saying that Canada Line had been mapped out in the City’s transportation plans long before 
Vancouver decided to bid for the Games. The decision to complete the project before the 
Olympics was made to avoid construction during the Games, which could have caused 
disruption along the Canada Line corridor, where important venues were supposed to be 
located (Laclaire, personal communication, February 2014, 2012). 
Olympic project or not, Canada Line was an important component of the Olympic 
transportation plan. During the Olympics it was carrying 200,000 to 250,000 passengers a 
day – more than double its usual ridership (Laclaire, personal communication, February 
2014, 2012). In the longer term, Canada Line has solved overcrowding and inefficiency 
problems on 14 bus routes previously operating along its corridor (Laclaire, personal 
communication, February 2014, 2012). It has also helped attract additional 50,000 riders a 
day from outer regions of Vancouver and neighboring Richmond (Laclaire, personal 
communication, February 2014, 2012). Today, the line moves 5,000 people per hour (about 
110,000 per day) with the expansion potential of up to 15,000 riders (Laclaire, personal 
communication, February 2014, 2012; Wikipedia, n.d.(b)). In rush hours, the trains and 
platforms are crowded, which prompted the critics to blame Vancouver Transportation 
Department of “thinking too small” (Laclaire, personal communication, February 2014, 
2012). However, the City sees overcrowding during peak hours as a sign of the transit’s 
health and long-term viability (Laclaire, personal communication, February 2014, 2012).  
  
3.3.3.3 Transformed Public Realm and Pedestrian Experience 
 
The transformation of pedestrian experience and citizens’ perception of public realm 
was another important co-benefit of staging the Olympics in Vancouver. In longer term, 
lessons learned from the Olympic street celebrations and activities have prompted the City 
to adopt pedestrian-oriented programs. 
The LiveCity project launched by the City in the Games-time was meant for people 
to enjoy the Olympic entertainments, such as big-screen sports broadcasts, sponsor and 
country pavilions, international houses and other outdoor celebtrations – all for free. Also, 
expecting and planning for a huge influx of people in Downtown, the City decided to close 
seven main Downtown streets for traffic and make them pedestrian only. During the two 
weeks of the Games, these streets were always full of people and bustling with activity (The 
City of Vancouver, n.d.(d)). Given that the City lacks plazas in the Downtown, both these 
initiatives has proven to be revolutionizing from the point of view how people perceive 
public space and city streets (Toderian, 2010). In Toderian’s words (2010), Olympics-
related “urban happenings” have ignited the City and become “examples of great urbanism 
on display’. In his blog, he writes: 
  
Canadians and international visitors have come together to create a fantastically 
friendly and passionate street scene that never seems to stop. Olympic officials are 
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saying that perhaps only the Sydney Summer Olympics is comparable in terms of the 
energizing of the city’s public, and public realm. It is absolutely thrilling to see and 
experience and may very well permanently transform our mind-set as a city and 
citizenry about our streets and public spaces – another huge legacy of these Games. 
Already it has re-ignited the discussions on pedestrianizing our Granville Street and 
many others, sparked discussions on a much bigger sidewalk patio culture, and on 
and on. (Toderian, 2010).  
 
Building on the successful experience of the Olympics, in the summer of 2009 the 
City launched the Open Streets program. The program involves regular temporary closing of 
selected Vancouver main streets in four different neighborhoods with the goal of creating a 
space for citizens to explore and rediscover familiar streetscapes, feel a renewed sense of 
community, meet new people, engage in healthy activities and use sustainable forms of 
transportation (The City of Vancouver, n.d.(f)). In the summer of 2010, the Open Streets 
program expanded to include Rediscover Granville19 initiative, which opened up five blocks 
of Granville street to pedestrian activities, including art and dance classes, concerts, street 
hockey, markets, exhibitions and so on (The City of Vancouver, n.d.(g)).  
 
3.4 Social Impacts 
 
The long-term social sustainability legacy of the Games was far more modest. In 
fact, there was very little to none, if compared to the initial public expectations about the 
potential of the Games to address existing social development challenges in Vancouver. 
These expectations were based on the inclusion of social responsibility statements in the 
Olympic bid book. Although the City has largely been able to protect existing rental housing 
stock, critical for the needs of Vancouver’s poorest, and managed to prevent Olympic-
related gentrification and displacement processes, the key bid book commitment of creating 
a meaningful affordable housing legacy has not been fulfilled. Furthermore, the City has left 
only 8% of the Olympic Village units for the City’s homeless in contrast to its initial plan of 
securing 33% of units for “core needs” of Vancouver’s inner city residents. The good 
outcomes potentially include greater municipal and provincial government’s attention to the 
needs of Vancouver’ underprivileged ones (Laviolette, personal communication, February 
14, 2012) and stronger and more united civil society and community groups 
(VanWynsberghe, personal communication, February 2016, 2012). Furthermore, the multi-
stakeholder dialogue about affordable housing issues in Vancouver, which was started in 
2006 to deliver on the Olympic social sustainability commitments, has continued in 2012.  
 
3.4.1. Background 
 
The Downtown East Side (DTES) neighborhood has been Vancouver’s acute pain 
and most pressing social equity and development challenge for decades. The neighborhood 
is known as ‘Canada’s poorest postal code’ with a predominant population of low-income 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Granville Street is Vancouver’s main downtown entertainment spot, where a lot of nightclubs, restaurants, bars and 
boutique shops are located.  
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singles, and is plagued by many typical inner city problems such as extreme poverty, 
homelessness, drug addiction, sex trade, HIV infection, crime, violence, unemployment and 
loss of businesses (Wikipedia, n.d.(b)). The situation was exacerbated by massive 
deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill in the 1980s, the development of a large open drug 
market, increasing rents and loss of inexpensive housing, such as SROs (singly room 
occupancy) in residential hotels due to gentrification (Wikipedia, n.d.(b)). At the same time, 
DTES boasts a large number of community organizations, social agencies and activist 
groups, as well as residents who take pride in their neighborhood and have a great volunteer 
ethic (The City of Vancouver, 2009a). The City and Province have been active in 
implementing long-term measures aimed at improving community health and safety, 
provision of affordable housing and encouraging economic development (The City of 
Vancouver, n.d.(b)). 
 
3.4.2 Affordable Housing Outcomes20  
 
To address social equity challenges in Vancouver, key Olympic stakeholders, 
including the City, the 2010 Bid Corporation, and the Province, developed the“2010 Inner-
City Inclusive Commitment Statement” (ICICS), which stated the goal of an inclusive 
approach to planning and implementing the 2010 Games through maximizing the 
opportunities and mitigating potential negative impacts and creating a strong foundation for 
sustainable socio-economic development in Vancouver’s inner-city neighborhoods, such as 
Downtown Eastside, Downtown South and Mount Pleasant. In particular, the document 
guaranteed adequate housing and rental stock and protection against eviction or 
displacement, as well as a legacy of affordable housing. There are provisions about setting 
up a “full and accountable consultations process” that ensures inner-city residents’ input to 
decision-making process. The Statement also contains a large number of provisions on the 
creation of business, employment and procurement opportunities for Vancouver’s inner city 
residents, which VANOC was responsible for and largely delivered on 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011; VANOC, 2010). Finally, in the ICICS, the City committed 
to converting a portion of the athletes' village into affordable housing. Essentially, it was 
these commitments upon which Vancouver citizens accepted the terms of hosting the Games 
and welcomed the Olympics in the plebiscite. The ICICS created a lot of public expectations 
of the Olympic affordable housing legacy, as well as concern about the needs of 
Vancouver’s inner city residents.  
 
3.4.2.1 Affordable Housing in the Olympic Village 
 
The share of affordable housing in the Olympic Village project was an issue of a 
heated and bitter debate throughout the Olympic planning process. Originally, the Village 
was planned as an ideal mixed-income, inclusive community capable of compensating for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Before going into the discussion of the Olympic affordable housing outcomes, it should be noted that affordable housing 
policy in Vancouver is shaped by the Federal, Provincial and Municipal governments. The Federal Government is  
responsible for funding housing co-operatives and aboriginal housing. In 2007, the Province took over administration and 
ownership of the rest of the Federal affordable housing portfolio. It is the Province that funds, develops and manages 
affordable housing. The City provides sites and some grant funding for affordable housing projects. The City also acts as a 
regulator and policy-maker.  
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any potential displacement effects of the Olympics. Until 2006, the Official Development 
Plan (ODP) of SEFC OV had required two-thirds affordable housing, with a full half of that 
set aside for “deep core” housing needs (The City of Vancouver, 2005). In other words, 33% 
of the SEFC OV project had been devoted to the needs of the homeless and those at 
immediate risk of homelessness (The City of Vancouver, 2005). The City’s vision has been 
especially forward-looking taking into account the fact that the inclusionary zoning 
regulations at that time required only 20% of affordable housing in new development 
projects (Moscovich, personal communication, February 13, 2012).  
However, in 2007, a new mayor reduced the share of affordable housing from the 
promised 66% to 20%, or 252 units (False Promises on False Creek, n.d.). From these 252 
units, only 8% were set aside for the “core need” dwellers, meaning that the original ODP 
promise was reduced from 33% to mere 8% (False Promises on False Creek, n.d.) (see 
Figure 4 below). When the crisis hit and the developer of the Olympic Village had to pull 
out of the project, the City staff recommended that the “core need” share be reduced to zero 
and that all 252 units of affordable housing be sold off at market prices to make up for 
City’s financial losses incurred as a result of rescuing the project (Antrim, 2011). It did not 
happen only thanks to the last-minute plea of affordable housing organizations (Antrim, 
2011). To make up for the record of broken promises, the City injected $32 million into its 
affordable housing program, to ensure that the 252 affordable housing allocation target 
could be met (The City of Vancouver, 2010a). 116 of those units were saved as “core need” 
provincial shelter-rate housing (The City of Vancouver, 2011). 
 
	  	  
Figure 4. Broken housing legacy promises. Source: False Promises on False Creek Community Action. Retrieved from 
http://falsecreekpromises.wordpress.com/false-promises/ 	  
3.4.2.2 Affordable Housing Outcomes of the ICICS 
 
Despite the high Olympic hopes associated with the inclusion of the ICICS in the bid 
book, the Olympic partners (VANOC, the City and the Province) failed to build any 
significant amount of affordable housing in Vancouver during the Olympic planning 
process. The Inner-City Inclusive Housing Table, a multi-stakeholder process convened in 
2006 by the City and VANOC to develop the implementation plan for the housing related 
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commitments outlined in the ICICS,21 urged the partners to build 800 units of affordable 
housing each year before the Games, i.e., 3,200 units by 2010, which could be the the 
affordable housing legacy of the Olympics (Report of the Inner-City Inclusive Housing 
Table, 2007). However, for a number of reasons discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, 
neither the City nor the Province took actions to meet these demands.  
Some good outcomes included the purchase of 1,800 SRO units (22 SRO hotels) and 
their renovation by the Province following the recommendation of the Housing Table (The 
IOC, 2011a). The City has recently secured 14 sights for affordable housing projects, which 
the Province has allocated funding for (Johal, personal communication, March 28, 2012). 
The Province has also pledged to allocate US$3.9 million in operational funding for the 
Covenant House Emergency Shelter (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). The Government of 
Canada pledged to provide over US$380 million for homelessness and housing programs in 
2009-2014. Thus, there is a potential for more affordable housing to be built in Vancouver in 
the future. These good outcomes might have been caused by extensive exposure of 
Vancouver’s inner city problems to the media in the Games-time, which compelled the 
government to allocate more resources to affordable housing programs and make up for its 
broken promises (Johal, personal communication, March 28, 2012; Mauboules, personal 
communication, February 16, 2012; Laviolette, personal communication, February 15, 
2012).  
Another important outcome of the affordable housing negotiations within the 
framework of the ICICS, was a stronger and more united civil society and community 
groups in Vancouver (VanWynsberghe, personal communication, February 16, 2012), as 
well as greater responsiveness on the part of the City’s Social Planning Department 
(Mauboules, personal communication, February 16, 2012). In 2012, the City is seeing the 
affordable housing dialogue continued. Vancouver’s Mayor Gregor Robertson has convened 
a special Task Force on Housing Affordability in Vancouver and charged it with identifying 
barriers to the creation of affordable housing in Vancouver and developing recommendation 
to remove them (The City of Vancouver, n.d.(a)). Similar to  the Olympic Housing Table, 
the new Task Force includes a broad range of representatives, including community 
organizations, groups representing the First Nations, tenants associations, housing non-
profits, as well as building and real estate sector representatives (The City of Vancouver, 
n.d.(a)). 
 
 
3.4.2.3 Existing Low-Income Housing Stock 
  
In order to protect the existing affordable housing stock, in 2003, the City passed a 
number of regulations, including the SRA22 by-law managing the rate of demolition and 
conversion of the SRO stock. The by-law requires the level of investment in new and 
renovated units to be sufficient to maintain the one-for-one replacement rate. In 2006, the 
City increased the SRA conversion/demolition fee from $5000 to $15,000. These fees went 
to the reserve fund for the creation of replacement housing (The City of Vancouver, 2003). 
The regulatory approach taken by the City to protect the existing rental housing stock was in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The Housing Table will be discussed at length in Chapter 4. 
22 Single Room Accomodation 
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line with the recommendations of the Housing Sector table (Report of the Inner-City 
Inclusive Housing Table, 2007). 
There are different views on whether the City’s efforts to protect the existing inner 
city housing stock and prevent displacement of the homelessness were successful. The 
City’s Social Planning Department believes they accomplished the task (Mauboules 2012). 
On the other hand, the Impact on Community Coalition (IOCC), a key Olympic watchdog 
organization, reports that over 1,300 SROs in East Side hotels were lost in the process of the 
preparation for the Olympics and the City therefore failed to ensure that SROs had been 
replaced at a one-to-one rate (Delisle, 2010; Johal, personal communication, March 28, 
2012). Furthermore, the Games’ opponents believe that the Games have exacerbated the 
homelessness issue in Vancouver (Shaw, 2008). For example, according to the Metro 
Vancouver Homeless Count in 2011, the total number of homeless was 2,576, which is more 
than a two-fold increase since 2002 (Metro Vancouver Homeless Count, 2012). Shaw 
maintains that the loss in SRO units during the Olympic planning process have contributed 
to the increase in the number of homeless people in Vancouver’s streets (Shaw, 2008, p. 
208). Conversely, the Social Planning department believes that the spike in homelessness  
 
could not be attributed directly to the Games. Larger trends such as global 
economic downturn, slowdown in construction and other factors, are more likely 
causes of homelessness and poverty. (Mauboules, personal communication, March 
30, 2012)  
 
3.5 Chapter Conclusions 
 
In Vancouver, the lasting urban sustainability outcomes of the 2010 Games include: 
 
• reconsideration of existing policies and regulations to remove barriers to greater 
sustainability of the built environment; 
• adoption of ambitious long-term urban sustainability goals within the framework of 
the Greenest City 2020 initiative;  
• a surge in urban environmental sustainability policies and regulations in the areas of 
energy efficiency, green design and building, district energy, urban design and 
agriculture, etc.; 
• a sustained increase in transit ridership following the implementation of the Host 
City Olympic Transportation Plan; 
• rethinking of public space, including the City’s Open Streets Program.  
 
More “physical” urban sustainability legacies include: 
 
• the Olympic Village, the most sustainable neighborhood in the world according to 
the LEED-ND rating, which has set new, advanced standards for all new 
construction in Vancouver and beyond and will continue to bring the benefits of 
improved energy efficiency, residential comfort, and urban experience, reduced 
household costs and enhanced urban ecology; 
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• Canada Line of the Metro Vancouver transit system, which, according to the City’s 
estimates, is going to carry an increasing number of riders in the future; 
• Neighborhood Energy Utility system, which will support all future developments in 
the area and has catalyzed similar solutions around the city; 
• LEED-certified former Olympic venues, which have been turned into community 
centers and will support community sports and recreation for years to come.  
 
In addition to these legacies, the 2010 Games gave rise to several important 
outcomes that have a potential to drive long-term urban sustainability. They include: 
 
• improved expertise and capacity of the City to formulate and implement urban 
sustainability policies, as well as better design and planning practices generated by 
the learning from the Olympic Village development; 
• transformation of Vancouver’s building design, development and construction 
sector towards greener, more sustainable practices generated by learning from the 
Olympic Village development; 
• an improved dialog and cooperation between the City and building design, 
development and construction sector in the development of the goals, policies and 
regulations of the Greener City 2020 Initiative; 
• “can-do” attitude towards urban sustainability developed by the City as a result of 
the successful Olympic Village development and realization of the Host City 
Olympic Transportation Plan. 
 
These are the positive outcomes of the Games that the City did not originally commit 
to in the Olympic bid book. However, it would be wrong to call these important policy 
outcomes unintended. Rather, these are Olympic sustainability planning co-benefits, which 
came out of the City’s dedicated Olympic village planning and design efforts. Therefore, a 
major lesson for future Olympic host cities to learn is that the Olympics, as a major urban 
planning undertaking, is capable of magnifying a host city’s urban sustainability efforts 
beyond its initial plans and bid book commitments. A 7-year planning process involving 
dozens of municipal government staff, can generate a major shift in their values, practices, 
policies and regulations towards greater long-term sustainability.  
Given Vancouver’s pre-Olympic sustainability achievements and its general 
predisposition to sustainable living, the Greenest City initiative and other policies would 
have happened anyway, but probably years later. The Olympics have majorly accelerated 
decision and policymaking with regards to urban environmental sustainability in Vancouver. 
The Olympics have profoundly changed the City’s “business-as-usual” operations regarding 
built environment and transportation. Today, the Greenest City policy directs citizens’ post-
Olympic momentum to individual actions that enhance the collective well-being and 
prosperity of the City” (VanWynsberghe et al., 2012). 
Importantly, the Games also enabled the City to “develop its own sustainability 
brand to attract international audiences” (VanWynsberghe et al., 2012). Thus, urban 
environmental sustainability was central to Olympic placemaking in Vancouver, enabling 
the City to “make changes that enhance its ability to compete internationally in the growing 
market of economic, environmental, and social sustainability” (VanWynsberghe et al., 
2012).  
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Unfortunately, in terms of social sustainability, similar transformations did not 
happen as a result of the Games, despite the high hopes of the civil society and bid book 
commitments. The biggest frustration of the 2010 Games had to do with the unfulfilled 
promise of affordable housing legacy, which the City was deeply in need of. The reduction 
of the originally promised affordable housing share in the Olympic Village was another 
source of public disappointment. On the other hand, despite some losses of SRO units 
reported by the IOCC, the City was largely able to protect existing housing stock from a 
speculative gentrification and the inner city poor from displacement and evictions. 
Furthermore, as a result of increased media and civil society attention to Vancouver’s inner-
city problems, as well as public disapproval of the City’s record of broken promises, the 
three levels of government have recently allocated sites and funding for a number of 
affordable housing projects to be built in the future.  
Importantly, active involvement of community-based organization in the planning of 
Olympic affordable housing legacies and protection of rental housing stock has resulted in a 
stronger civil society and a more responsive City government. Both the City and community 
representatives commended the Housing Sector table for its important contribution to a 
dialogue and joint problem solving efforts to address affordable housing issues in 
Vancouver. In 2012, the City has continued a multi-stakeholder dialogue on the affordable 
housing problem in Vancouver: Mayor Gregor Robertson has convened Housing 
Affordability Taskforce to identify measures needed to remove barriers to the provision of 
more affordable housing in Vancouver.  
As far as economic sustainability is concerned, it is still too early to make any final 
conclusions about the impacts of the Games on the City’s economy. They will take years 
and even decades to fully unfold. Furthermore, in a study of Olympic economic impacts, one 
needs to take into account profound negative effects of the 2008 crisis. In the short term, the 
2008 global credit crunch has contributed to the financial mismanagement of the Olympic 
Village project, and a US$1 billion public debt the City incurred as a result. 
A comprehensive analysis of social, economic and environmental outcomes of the 
2010 Vancouver Games has demonstrated trade-offs among them. The installation of 
cutting-edge green measures significantly drove up the costs of the Olympic Village 
construction, contributing to the project budget overruns. To prop-up the developer in times 
of financial trouble, the City had to resort to the Public Endowment Fund established to 
finance social housing projects. Furthermore, as the financial situation around the 
development of the Olympic Village was deteriorating, the City was reducing  the number of 
affordable housing units in the Olympic Village.  
An study of the outcomes of the 2010 Vancouver Games has also shown that 
Olympic sustainability planning is still overly focused on the environmental aspects of it. 
The Games remain an enormous financial burden and still hardly contribute to social equity 
in host communities.  
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Our ability to do our best and get the most from our involvement in this undertaking 
depends on effective planning and preparation 
(The City of Vancouver, 2006) 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
  
The leading business and political circles of the Vancouver-Whistler area and the 
Province of B.C. have long believed that hallmark, signature events were critical to the 
economic development of the region (Meggs, personal communication, February 21, 2012). 
In 1986, a small, closely-knit business community strongly advocated for hosting the World 
Expo as a means to overcome the recession of the 1980s (Meggs, personal communication, 
February 21, 2012; Shaw, 2008, p. 6). Expo 86’ put Vancouver on the world map, opened 
the City to Asian markets and majorly spurred the development of the Downtown (Wilson, 
personal communication, January 20, 2012). Having seen the benefits of a mega-event and 
expecting windfall profits from renewed international attention and inflow of rich foreigners 
to the City, real estate and business elites of Vancouver and Whistler formed the Vancouver-
Whistler Olympic Bid Society and began to pursue the 2010 Winter Olympics with the 
blessing of the key political figures in the provincial government (Shaw, 2008).  
The initiation of the Olympic project in Vancouver is a typical example of host 
cities’ entrepreneurial “growth elites” using the Games to gain a competitive advantage in 
the global economy (Burbank et al., 2001; Hall, 2006). Vancouver’s initial motivation to 
pursue the Olympic Games clearly illustrates Molotch’s “city as growth machine” theory 
(Molotch, 1976). In this paradigm, Olympic bid committees are a tangible manifestation of 
host cities’ growth regimes, putting emphasis on consumption-based development and 
growth-oriented policy agenda (Burbank et al. 2001), not urban sustainability.   
In previous North American Olympic host cities, where Olympic bids were initiated 
and sustained by the elements of their growth regimes, the interests of businesses dominated 
in the policy initiatives undertaken; public control and policymaking integrity was 
threatened; accountability and responsiveness of local government deteriorated; public-
private partnerships tended to be manipulated by investor interests; and citizens were largely 
left out of the decision-making process (Burbank et al., 2001). Such a process clearly 
violates the principles of planning for sustainable development and did lead to poor Games’ 
outcomes in Atlanta and Salt Lake City (Burbank et al., 2001).   
Despite the early signs of an entrepreneurial, business-driven and growth-oriented 
Olympic planning process, this scenario never unfolded in Vancouver thanks to some 
planning and decision-making mechanisms the City put in place to ensure compliance with 
sustainable development principles and achieve good Olympic outcomes. This chapter looks 
at some general strategies the City used to be able to integrate urban sustainability 
considerations in the Olympic documents and operations. In addition to the discussion of the 
general strategies of Olympic sustainability planning, this chapter tells a story of how the 
City planned its most important sustainability outcomes, including the Olympic Village and 
the financial arrangements surrounding it, Olympic transportation, Canada Line, and 
affordable housing. In each planning story, I dwell on the most important aspects of the 
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planning process that might have contributed to the lasting urban sustainability legacies 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
 4.2 General Strategies of Sustainability Planning 
 
Having stated in the Olympic bid book its commitment to sustainability principles, 
the City was faced with a challenge to live up to its promise of hosting economically, 
socially and environmentally responsible Olympics and ensure sustainable legacies of the 
Games. The City was well aware of the fact that  
 
In a comprehensive and large-scale process, like staging the Olympics, one is sure to 
make mistakes. This being said, the goal of Olympic planners is to minimize mistakes 
by having a good plan and process in place.” (Godfrey, personal communication, 
February 17, 2012) 
 
Therefore, it was important for the City to develop some overarching planning 
strategies and adopt some guiding principles early on to minimize the risk of slipping into 
unsustainable, production-oriented Olympic planning and ensure that at each point of a 7-
year Olympic planning process the City is working towards a long-term vision of post-
Olympic urban sustainability. The sections below discuss some of these general principles 
and approaches.  
 
4.2.1 The Strategic Planning 
 
First and foremost, for Vancouver achieving long-term urban sustainability 
objectives in the context of Olympic planning meant treating the Olympic event not as an 
end in itself, but as just one stage in a continuous process of working towards strategic 
sustainability goals. Before entering the bid process, the City Council and staff assessed the 
potential benefits of being an Olympic host city (The City of Vancouver, 2006). Through 
this process the City developed eight strategic objectives of its participation in the Games: 
 
1. Work with partners to successfully host the Games. 
2. Sports and fitness legacies. 
3. Arts and culture legacies. 
4. Social sustainability, accessibility and inclusivity legacies. 
5. Environmental sustainability legacies. 
6. Economic sustainability and opportunity. 
7. Lasting partnerships and knowledge transfer. 
8. Civic pride and citizen engagement. 
 
The City designed all Olympic projects and initiatives in such a way as to achieve 
one or more of these strategic objectives (The City of Vancouver, 2006). Therefore, 
sustainability and legacy considerations were engrained in the Olympic planning process in 
Vancouver.  
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4.2.2 The Principled Planning 
 
As early as 2002, even before the Olympic Bid was submitted to the IOC, the City 
had established 12 guiding principles of its engagement in the Olympic planning process. 
Central to these principles were the values of sustainability, aspiration for lasting Olympic 
legacies, as well as the tenets of sustainability planning such as accountability, stakeholder 
involvement, and public consultation (The City of Vancouver, 2006).  
 
1. Develop lasting legacies. The City’s approach to achieving lasting legacies is 
through “forging alliances, designing programs and building venues to best leverage 
the tremendous power and resources associated with the Olympic and Paralympic 
movements”. The City strives to achieve both physical legacies, such as public 
infrastructure and sports and cultural facilities, and non-physical legacies, such as 
increased skill sets and capacities and stronger inter-agency relationships. 	  
2. Ensure sustainability benefits. Vancouver commits to take decisions that 
“emphasize the lasting sustainability benefits […] which include measures relating to 
environmental stewardship, social responsibility, accessibility, inner-city inclusivity, 
economic opportunity, livability, sport development and health promotion.” 
3. Work closely with partners and stakeholders. The City recognizes the importance 
of cooperation and partnerships with Olympic stakeholders, which “will last longer 
after the Games have come and gone”. The City pledges to “take full advantage of 
opportunities to collaborate with Olympic and Paralympic partners and stakeholders, 
to learn from one another, and leverage each others’ strengths and resources 
wherever possible.” 
4. Maximize employee participation. The City sees the Games as “once-in-a-lifetime 
chance to participate in staging the Games and to tap into the vast body of 
knowledge contained within Olympic and Paralympic movements”. Instead of 
devoting just a small number of City employees to work on Olympic planning full-
time, the City chooses to integrate most of the Games-related tasks into the City’s 
existing governmental structure.  
5. Be accountable. The City commits to ensuring  “that every Games‐related action or 
decision taken by City Council and staff is a principled action or decision, that 
processes are transparent, and there is adequate information flowing to the various 
entities that are monitoring the Games.”  
6. Be creative and innovative. “Acknowledging that the Olympic and Paralympic 
Games are a unique deliverable”, the City strives to “take a creative and innovative 
approach to developing [their] service, venue delivery plans and [their] strategies for 
leveraging Games-related opportunities.” 
7. Consult with and engage the community. The City pledges to involve interested 
stakeholder groups “to ensure the community has appropriate input into the City’s 
Games‐related decisions, and to engage community members so that Vancouver’s 
citizens have the opportunity to participate in the Games experience.” 
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8. Create positive experience for athletes. This will be achieved “through the design 
and development of sport and non-competition venues, as well as the various other 
roles the City will play as Games Host City.”   
9. Optimize citizen’s Games experience. The City will ensure that the Games touch 
the lives of as many citizens as possible. It also pledges to “minimize any negative 
impacts of the Games on all of the City’s citizens – including businesses, residents, 
commuters and inner‐city communities.” 
10. Optimize visitors’ and viewers’ experience.  The City promises to do “all it can to 
showcase all that Vancouver has to offer” to visitors and remote viewers.   
11. Minimize budget impacts. The City commits to leverage available financial 
opportunities and minimize impacts on existing departamental budgets.  
12. Limit the City’s exposure. The City pledges to “appropriately limit Games-related 
risk and financial exposure” through “proper budgeting and risk management 
planning” (The City of Vancouver, 2006).  
 
These guiding principles were meant to be “a filter through which City Council and 
staff considered all Olympic Games-related decisions and “a consistent philosophy 
underlying [Vancouver’s] involvement in the Games from the Bid phase forward” (The City 
of Vancouver, 2006). As will be discussed below, these guiding principles helped the City to 
achieve not only planned sustainability outcomes, but also important sustainability co-
benefits, which it had not initially envisioned in the bid book.  
 
4.2.3 The Continuous Planning 
 
The City of Vancouver was aware of the fact that achieving urban sustainability 
objectives required longevity and consistency of the planning process: 
 
Planning for the Games goes beyond thinking about just the twenty‐seven days of the 
Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games themselves. It encompasses a continuum, 
which begins with pre‐Games planning, events and initiatives, through to Olympic 
Games‐time, then to Paralympic Games‐time, to post‐Games decommissioning and 
follow‐up, and ends with the long‐term management of the legacies that will remain 
after the Games are over.” (The City of Vancouver, 2006). 
 
Vancouver’s Olympic Games Strategic Plan encompassed the following stages: 
foundation planning (2002-2005), strategic planning (2005-2006), ongoing monitoring 
(2006-2010), operational planning and testing (2006-2009), Games delivery (2009-2010), 
and wind-up and dissolution (2010-2011). At the foundation planning stage, the City 
established the strategic objectives and guiding principles of engagement in planning (The 
City of Vancouver, 2006). As discussed in the sections above, most of these objectives and 
principles were concerned with economic, environmental and social sustainability and 
Olympic legacies. Therefore, in the foundation planning phase, the City essentially 
developed a roadmap for addressing sustainability issues throughout the Olympic planning 
process.  
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In the strategic planning phase, the City made a plan of infrastructure and venues 
delivery in accordance with the guiding principles and strategic objectives established at the 
foundation planning stage. During the on-going monitoring phase, while developing the 
needed infrastructure and venues, the City measured sustainability performance and 
progress. Finally, after the Games, the City engaged in the Olympic legacy management 
(The City of Vancouver, 2006).   
Thus, the City had a comprehensive system of sustainability and legacy management 
in place throughout the seven years of the preparation for the Games, which enabled it to 
have control over a protracted and incredibly complex Olympic planning process and steer it 
towards more sustainable outcomes.  
 
4.2.4 Integrating the Olympics into Longer-term Urban Development Strategy  
 
Already at the bid development stage, the City viewed the Olympics as a means “to 
move forward with the urban agenda it had in mind and get the provincial and federal 
dollars to finance it.” (VanWynsberghe, personal communication, February 16, 2012). This 
was critically important from the point of view of sustainability, which had been high on the 
City’s urban development agenda for decades before its decision to compete for the 
Olympics. In this connection, Judy Rogers, Vancouver City Manager in 1999-2008 and a 
key person representing the City in the Olympic bid development says:  
 
We strategically viewed the Olympics as an opportunity to get infrastructure and 
venues built or upgraded at a level that was more sustainable […] In everything, 
from the building of the Olympic Village to the retrofit of our arenas, we were able 
to step back for a number of years and built that into the capital campaign.” 
(Rogers, personal communication, February 15, 2012)  
 
Vancouver’s strategy to further sustainability agenda taking advantage of the 
Olympic momentum is an example of VanWynsberghe’s theory (2012) of leveraging the 
Games to achieve desired outcomes and create legacies that speak back to the challenges the 
City was faced with before the Games. As Chapter 3 has shown, not only did Vancouver 
construct or rehabilitate the needed infrastructure and venues according to the highest 
environmental sustainability standards – it also managed to leverage important sustainability 
policies that defined its urban sustainability future for years to come.  
 
4.2.5 Political Leadership 
 
The City’s Olympic sustainability vision  
 
was a result of the convergence of politics and leadership at the city and provincial 
level and the confluence of visions of like-minded individuals (Rogers, personal 
communication, February 15, 2012).  
 
The B.C. leaders at the time of the bid, Premier Gordon Campbell and his deputy 
Ken Dobell, were both “policy wonks, who understood the process of the City and its 
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importance in creating the Olympic vision and the way of working”23 (Rogers, personal 
communication, February 15, 2012). Having worked with both of them previously in 
Vancouver and knowing them well, Rogers was able to create an alignment between the 
City and the Province on the issue of inner-city inclusivity and sustainability (Rogers, 
personal communication, February 15, 2012). Furthermore, since Rogers was both the main 
employee for the City and a member of the VANOC board, she was able to introduce 
sustainability and inclusivity concepts not only into the City’s, but also VANOC’s Olympic 
vision (Rogers, personal communication, February 15, 2012). Whistler was Rogers’s keen 
sustainability ally in the bid and all subsequent negotiations with VANOC and other 
Olympic stakeholders. Jim Godfrey, the municipal administrator of Whistler, strongly 
supported urban sustainability values and saw the Games as a vehicle to accomplish 
Whistler’s long term plans to become an advanced sustainable community by 202024 and 
helped Rogers to spearhead sustainability ideas in the bid development and Olympic 
planning process (Rogers, personal communication, February 15, 2012). 
Rogers played a key role in the development of the City’s sustainability governance 
system. Thus, she created a sustainability team, which later became the Sustainability Group 
within the City government (Rogers, personal communication, February 15, 2012).  
 
4.2.6 Including Sustainability Commitments in the Bid Book 
 
It was very astute and strategic of the City to insist on the inclusion of sustainability 
commitments in the bid book. The City realized that Olympic planning is an extremely 
front-loaded process (Rogers, personal communication, February 15, 2012), meaning that 
once the bid book is submitted to and accepted by the IOC,  
 
A lot of the main legacies have already been identified. While of course this doesn’t 
mean that legacies and plans have been cast in stone, it’s unlikely that Olympic 
stakeholders will take on new commitments after the Bid book is submitted. (Coady, 
personal communication, February 20, 2012)  
 
Needless to say, the mere inclusion of sustainability commitments in the bid book 
does not guarantee their delivery in the end. Olympic history has seen a lot of false 
promises. As Chapter 3 has shown, Vancouver was not an exception to this rule. However, 
incorporating sustainability commitments in the bid and publicly announcing that the City 
was going to be guided by sustainability principles in planning and staging the Games, made 
sustainability a matter of Vancouver’s international reputation and certainly improved the 
chances of Olympic sustainability goals to be met. In hindsight, Am Johal, the Chairperson 
of the IOCC, compares the Olympic planning process to a corporate franchise, which is 
operated in accordance with the conditions of the franchise agreement. Whatever the city 
incorporates in the Olympic “franchise agreement”, i.e. the bid book, has effects on the 
whole planning process (Johal, personal communication, March 28, 2012).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Premier Gordon Campbell served as Vancouver Mayor in 1986-1993 (including the time of World Expo); Ken Dobell 
was the former Vancouver City Manager.  
24 “Whistler 2020: Moving Towards a Sustainable Future” is Whistler’s long-term urban sustainability vision adopted in 
2005 
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Furthermore, given the multitude of different agendas and self-interests, which key 
Olympic stakeholders such as the Province and real estate and corporate sector leaders, 
wanted to address in the bid book, it was critically important for the City to have an 
understanding and assert what was important for its long-term interests. Urban sustainability 
was among Vancouver’s top priorities (Rogers, personal communication, February 15, 
2012). The City had been committed to the sustainability vision and had had a strong voice 
about it at the negotiating table before the bid went in (Rogers, personal communication, 
February 15, 2012).  
  
4.2.7 Leveraging Partnerships with Olympic Planning Stakeholders 
 
The City built and leveraged partnerships with higher levels of government and other 
Olympic stakeholders such as VANOC to achieve its sustainability objectives. Partnerships 
with The Province and the Government of Canada were important from the point of view of 
strengthening the City’s negotiating position with VANOC and the IOC, improving its 
financial standing and expanding the range of policy, regulatory and legal tools to shape the 
Olympic sustainable infrastructure and venue legacies (Wilson, personal communication, 
February 20, 2012).  
Furthermore, since staging the Olympics involves many other stakeholder groups 
pursuing their own divergent interests and agendas and ultimately influencing the outcomes 
of the Olympics, building partnerships was important for the City from the point of view of 
keeping the 7-year Olympic planning process within a desired frame and steering it towards 
desired legacies, while not letting undesirable outcomes to materialize. In this regard, the 
City maintains:  
 
Creating effective, productive relationships with the partners and stakeholders 
involved in the Games is one of the most important keys to the City delivering on its 
commitments, and benefitting to the greatest possible extent from the 2010 Olympic 
and Paralympic Games. (The City of Vancouver, 2006) 
 
The City successfully used partnerships to enhance their bargaining power in the 
negotiation of legacies with other Olympic stakeholders. For example, Vancouver worked 
closely and built alliances with the resort municipality of Whistler and Richmond to 
strengthen their negotiation position at the table with VANOC (Godfrey, personal 
communication, February 17, 2012). In Godfrey’s (2012) words, VANOC couldn’t “divide 
and conquer” with all the three municipalities demanding a fair treatment in terms of the 
planning process and the legacies.  
The Multiparty Agreement25 illustrates the City’s aptitude in building and leveraging 
, among other things, relationships with other Olympic stakeholders to secure the Olympic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  The Multiparty Agreement (2002) is the agreement signed by key partners involved in Vancouver’s bid to host the 2010 
Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, namely the Government of Canada, the Province of B.C., the City of Vancouver, 
the Resort Municipality of Whistler, the Canadian Olympic Committee, the Canadian Paralympic Committee and the 
Vancouver 2010 Bid Corporation. The Agreement established how each signatory would contribute to a successful Games 
and delineated the roles and responsibilities of each party, as well as working relationships and contractual arrangements 
between them. In the history of the Olympic Games, it was the first accord of its kind to be concluded as part of a Games 
bid prior to a Games being awarded to a host city. 
 
59 
legacies that were important for Vancouver. Critically important for the City, the Multiparty 
Agreement addressed the issue of the parties’ financial contributions the creation of 
Olympic legacies of the Games. According to Rogers, it was the relationships with the key 
Olympic stakeholders that was critically important for the City to ensure that the Multiparty 
agreement ultimately included things which were important for the City. She says, 
 
We talked about things that were important to us. It was the relationships that got us 
through. We made commitments to some values. We made commitments to some 
principles about how we were going to work together. And we were going to honor 
what was important to each level of government. And that’s what it took. (Rogers, 
personal communication, February 15, 2012) 
  
 
4.2.8 “Balancing out” VANOC26  
 
In achieving long-term urban sustainability goals, any Olympic host city has to make 
sure that the Olympic planning process is not dominated by the interests of IOC and OCOGs 
representing it. OCOGs’ sole mission is the production of the Games, not urban 
sustainability. Their Olympic operations are largely driven by time and cost reduction 
considerations. Therefore, it is host cities’ task to integrate urban sustainability principles in 
the Games delivery.  
The City of Vancouver managed to “balance out” VANOC’s Olympic Games by 
making them concentrate on quality, environmental and social sustainability aspects of 
planning and emphasizing the guiding principles in their Olympic operations (Petri 2012). 
The goal of “balancing out” VANOC also manifested itself in the VANOC board 
composition. Judy Rogers, Vancouver City Manager in 1999-2008 (as well as Jim Godfrey, 
municipal administrator at the resort of Whistler), “wore different hats” in the Olympic 
planning process, meaning that she served as a City official, while also representing 
Vancouver on the VANOC and 2010 Legacies Now27 board. Thus, she was constantly 
making sure that VANOC’s decisions or actions were not at odds with the City’s interests 
(Rogers, personal communication, February 15, 2012). Whenever there was a conflict of 
interest, she would be asked to step out of the meeting room by the other Board members. 
The Board would then make its decision and communicate it to her. According to Godfrey, 
there were not many cases when he and Rogers, as Whistler and Vancouver representatives 
were disappointed with the VANOC Board’s decisions, simply because for VANOC it 
would have been “challenging to have an unhappy partner at the table” (Godfrey 2012).   
Close collaboration with VANOC also helped the City secure better Olympic 
legacies. For example, according to Godfrey, small organizational details like having their 
offices on right next to those of VANOC, really enhanced day-to-day cooperation (Godfrey, 
personal communication, February 17, 2012). 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Term used by Robin Petri in a personal conversation, February 21, 2012 
27 Read below about this organization.  
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4.2.9. Dealing with Olympic Entrepreneurs 
 
The same way the City counterbalanced VANOC’s Games-production agenda, it 
made sure that the City entrepreneurs could not pursue their profit-oriented interests 
damaging long-term sustainability of the Olympics. In putting in place the planning 
processes, setting up governance structures and constituting the Bid Committee and 
VANOC boards, it was important for the City that no Olympic stakeholder could pursue 
their individual benefit and decision-making power didn’t rest in the hands of any one 
stakeholder (Rogers, personal communication, February 15, 2012). When members of the 
Vancouver Bid Society approached the City about supporting the Olympic bid, the City was 
uncompromising about its strategy to back up the bid only if Olympic entrepreneurs 
backstop the City in achieving its long-term objectives (Rogers, personal communication, 
February 15, 2012). Another checks and balances approach in the Olympic planning process 
was making sure that the makeup of VANOC’s board didn’t allow political power to be 
concentrated in the hands of certain individuals or stakeholder groups. Although it had 
people representing different political interests, VANOC’s board on the whole was non-
political and changed very little over the course of the Olympic planning process (Rogers, 
personal communication, February 15, 2012).  
 
4.2.10 Ensuring Public Support of the Olympic Bid 
 
The City’s decision to seek public approval of the Olympic project was important 
from the point of view of integrating sustainability considerations in Vancouver’s bid. 
Vancouverites supported the bid on the condition that the Inner-City Inclusivity 
commitments of preventing potential adverse impacts of the Olympics on the City’s most at-
risk communities and creating economic opportunities for the poorest people were included 
in the bid (Wilson, personal communication, February 20, 2012). Once these pledges had 
been made, the City, despite the Province’s and Bid Corporation’s objections, held a city-
wide plebiscite to let Vancouverites decide whether they wanted to host the Games or not. 
The plebiscite had been held just months before the IOC’s final vote on the winner of the 
2010 Games in 2003. According to Linda Coady, Vice-President of Sustainability at 
VANOC, the City considered the public opinion important because of the taxpayers 
concerns about Olympic legacies and the trauma of the 1976 Montreal Games, which 
resulted in a huge public debt (Coady, personal communication, February 20, 2012). 
Furthermore the City wanted to follow a good Olympic practice of consulting local citizens, 
which was started by Denver in 1976 (Wilson, personal communication, February 20, 2012).  
It should be noted that, unlike in the referendum, the results of the plebiscite were 
not supposed to be legally binding (Meggs, personal communication, February 21, 2012, 
Shaw, 2008). Therefore, it will always remain a question what the City would have done had 
Vancouverites said “no” to the Olympics28 and whether they had a real choice of refusing to 
host the Games. However, given the importance the IOC attaches to the public support of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The results of the plebiscite was as follows: 63.4% of Vancouver citizens were in favor of the Games; 36.6% were 
against the Olympics. Over 40% of Vancouver citizens voted, which was higher than in the previous city votes (Shaw, 
2008, p. 43).  
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the Games and the risk of derailing the bid if the vote had gone sideways, asking for the 
expression of public opinion was probably a courageous decision on the City’s part.  
Shaw believes, however, that the results of the plebiscite was largely a manufactured 
consent, created by an aggressive “It’s Our Time to Shine” media campaign heavily 
sponsored by the Vancouver real-estate sector. The opposition got significantly less 
attention by the media, than the ‘yes’ side (Shaw, 2008). Furthermore, while the Bid 
Corporation spent over US$1 million on advertising the Games in addition to in-kind 
contributions from the Vancouver and B.C. governments and donations from the corporate 
sector, the “No” side had a meager U$1,500 budget (Shaw, 2008; Makarenko, 2006). 
 
 
 4.3 Planning Specific Outcomes 
4.3.1 The Olympic Village 
4.3.1.1 Design and Development 
 
The City successfully used the opportunity of the Olympic Games to implement the 
long-sought SEFC OV project. Back in 1991, following the seminal “Clouds of Change” 
report, the City Council ruled that SEFC should be a model sustainable community: “On the 
South shore of False Creek, develop a neighborhood that is a model of sustainability, 
incorporating: forward-thinking infrastructure; strategic energy reduction; high performance 
buildings; and high transit access” (The Challenge Series, n.d.). However, for a number of 
years the project was stalling due to enormous financial resources, commitment and 
coordination and a large number of approvals needed from different agencies at different 
levels of government (Rogers, personal communication, February 15, 2012). A long-time 
advocate of creating a model sustainable community in SEFC, Rogers, was able to 
strategically use the Olympic bid momentum and her political influence to promote the 
“model sustainable” vision of the Olympic Village among other key Olympic stakeholders, 
including the Bid Corporation, the federal government, and the IOC (Rogers, personal 
communication, February 15, 2012). She says, 
 
I knew it would take beyond my lifetime to get in place the collaboration and 
cooperation that was required from the federal agencies […] the Olympics was my 
only chance to develop that plot. (Rogers, personal communication, February 15, 
2012) 
 
Robin Petri, Manager of Engineering at the Olympic Project Office, echoes this: 
 
If we didn’t have the Olympics, we probably wouldn’t have the Village. We would 
have probably still a bunch of drawings and people would still be just talking about 
it. So the Olympics made it happen (Petri, personal communication, February 21, 
2012).  
 
Taking advantage of the Olympic opportunity, the City remained committed to the 
original urban sustainability goals it had established before the Olympic bid. While keeping 
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in mind the needs of the athletes, as well as the requirements of VANOC and the IOC, the 
City was ultimately guided by the long-term needs of the future SEFC community, rather 
than the priorities of the Games. Petri says:   
 
In building the Olympic Village, we always had the future and the long-term goal in 
mind. We weren’t thinking that we were building something just for two weeks. We 
were building something that would be here forever. And that’s what helped us keep 
true to our goals. (Petri, personal communication, February 21, 2012)  
 
Importantly, VANOC, despite its far-reaching Olympic planning mandate granted by 
the IOC, always “treated the City as a partner, never dictating it what to do” (Petri, 2012). 
The City always had a clear vision of what was important for it in developing this 
neighborhood. Therefore it wad able to “carry VANOC through to the end on [this vision]” 
(Petri, personal communication, February 21, 2012). VANOC was just making sure that the 
Village was going to meet their purposes, i.e. the accommodation of athletes’ needs (Petri, 
personal communication, February 21, 2012).   
Furthermore, notwithstanding the Olympic deadlines, the City was committed not 
only to incorporating cutting-edge green measures in the project, but also to “authentic 
placemaking” (Hein, personal communication, February 20, 2012). Being in constant 
conversation with the local community of architects and designers, the City proved to be 
attentive and responsive to their calls to shift away from the habitual high-rise mixed-use 
urban shapes of “Vancouverism” and seek new, more human-scaled, dense, low- and mid-
rise forms reflecting the spirit of the place (The Challenge Series, n.d.). As a result, the ODP 
of the Village reflected the requirement of an authentic neighborhood character, 
contemporary expression of its unique identity, and respect for natural topography. This new 
approach to neighborhood development has prompted the City’s willingness to apply the 
concept of place-based design to other developments in Vancouver after the Olympics 
(Hein, personal communication, February 21, 2012).  
The Olympic commitment to technical excellence, innovation and unique design, 
coupled with the urgency of Olympic deadlines, required an extraordinary level of 
interagency coordination, close cooperation with the private sector and VANOC, as well as 
continuous joint problem-solving (The Challenge Series, n.d.). To coordinate the Olympic 
Village project delivery, the City established a special SEFC OV Project Office, which was 
responsible for i) the relationships with the private developer of the buildings; ii) the 
development of the public spaces, including the shoreline, parks, streets, the plaza and 
community center, and iii) working with VANOC (Petri, 2012). Given its tasks, the OV 
Project Office was able to ensure communication and collaboration among all those 
involved in the OV development (Petri, personal communication, February 21, 2012). The 
Office’s staff included people representing different city departments, which enhanced 
interdepartamental coordination and group decision-making (Petri, personal communication, 
February 21, 2012). The Office also brought together experts and planners from different 
fields, which enabled a highly integrated decision-making, planning and design process 
(Petri, personal communication, February 21, 2012; Hein, personal communication, 
February 20, 2012). Finally, the Project Office reported directly to the City Manager, which 
significantly expedited the decision-making process needed for meeting the Olympic 
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deadlines. Driessen, a SEFC OV park planner, describes the unprecedented level of 
cooperation achieved in the project:  
 
Throughout this project, we had a level of cooperation with other agencies that we 
don’t always have, and I think the key was that from the start we said, ‘Let’s not talk 
jurisdictional lines. Let’s have a process where our goal is that everyone agrees, 
where we make decisions based on everybody accepting that the solution is the best 
one given the circumstances.’ It was a very good process. I hope we can continue 
that, because it made a lot of sense. (The Challenge Series, n.d.) 
 
Public engagement was also an important aspect of the SEFC OV project. Starting 
from the beginning of the design process in 2003, the City Planning Department held 
numerous public meetings, workshops, hearings and open houses (The Challenge Series, 
n.d.). Vancouver citizens were informed about and had an opportunity to comment on 
conceptual designs and proposed changes to design of the Village, as well as the design and 
technology solutions of the Neighborhood Energy Utility (The Challenge Series, n.d.). The 
groups that were involved in the SEFC OV planning process included the Southeast False 
Creek Working Group, Southeast False Creek Stewardship Group, Designers for Social 
Responsibility, and City Advisory Committee (The Challenge Series, n.d.). The planning 
process also benefitted from an input from business and residential associations (The 
Challenge Series, n.d.). Citizens offered their research efforts and recommendations on a 
number of issues, including housing quality, community spaces, mobility, health care, etc. 
(The Challenge Series, n.d.). 
 
Since there is no single approach to sustainable community development, the rich 
scope of discussion, diverse points of view and comprehensive input to the City – as 
well as the challenges of defining the input and guidance process and outcomes – 
were all critical elements in the SEFC process[…] Despite the shifts caused by 
successive Councils, the Olympic bid and various interests and pressures, this vision 
has held strong. (The Challenge Series, n.d.). 
 
The City also engaged the citizens through occupant sustainability education. The 
Net Zero energy strategy required the Village occupants to change their behavior with 
regards to energy consumption. The City informed the occupants about the goals of Net 
Zero strategy and encouraged them to change their behavior by using energy meters to track 
their energy consumption in real time (The Challenge Series, n.d.).  Moreover, contributing 
to the Net Zero strategy objectives was part of their occupant agreement. The City provided 
user’s manuals for occupants describing how their activities affect overall building energy 
consumption (The Challenge Series, n.d.). Ramslie, the City Sustainability Manager, says: 
 
You know you’ve achieved a successful green building not when you get the plaque, 
but when occupants are engaged. (The Challenge Series, n.d.)  
 
In sum, the success of the Olympic Village project planning strategy seems to have 
hinged on a highly collaborative, inclusive and coordinated process involving multiple City 
agencies, private sector, citizens and users, and VANOC. In setting up the SEFC OV design 
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and planning process, the City managed to live up to many of its Olympic guiding 
principles: developing lasting legacies, ensuring sustainability benefits, building 
partnerships, involving stakeholders, ensuring public participation, maximizing employee 
participation, being accountable, and creating a positive experience for athletes and 
community. The City’s lasting commitment to its long-term sustainability vision and its 
desire to create a strong sense of place also contributed to the lasting success of the Village. 
Importantly, an absolute Olympic timeline damaged neither the stakeholder consultation 
process, nor creativity and innovation. Finally, political leadership proved to be an important 
project driver, as well as a big factor of its ultimate success.  
 
4.3.1.2 Finance 
 
There has been a lot of frustration among Vancouver’s taxpayers with massive 
amounts of money the City threw at the Olympic Village development (Gregory, 2010; 
Judd, 2011; Antrim, 2011). While it must have been rewarding for the City to see athletes 
blown away by all the green and hi-tech chic of the residential complex and breathtaking 
views of Vancouver downtown skyline, many questioned whether it was worth a US$1 
billion debt and taxpayers’ money (Gregory, 2010; Judd, 2011). 
At first, the project finance and development arrangements seemed to be as good as 
it gets. A private developer (Millennium Development) would buy and develop the last 
undeveloped, highly valuable piece of city-owned land in SEFC. For the City it was a 
perfect opportunity to realize the long-sought project without having to worry about 
financing and supervising the development. Besides, the City did not have the expertise to 
develop the buildings on its own (Hiebert, personal communication, February 15, 2012). 
The developer would finance and complete the Village and convert it into luxury 
condominiums after the Olympic was over to recoup its investments. At the time of the bid, 
when these plans were being developed, Vancouver’s real estate market was booming and 
the thinking behind the project was that the market-priced share of condos would be easily 
sold or rented out at high prices after the Games, subsidizing the affordable housing part 
(Judd, 2011). Back in 2006, when the agreement with Millennium was signed, the City 
planned to invest a mere $47 million in the $950 million project, while receiving $193 
million from selling the land to Millennium (Gregory, 2010). As the project was 
experiencing budget overruns, to prop up the developer, the City had to use financial 
resources from the Property Endowment Fund, which had been created to invest in the social 
and affordable housing projects. In the end, the City had to bail out the whole project.  
Unlike the process of the physical planning and design of the Village, the financial 
arrangements between the City’s and Millennium were not transparent and clear to 
Vancouver citizens. There was a general lack of public information surrounding the 
relationship among the City, developer and financier, as well as the financial and public 
finance implications of the deal (Austen, 2011). Experts believe that while the financial deal 
around the development of the Olympic Village was overall sound, the politicians misled the 
public by initially characterizing the project as risk-free (Austen, 2011).  
To make matters worse, there was the urgency of the Olympic deadlines, which 
resulted in the City’s inability to freeze the construction of the Olympic Village for the time 
of the financial crisis. “We had to keep building something that anyone else in the City 
 
65 
would not be building, which turned into a very tricky economic situation for us”, says Petri 
(Petri, personal communication, February 21, 2012).   
On the other hand, the City believes that creating a neighborhood such as the 
Olympic Village was worth the money spent on it. The former co-director of planning Larry 
Beasley says this about the project: 
 
Occasionally, a city decides to take its wealth and to invest it in something that goes 
beyond just making money. It wants to do something more, in this case the city wants 
to model a kind of development which is different than what we’ve been able to see 
elsewhere. We want to test new things. We want to be first to set the pace, so that 
others can then take things up, and they can become more integral in the way we do 
business. If you take the short-term perspective then yes, it means we suggest the 
[Property Endowment Fund], council suggests the PEF, put more into that 
development than economically makes sense. If you take a long-term perspective – 
then we can instigate practices that are helpful – we make up a lot of that money 
over time (Beasley as cited in Antrim, 2011). 
 
Within the scope of this analysis, it is hard to separate the effect of the 2008 crisis on 
the financial situation surrounding the development of the Olympic Village project from the 
effects of a potentially bad planning and risk management process. Having a more 
transparent decision-making process and dialogue about alternative financing and 
development options might have helped the City to better hedge against financial risks.  
 
4.3.1.3 The Share of Affordable Housing  
 
Changes in the City government turned out to be a critical factor causing swings in 
the policy direction pursued by the City with regards to the share of affordable housing in 
the Olympic Village. Sam Sullivan, a pro-business Vancouver mayor in 2005-2007 cut the 
number of affordable housing units from 66% (original “model sustainable community” 
commitment) to 20% (pre-Olympic business-as-usual policy). Furthermore, in the wake of 
the 2008 financial crisis, the City reduced the share of core need housing to a mere 8%. The 
City did not take a lead in ensuring the necessary public and stakeholder consultation about 
these important decisions (VanWynsberghe, personal communication, February 16, 2012). 
Thus, the City failed to live up to its guiding principles of creating meaningful Olympic 
legacies and consulting the public. Instead, their decisions were driven exclusively by 
political and financial considerations.  
 
 
4.3.2 Transportation planning 
4.3.2.1 The Host City Transportation Plan  
 
Ensuring sustainable and efficient transportation during the Games was a 
considerable challenge for the City (Laclaire, personal communication, February 14, 2012). 
In the Games-time, the City expected the whole transportation system to be stretched to its 
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limits by more than quarter of a million visitors and 10,000 media and 55,000 VANOC 
members and volunteers serving the needs of the Olympic basic functions (Bracewell, 
2009). For example, the City anticipated a 30% increase in the number of trips to 
Downtown. At the same time, during the 17 days of the Games, the City expected a 20% 
decrease in road capacity due to the closure of many streets around the main Olympic 
venues for security purposes (Bracewell, 2009).  
Vancouver managed to use the constraints of the Games’ logistics as an opportunity 
to meet the Olympic transportation needs with zero additional cars (Laclaire, personal 
communication, February 14, 2012). Furthermore, the City saw the Olympics as an 
opportunity to experiment with sustainable transportation behavior shifts beyond the goals 
established before the Games (Toderian, 2010). To meet the zero car challenge, the City 
developed the Host City Olympic Transportation Plan (HCOTP), whose main goals were to: 
1) ensure reliable travel arrangements for the Games; 2) maintain a functioning urban city; 
3) promote sustainable modes of transportation; and 4) leave a legacy of longer term 
sustainable transportation behavior. The plan included dedicated pedestrian corridors in the 
City Downtown, traffic reduction measures, bike route network and secure bike parking 
facilities, a free streetcar demonstration project, road closures, restricted parking, and 
expanded transit service (Bracewell, 2009). 
Realizing that the success of the HCOTP hinged entirely on the experience of 
citizens, visitors and businesses, the City provided the public with timely and accurate 
information about the Olympic transportation arrangements. In 2008-2009, the City was 
regularly holding public information sessions to keep citizens and stakeholders informed 
about its transportation plans and hear their concerns (Bracewell, 2009). The City was also 
working with stakeholder groups including Business Improvement Association group, 
Vancouver Board of Trade, the Business Coordinating Committee, Smart Growth BC, 
Vancouver Cycling Coalition, utilities, event industry companies and others to discuss 
potential street use limitations during the Games-time (Bracewell, 2009).  
To achieve the HCOTP goals and influence people’s travel behavior, in 2008, the City 
launched TravelSmart 2010 Challenge communications campaign to “encourage 
incremental reductions in vehicle traffic to Downtown as road closures and transit service 
increases were put into place before the Games began.” (Bracewell, 2009). In other words, 
the City sent a strong message to Vancouver’s residents and businesses: “You shouldn’t 
drive your car during the Games because there would be no place to park it. Take transit. 
Period” (Laclaire, personal communication, February 14, 2012). The citizens were 
constantly reminded that spectator car parking would not be available at venues and that 
their event tickets included the use of public transport (Laclaire, personal communication, 
February 14, 2012; Bracewell, 2009).  
Stakeholder engagement, coordination and cooperation were critical in developing 
and implementing the HCOTP. The plan was executed by multiple partners, including the 
City of Vancouver transportation and engineering staff, VANOC, B.C. Ministry of 
Transportation and Infrastructure, BCTransit29, Translink30, Resort Municipality of Whistler, 
and the Vancouver 2010 Integrated Security Office (The City of Vancouver, 2010c). 
Representatives of each stakeholder group formed the Olympic and Paralympic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Provincial public transportation agency 
30 Metro Vancouver Regional Transportation Authority 
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Transportation Team (OPTT), which oversaw and steered the integrated transportation plans 
of each party. The OPTT provided “a unique opportunity for all transportation agencies to 
work together to ensure that the needs and demands of each partner’s client group are 
understood and satisfied” (Bracewell, 2009). Furthermore, the City established the Olympic 
Transportation Technical Team that included members from each of the City’s 
transportation branches with expertise in different fields. This team coordinated interagency 
cooperation within the City government and was responsible for working with VANOC 
(Bracewell, 2009).  
The analysis of the Olympic transportation process suggests that its key success 
factors were stakeholder engagement and cooperation, integrated and coordinated approach 
to multi-stakeholder transportation planning, as well as community engagement and 
education. Furthermore, by thinking out of the box, being visionary and creative, the City 
managed to turn the Olympic transportation challenge into an opportunity to test its 
preparedness to a more sustainable transportation future. Thus, the HCOTP is another 
successful example of social leveraging of the Olympics to create sustainability legacies and 
advance urban sustainability policy agenda.  
 
4.3.2.2 Canada Line 
 
The City and the Province had been interested in the Canada Line project long before 
the Olympics. There had been “a number of starts and stops on the project and eventually it 
had been put on hold” (Laclaire, personal communication, February 14, 2012). The 2002 bid 
breathed a new life into the project and eventually got it back on track. Under the pressure of 
the Olympic deadlines, the City made some “tough” decisions, which it had been avoiding 
or putting off for years because they were either too expensive, or politically unfeasible, or 
both (Laclaire, personal communication, February 14, 2012). It managed to secure buy-in 
and significant financial contributions from the upper levels of government, Translink and 
Vancouver Airport, without which the City would not have been able to pull the project off. 
The Federal Government of Canada financed over 30% of the project; the Province, 
Translink and the Airport contributed 22% each. The City had to pay only for accompanying 
road improvements and building one additional stop at the Olympic Village (Laclaire, 
personal communication, February 14, 2012).  
Thus, by building strategic partnerships, the City used the Games’ momentum to 
address the long-standing issues that needed resolution (Laclaire, personal communication, 
February 14, 2012). In this regard, Laclaire used a telling pre-party house cleaning 
metaphor:  
 
From a personal perspective, I always think about [the Olympics] as when you are 
putting on a big party in your house and you just moved there a couple of month ago 
and you still haven’t hung those pictures, you haven’t set things up properly, you 
have a couple of boxes lying about and the party makes you hang that picture and 
clean up that thing and get this stuff done. That’s how it felt like to me. It’s like, boy, 
how did we overlook this issue for so long?! (Laclaire, personal communication, 
February 14, 2012) 
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4.3.3 Housing  
 
From the very beginning of the bid process, there was a great deal of community 
consensus about the need to not let the Games to exacerbate the situation in DTES. Fearing a 
repeat of Vancouver Expo ’86, which resulted in large-scale evictions, displacements of the 
poor and overlooking DTES residents for construction jobs, at the bid discussion stage 
community activist groups and politicians representing Vancouver’s East Side raised 
concerns about similar risks associated with the Olympics (Johal, personal communication, 
February 13, 2012). In 2001, several community groups created the Impact of Olympics on 
Community Coalition (IOCC) to serve as a watchdog over the Olympic bidding and 
planning process. Jim Green, a pro-poor City Councilor at the time of the bid development, 
was a founding member of the IOCC and its strong supporter. He used his political influence 
to make the City include the IOCC in the Olympic planning process at its very early stages 
(Makarenko, 2006; Johal, personal communication, March 28, 2012).  
Being aware of the pressing urban poverty and disenfranchisement issues in its own 
backyard and experiencing a lot of pressure on the part of the local community and the 
IOCC in particular, the City insisted on including the Inner-City Inclusivity Commitment 
Statement in the Bid Book (Wilson, personal communication, February 20, 2012). Wilson 
says:  
 
If the City hadn’t voiced strongly at the bid stage what the social commitments 
needed to be and that all levels of government, including the Provincial government, 
the Federal government, as well as the local civic government, had a role to play in 
dealing with these commitments, they would not have gotten the commitment of these 
larger governments at a later date. That is a very specific example in our Games 
where there had to be an agreement early on. (Wilson, personal communication, 
February 20, 2012) 
 
Judy Roger’s political leadership played a critical role in getting a high-level 
agreement on the inclusion of the ICICS in the bid book (Rogers, personal communication, 
February 15, 2012). A nation-wide platform of relationships built around the Vancouver 
agreement, signed by the Federal Government of Canada, the Province of B.C. and the City 
of Vancouver in 2000 to improve the well-being of Vancouver’s inner city in a coordinated 
fashion, helped Rogers to promote the same model of intergovernmental cooperation in 
delivering Olympic planning goals. Since the Vancouver Agreement had been in place well 
before the Olympic bid was developed, Rogers already knew the political landscape at the 
provincial and federal level and all the people she needed to work with (Rogers, personal 
communication, February 15, 2012).  
Jim Green’s political leadership was also critically important for the inclusion of 
social equity principles in Vancouver’s Olympic planning. As mentioned above, he strongly 
advocated for engaging the IOCC in the planning and decision-making process. 
Furthermore, he successfully used the Olympic bid to leverage affordable housing 
initiatives. In 2001, the government of B.C. bought an abandoned Woodward’s department 
store in DTES, and promised to include 245 units of affordable housing in the development 
project. However, in 2002, a newly elected government halted the project, causing DTES 
residents to picket outside the building for three months. Jim Green, thanks to his influential 
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position in Vancouver City Council, threatened to kill the Olympic bid idea unless the 
Province agreed to implement the project as originally planned. Subsequent negotiations 
between the City and the Province resulted in the City’s buying the project and the 
Province’s paying for 100 out of 200 affordable housing units in the 536-unit project 
(Makarenko, 2006; Johal, personal communication, February 13, 2013).  
The City’s promise to hold the plebiscite also strengthened its bargaining position 
during the negotiation with the Province, the federal government and the Bid Corporation 
about the inclusion of the ICICS in the bid book. In order to make the bid more palatable for 
the voters, the City demanded the inclusion of Olympic social legacy commitments in the 
bid book. Furthermore, the plebiscite and the public dialogue around it improved the 
understanding of senior governments of what mattered most at the local level (Wilson, 
personal communication, February 20, 2012). Furthermore, as the plebiscite was looming 
large, the City wanted to have the IOCC, which spoke for Vancouver’s most disadvantaged 
inner-city residents and represented the views of many community-based organizations and 
advocacy groups, at the table (VanWynsberghe, personal communication, February 15, 
2012). VanWynsberghe says: 
  
It was an important bid-phase attempt to engage community and make people feel 
comfortable with the fact that the Games were coming and deal with their concerns. 
(VanWynsberghe, personal communication, February 15, 2012)  
 
Notwithstanding the importance of the inclusion of social sustainability 
commitments in the bid book, in the IOCC’s view, “the ICICS had no teeth” (Johal, personal 
communication, March 28, 2012). Unlike the much-commended Multi-party agreement, the 
ICICS did not have a real legal force. Rather, it was a value-based, good-will statement 
collectively made by the Olympic parties to justify the Olympics in the eyes of the local 
community. In the ICICS, the Olympic partners announced what they wanted to achieve as a 
result of the Olympic planning process, but failed to put any “hard numbers” of affordable 
housing legacy or any other concrete promises in it. Therefore, the document was essentially 
powerless in terms of holding the levels of government to their promise of affordable 
housing legacy (Johal, personal communication, March 28, 2012). He says:  
 
The City should have included a legally binding document with some concrete 
promises in the bid book. After they won the rights to host the Games, it was very 
unlikely that they would take on any additional or more challenging commitments 
(Johal, personal communication, March 28, 2012).    
 
In 2006, the City and VANOC convened an advisory Housing Table to develop 
specific goals and implementation strategies to realize the five housing related commitments 
laid out in the ICICS, including the provision of affordable housing legacy, protection of the 
City’s poorest against eviction and displacement, provision of different forms of temporary 
housing for visitors and workers, and protection of rental housing stock. The Housing Table 
had 25 members, including a broad range of community organizations, groups representing 
the First Nations, tenants associations, housing non-profits and sector representatives. 
VANOC, federal, provincial and municipal governments supported the Table and were its 
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voting members. A B.C. Housing31 representative facilitated the Housing Table (The City of 
Vancouver, 2007). Although the Housing Table stakeholders had diverse perspectives, there 
was a remarkable degree of consensus about the recommended actions, as well as a shared 
understanding that the main legacy of the Games should be the elimination of homelessness 
(Report of the Inner-City Inclusive Housing Table, 2007). 
The Table met for several months in 2006-2007, “reviewing the impacts experienced 
at previous hallmark events, grappling with complex issues of housing and services, and 
anticipating how the pre-Games period will affect the housing market” (Report of the Inner-
City Inclusive Housing Table, 2007). The table ultimately produced a report that contained 
25 recommendations, each relating to the specific ICICS commitments (“Report of the 
Inner-City Inclusive Housing Table”, 2007). Notably, 23 recommendations out of 25 were 
approved on consensus (Report of the Inner-City Inclusive Housing Table, 2007). 
The Inner-City Inclusivity (ICI) Partners, i.e. the City, the Province, VANOC, and 
the Government of Canada, made a commitment to provide an initial response to the Table’s 
recommendations within 90 days (Mauboules, personal communication, February 16, 2012). 
In order to provide a meaningful and coordinated response to each recommendation made by 
the Housing Table, the ICI Partners formed a joint working group. The City Council 
generally endorsed all the Table’s recommendations, with a caveat that the possibility of 
immediate financing of 3,200 affordable housing units demanded by the Housing table as 
key Olympic affordable housing legacy, is questionable due to Provincial funding 
constraints (The City of Vancouver, 2007). In terms of the rest of recommendations, the City 
explained to what extent the Housing Table’s suggestions are consistent with the existing 
policy direction pursued by the City, what the City intended to do to implement the 
recommendations, why certain recommendations could not be implemented and what 
alternative ways the City considered to take to address the problem (The City of Vancouver, 
2007).  
Due to an inconvenient political situation around financing affordable housing 
legacy, this very promising policy dialogue was dropped. The dialogue was abandoned after 
one of the stakeholders prematurely released the Housing Table report to the press, without 
getting an official response from the Province (Mauboules, personal communication, 
February 16, 2012). Unfortunately, the City failed to step up to keep it (VanWynsberghe, 
personal communication, February 16, 2012).  
As a result, the Housing Table did not end up leading to good affordable housing 
outcomes eventually. The way the Table’s participants see the situation around the 
negotiation suggests that the broken promises of affordable housing legacy were not due to 
the flaws in the multi-stakeholder process itself. Rather, they had to do with the social 
spending cuts at the provincial level (Johal, personal communication, March 28, 2012), 
sudden break of the Housing dialogue and mutual frustration among stakeholders due to the 
premature press release, subsequent replacement of the dialog with a superficial consultation 
process (VanWynsberghe, personal communication, February 16, 2012), and other political 
factors.  
VanWynsberghe believes that the Housing Table was a real strength of the Olympic 
planning process and one of the best community consultation processes he has ever seen 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 BC Housing is the provincial crown agency that develops, manages, and administers a wide range of subsidized housing 
options (http://www.bchousing.org/aboutus). 
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happening in Vancouver. He laments the lack of such processes in other sectors and spheres 
of Olympic planning (VanWynsberghe, personal communication, February 16, 2012). 
 
 
4.4. Chapter Conclusions 
 
In retrospect, the City maintains that the following lessons from planning sustainable 
Olympic legacies were important:32  
 
1. Have a long-term vision. The City had a clear vision of how it could use the Olympic 
Games to achieve its longer-term, strategic urban sustainability objectives, such as 
building Canada Line and developing a model sustainable community in SEFC, which 
would set new urban sustainability standards for Vancouver and enable the City to try 
new policy approaches and technologies. In other words, the City modeled the Olympics 
on the future it wanted to be in after the Games.   
2. Leverage the Games to advance urban agenda. The City strategically used the Games 
to “get its house in order”33 and initiate or further the projects that were too expensive, 
complex or politically infeasible to realize without the Games.  
3. Include sustainability commitments in the bid book. Including sustainability 
commitments in the bid book proved to be critically important as a guarantee of the 
incorporation of sustainable development principles in Olympic planning. It would have 
been much more difficult, if not impossible, for the City to secure senior governments 
and VANOC’s buy-in and financial support of urban sustainability projects and 
initiatives after the Games were awarded to Vancouver.  
4. Set guiding principles. In order to prevent the pursuit of short-term, near-sighted goals 
of the production of the Games and forestall any potential damage to local communities 
and development, the City decided early on that all of its activities and projects would be 
guided by a certain set of principles, which included positive Olympic legacies, 
sustainability benefits, building partnerships, involving the community, etc. Constantly 
checking back with the guiding principles helped the City to keep in mind the needs of 
long-term sustainable urban development and make sure that it was serving the 
community in the first place.  
5. Have a legacy mindset. In its decisions the City was guided by the long-term local 
development interests and was concerned with what legacies Vancouver would be left 
with after the Olympic Closing Ceremony. It did not do the things that catered to the 
actual event, unless they were part of the City’s local development plan. 
6. Be at the table and formulate as many partnerships as you can. The City was 
constantly at the table with the senior levels of government, the 2010 Bid Corporation 
and later VANOC, negotiating favorable terms of its involvement in the Olympic 
project. It was strategic about building relationships and formulating partnerships with 
key Olympic stakeholders to get their buy-in and financial contributions to important 
urban sustainability projects.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Opinions provided by Rogers, Laclaire, Godfrey, Duffy, Petri, Hein, Johal and VanWynsberghe (personal conversations, 
February – March 2012).  
33 Used by Laclaire in a personal conversation, February 2014, 2012.  
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7. Benefit and engage the community. The City realized that in order for Olympic 
legacies to be sustainable, the City had to address the needs of Vancouver’s citizens, 
especially less privileged one. Furthermore, the City knew that the community had to 
receive tangible benefits of hosting the Games before, during and after the Olympics, 
feel engaged in be able to influence the Olympic planning process.  
8. Use limitations as opportunities. The City was creative about addressing short-term 
challenges of the Games in such a way as to create longer-term benefits for Vancouver.  
 
Furthermore, the City was able to achieve sustainable Olympic legacies thanks to 
highly integrated, coordinated and inclusive planning processes and management structures 
it established to develop the Olympic Village and plan Olympic transportation. An 
extraordinary level of commitment to common goals and cooperation of the City 
departments and agencies among themselves and with other Olympic stakeholders, private 
sector and the public, made good Olympic outcomes possible.  
The City’s guiding principle of maximizing staff exposure to Olympic planning, 
although not directly related to urban sustainability, nevertheless augmented sustainability 
legacies of the Olympics by transforming the City staff’s values and everyday practices. 
Additionally, the guiding principle of optimizing citizens’ experience of the Olympics has 
also contributed to the achievement of sustainable Olympic legacies: the success of the 
Olympic transportation plan and Olympic street festival enhanced public perception of 
transit and public space and motivated sustainable travel behavior shifts.  
As for the Olympic sustainability failures in Vancouver, such as the unfulfilled 
promise of affordable housing legacy and public debt the City had to incur to complete the 
Olympic Village, it is hard to explain them determinately and exhaustively by specific 
failures in the Olympic planning process. Both of these negative outcomes had a lot to do 
with external factors, which the City had no control over. However, experts agree that the 
City could have minimized the risks of these outcomes taking place, had it been more 
committed to a robust public and stakeholder consultation process and transparent and 
accountable about specific political decisions that were made.  
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5.1. Introduction: Policy Lessons from Vancouver 2010 
 
Before Vancouver was awarded the right to host the first “sustainable” Games in the 
Olympic history, Furrer (2002) gave the following recommendations to Olympic Games 
organizers that wished to make their Games more sustainable:  
 
1. Let the inclusion of sustainability policies in the Games organizational concept 
be a voluntary decision, “reflecting a genuine effort to maintain or even improve 
the quality of life for future residents of the host city and region.” “Sustainability 
must not be an afterthought or a greenwash PR-type strategy.”  
2. Integrate the Games into a long-term (15-20 years) strategy. Host cities should 
not treat the Olympic event as a one-off boost. Rather, the Games should catalyze 
long-term opportunities and activities, as well as improvement of people’s quality of 
life. Host cities should use the Games as a tool to create positive change, while being 
realistic and strategic about specific urban development issues the Games can help to 
solve.  
3. Integrate sustainable development principles into all phases of the Games’ 
organization, including conceptualization, feasibility, bidding, strategic and 
operational planning, operations and dissolution.  
4. Include the Games into sustainable urban and regional strategies early. Host 
cities and regions should “develop a vision for the Games and blend it together with 
its overall vision for the future of the city and region.” “The key to success is to 
successfully deliver all temporary demands of the Olympic movement, while 
focusing on the city or region’s permanent needs.  
5. Involve the public. “Citizens are key stakeholders of the Olympic legacy. They 
must be consulted from the earliest stages of the Games conceptualization until after 
the Games.  
6. Use mitigation measures. Organizers must be open and honest about all potential 
negative impacts, and properly identify, assess and communicate them in order to 
minimize as much as possible the economic, social or environmental pressure on the 
host citizens.  
7. Use sustainability monitoring and reporting tools. Monitoring and reporting 
should be performed in conjunction with NGOs, research institutes and universities. 
Independent watchdogs should be appointed to accompany all efforts towards 
sustainability (Furrer, 2002).  
 
Several years later Frey et al. (2008) underscored the need to involve all territorial 
stakeholders such as local institutions, practitioners, community groups, neighboring 
municipalities for a responsible and accountable decision-making in staging sustainable 
Games.  
The case of the 2010 Vancouver Games has clearly demonstrated the importance of 
these guidelines of Olympic sustainability planning. In addition to these principles, learning 
from Vancouver’s experience, future host cities could also benefit from a principled 
approach to Olympic planning, in which considerations of the Games’ positive legacies and 
sustainability benefits are at the core of each and every Olympic planning decision made by 
municipal authorities. Vancouver 2010 has shown the importance of political leadership and 
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strategic political alliances for the development and advancement of a far-reaching urban 
sustainability vision and large-scale sustainable infrastructure projects. Leveraging 
partnerships with key Olympic stakeholders and securing financial resources from senior 
levels of government are also critical for ensuring Olympic sustainability legacies. Finally, a 
highly coordinated and integrated approach to Olympic planning, as well as citizen 
education and engagement have proven to be critical for achieving lasting sustainability 
outcomes of the 2010 Vancouver Games.  
Finally, future Olympic host cities could be inspired by the sustainability co-benefits 
lesson of the Vancouver Olympics: a major planning undertaking such as staging the 
Olympics is able to magnify sustainability efforts of host city staff and bring lasting 
sustainability benefits well exceeding the initial Olympic bid book commitments.  
Having analyzed how Vancouver planned its lasting Olympic sustainability benefits 
and what the factors of success and failure might have been, in this chapter I discuss how the 
policy lessons learnt from the case of Vancouver 2010 can be applied in other planning 
contexts, in particular Sochi 2014. More specifically, I am concerned with policy 
implications for host cities that are less advanced in terms of urban sustainability thinking 
and/or controlled by centralized national governments. In addition to that, I discuss policy 
implications for the IOC in terms of assisting such cities in planning a more sustainable 
Olympics.  
 
5.2 Implications for Sochi 2014 
5.2.1 Background 
 
In the past two decades, Olympic host cities have achieved significant progress in 
“greening” the Games, planning for better post-Games use of Olympic infrastructure and 
venues and using the Games as a major urban regeneration and community building 
opportunity. Host cities have successfully used the Olympics to solve their long-standing 
environmental issues such as contaminated brownfield sites and poor water and air quality. 
The Games have been increasingly subject to robust environmental management and 
governance systems established by host cities to prevent undesired environmental impacts. 
Through staging the Games, several Olympic host cities have successfully undertaken 
significant urban redevelopment, such as the revitalization of urban core, expansion and 
modernization of road and public transport infrastructure, improvement of connectivity, 
reinvigoration of public spaces and so on. On the social equity front, host cities are 
beginning to engage minorities and indigenous people and ensure benefits for 
disenfranchised communities.  
Against this backdrop, experts believe that the 2014 Sochi Games will be a major 
step backwards on the trajectory towards more environmentally, socially and economically 
responsible Games and will undermine the IOC and previous host cities’ efforts to control 
the environmental and financial costs of staging the Olympics (Essex, 2011; Shaw, 2008).  
The IOC’s decision to award the Games to Sochi was clearly made for political 
reasons rather than on the merits of the bid (Essex, 2011; Shaw, 2008). For the IOC, it was 
“a mixture of political gesture and commercial opportunity to extend Olympism into the 
former communist world” (Essex, 2011). The bid was backed by strong political lobbying 
by Vladimir Putin himself, who was keen on the idea to turn Sochi into a world-class skiing 
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resort as a symbol of a resurgent Russia (Nemtsov and Milov, 2009; Essex, 2011). For the 
IOC, a guarantee from Putin was very reassuring: the Games will happen as planned, and the 
venues will be built on time at any price (Shaw, 2008). Unlike its rivals, Pyeongchang, 
South Korea, and Salzberg, Austria, at the time of the bid, the city had no winter sports 
infrastructure in place. Since then, a small village in the in Caucasus Mountains, Krasnaya 
Polyana,34 has been developed from scratch to become a new winter resort and host Olympic 
snow competitions (Essex, 2011). To support Olympic venues, enormous amounts of 
infrastructure, including power and gas lines, water and sewage and telecommunications 
systems, a number of new motorways and a light railway line with multiple bridges and 
tunnels, will be built in the extremely complex alpine terrain of the Caucasus, making the 
construction very costly, technically challenging and downright dangerous (Nemtsov and 
Milov, 2009; Essex, 2011). Furthermore, situated on the Black Sea coast in a humid 
subtropical climate region, Sochi has been one of the region’s most popular summer resorts, 
not a winter one. Spoiled by warm winters (one average +11 °C (52 °F) in the period from 
December to March (Wikipedia, n.d.(b))) Sochi citizens, compared to the rest of Russia, are 
not into winter sports, which makes the post-Olympic use of venues questionable (Nemtsov 
and Milov, 2009). To make the situation worse, there are serious security concerns 
associated with the Sochi Games. Sochi is located about 30 km from Abkhazia, a disputed 
region on the border with Georgia. In 2008, a seven-day military conflict over several 
disputed regions between Russia and Georgia killed hundreds of people and gave rise to a 
campaign to move the 2014 Olympics to a different city (Essex, 2011). 
Adventurist from the start, the Sochi 2014 bid engendered an economically, socially 
and environmentally irresponsible Olympic planning process. While in 2007 the Sochi bid 
team estimated the cost of the 2014 Olympics at US$12 billion, by 2010 Russia has already 
spent about US$30 billion on Olympic projects (“IOC Chief Visits 2014 Winter Olympic 
Site”, 2010), which is a record amount for the Winter Olympics and five times higher than 
Vancouver’s budget. All Olympic construction projects in Krasnaya Polyana have recently 
been put on hold due to “unclear project payback periods” and financial losses incurred by 
state-owned Vnesheconombank, one of the main financiers of the Sochi Olympics 
(“Olympic Sites Will Not Be Turned In On Time”, 2012).  
Although the Sochi Organizing Committee claims that the 2014 Games will be “in 
harmony with nature”, “climate neutral” and “zero waste”, there is evidence that the Sochi 
Olympics is associated with serious environmental concerns (Sochi 2014 Organizing 
Committee, n.d.). Olympic development is taking place in the Sochi National Park and the 
Caucasus Nature Reserve, both part of a World Heritage Site designated by UNESCO for its 
unique biosphere and species. In 2006, to streamline the construction process, the Russian 
authorities passed rezoning legislation to turn over control of these pristine areas to the 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade overseeing Russia’s Olympic bid (Shaw, 
2008). Key Olympic construction projects, such as the Central Olympic Stadium, have not 
undergone environmental impact assessments required by the federal law (Bellona, 2011). 
Environmental impact reports that were eventually released years after the beginning of 
construction “did not take into account the cumulative ... effects of the various projects on 
the ecosystems of the Sochi region and its population" (“UN criticizes Russia over Sochi 
Winter Olympics construction”, 2010). Environmentalists believe that the ecosystems have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Krasnaya polyana means “a beautiful glade” in English. 
 
77 
suffered irreversible damage, and bird and bear habitats have been destroyed (“UN criticizes 
Russia over Sochi Winter Olympics construction”, 2010). In 2011, frustrated by disregard 
for their recommendations, the World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace suspended their co-
operation as consultants for “Olympstroy”, a state-owned Olympic developer (“UN 
criticizes Russia over Sochi Winter Olympics construction”, 2010).  
In terms of social equity, things are looking grim too. In its letter to the IOC, Human 
Rights Watch provides examples of non-transparent procedures in the expropriation and 
relocation of tenants from Imeretinskaya Bukhta (Bay),35 arbitrary property valuation and 
compensation procedures, a number of forcible evictions, as well as destruction of 
livelihoods by illegal garbage dumps in the Village of Akhshtyr (Human Rights Watch 
2010). To complicate matters further, Olympic construction in the Krasnaya Polyana region 
places a disproportionate burden on the indigenous Ubykh and Adygh communities (also 
known as Circassians), in the Caucasus Mountains. This caused the launch of NoSochi2014 
campaign (NoSochi2014, n.d.) and protests of Circassians across the world. Furthermore, 
construction workers, most of whom are migrants, have complained about unsanitary 
conditions in the construction sites and long-standing wage-arrears. 
Notwithstanding the dramatic differences in the governance models, political 
context, level of economic development, environmental and societal values and record of 
achievements in urban sustainability between Vancouver and Sochi, there are important 
policy lessons that the municipal government of Sochi can learn from the case of the 2010 
Olympics. The section below discusses what the City of Sochi can do in the last two years 
before the 2014 Games to capture some lasting urban sustainability benefits of the 
Olympics.   
 
 
5.2.2 Policy Advice for Sochi 
 
The applicability of policy lessons learnt from Vancouver is determined by the 
planning context in Sochi. The Olympic planning process in Sochi is extremely centralized 
and fully controlled by the federal government, ‘Olympstroy’, the Sochi Organizing 
Committee, and a number of oligarch-owned businesses closely affiliated with the federal 
government. In other words, Sochi 2014 is a classic example of Hall’s (2006) Olympic city 
entrepreneurialism and Burbank’s (2001) growth-oriented political and business elitism. 
Furthermore, both the Governor of Krasnodarskiy Kray36 and the Mayor of Sochi are Putin’s 
appointees. As a result, the City has little authority over the Olympic planning process and is 
extremely limited in its ability to negotiate favorable terms of its involvement in the 
Olympic mega-project. A high degree of centralization of Olympic planning in Sochi 
undermines or even makes impossible meaningful public participation and stakeholder 
engagement processes. The situation is exacerbated by the general weakness of civil society 
in Russia – a legacy of the Soviet era. Finally, the City of Sochi had not been concerned 
with urban sustainability before winning the right to host the Games.  
Given the planning context in Sochi, as well as the fact that only two years are left 
before the start of the Games, many of the key lessons learnt from Vancouver’s case, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The site where the Olympic Oval and the Skating Ring are being built 
36 Regional government  
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including the importance of strategic sustainability thinking and visioning, principled 
approach to planning, using the Games to advance urban sustainability agenda, building 
partnerships with and leveraging resources from senior levels of government, involving 
community groups, and balancing out the OCOG and city entrepreneurs, cannot be easily 
applied in Sochi. Rather, these are the lessons for future host cities to keep in mind when 
starting internal Olympic bid negotiations.  
What Sochi can do now is to i) maximize staff exposure to urban sustainability 
practices; ii) ensure tangible benefits of enhanced urban experience and privileged access to 
Olympic venues for citizens; iii) where possible, integrate sustainable development 
principles in Olympic transportation planning; iv) raise awareness among citizens about 
urban sustainability benefits and educate them about sustainable travel and natural resources 
consumption behavior.  
In the last two years before the Games, the City of Sochi should do its best to live up 
to its Olympic sustainability mandate and ensure maximum staff exposure to sustainability 
practices. Vancouver’s example has shown that important sustainability co-benefits arise 
from a host city’s efforts to live up to its sustainability commitments, as well as the guiding 
principle of making sure that as many staff as possible is exposed to urban sustainability 
practices. According the Host City Contract, the City of Sochi is responsible for the 
following Olympic planning functions: licensing and regulation, waste management, 
appearance, permanent and temporary infrastructure, visitor services, security and public 
safety, workforce management, emergency aid services, parking and transport services 
(Sochi 2014 Organizing Committee, n.d.). Furthermore, the Contract obliges the City to 
integrate sustainable development principles in its Olympic operations. Sochi’s Olympic 
operations mandate is broad enough to make even modest and belated sustainability efforts 
count – both for its own staff, who will acquire invaluable sustainability planning skills, and 
for its citizens, who will benefit from sustainability legacies. Given the lack of any previous 
sustainability planning record in the City of Sochi, the Olympics is Sochi’s unique 
opportunity to start thinking about urban sustainability.   
 In particular, Sochi can start integrating sustainability principles in Olympic 
transportation planning. Vancouver’s experience has demonstrated that the last two years 
before the Games is an important stage of community engagement and education in Olympic 
transportation planning. Given that public transit is presently non-existent in Sochi and the 
city is suffocated by traffic jams, the Olympic Games could be its unique opportunity to start 
developing a public transportation system in Metro Sochi. For example, the City could 
negotiate with senior levels of government and the Organizing Committee the acquisition of 
the bus fleet that will be used during the Games to move spectators, media and OCOG 
representatives and volunteers. At the same time, Sochi could start an aggressive 
communication campaign to educate citizens about sustainable travel modes, as well as 
health and community benefits of sustainable travel behavior.  
To strengthen pre-Games community outreach efforts, during the Games, Sochi 
should maximize citizen transportation and pedestrian experience. As Vancouver has shown, 
the Olympic Games have a great potential to motivate shifts in people’s travel behavior if 
the transit, walking and biking experience during the event itself is enjoyable and 
memorable. Therefore, Sochi should ensure that local citizens get to enjoy the “urban 
happenings” of the Olympics and get a renewed sense of the public realm and transit in 
Sochi. Besides, Sochi boasts beautiful, quaint, shady and highly walkable streets that are 
 
79 
currently underappreciated and underused by the local community. The Olympic festival is 
capable of reemphasizing this advantage.  
Sochi should keep in mind that community outreach and education efforts will not be 
successful unless its citizens share the benefits of hosting the Games. The Olympic Village 
at Krasnaya Polyana is being developed as a high-class resort for rich Russians and 
foreigners, who Putin wants to lure to Sochi from European alpine resorts. The average 
Sochi citizen cannot afford the expensive hotels that have recently opened in Krasnaya 
Polyana, thus they feel disenfranchised and deprived of the benefits of hosting the Olympics. 
The City of Sochi could insist on making a portion of the Olympic Village resort affordable 
and Olympic venues accessible for Sochi citizens. The City could also create tangible local 
community benefits, such as cleaner and more comfortable public beaches, or opening up 
public spaces, coastal parks and other prime location amenities that are currently divided 
among state-owned resorts and designated for resort dwellers only. Importantly, as the case 
of Vancouver 2010 has shown, community benefits should not be limited to the city center 
and tourist attractions. Broader Metro Sochi and Krasnodarskiy Kray communities should 
benefit from the Olympics; otherwise, the Games will exacerbate existing investment 
disparities in the region.   
Finally, planning the Olympics is an opportune time to start engaging the local 
community and consult them about local development issues. While it probably will not be 
possible to reengage international and local NGOs in large-scale Olympic construction 
projects controlled by the federal government, the City of Sochi could involve them in local 
urban development matters. Involvement of NGOs and community stakeholder groups, at 
least as advisors at this point, will make the planning process more legitimate and 
accountable in the eyes of the local and international community. 
 
5.3 Implications for the IOC 
 
The violations of sustainable development principles in Sochi 2014 should alert the 
IOC to the risks of awarding the Games to cities with no record of urban sustainability 
accomplishments. Although, as this thesis has demonstrated, the Olympic Games have the 
potential to push host cities beyond their “business-as-usual” approach to urban 
sustainability, it would be unreasonable to expect the Games to motivate host cities, which 
have not previously been concerned with sustainable development, to transition to more 
sustainable modes of urban growth. On the contrary, staging the Games might exacerbate 
preexistent unsustainable trends.  
Furthermore, the case of Sochi 2014 should also caution the IOC against giving the 
Games to cities which do not have adequate financial resources, regulatory authority, 
negotiating power, experience, expertise and capacity to stage economically, 
environmentally and socially responsible Games. The IOC should be ever more vigilant as 
the Games increasingly make their way to developing countries and economies in transition 
and fewer and fewer “qualified” cities in developed countries are willing to bear the 
financial burden associated with staging the Games (Grant Long, 2012). For example, 
initially nominated by the Italian National Olympic Committee to bid for the 2020 Summer 
Games, Rome later withdrew from the application process due to the Italian government’s 
decision that the Olympic bid would be an “irresponsible” financial commitment given the 
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country economic concerns (“Italian PM Withdraws Rome’s 2020 Olympic Bid”, 2012). As 
of now, the five applicant cities for the 2020 Games include Baku (Azerbaijan), Doha 
(Qatar), Istanbul (Turkey), Madrid (Spain), and Tokyo (Japan) (The IOC, 2011d). 
Since restricting the Games to “qualified” cities in the Global North is not politically 
feasible, what should the IOC do to prevent Olympic sustainability debacles in developing 
countries and economies in transition, cities with little to no experience in urban 
sustainability, as well as cities whose urban sustainability goals are likely to be overridden 
by the interests of Olympic entrepreneurs, authoritarian national governments, closely 
affiliated with corporate stakeholders? 
First, sustainability should be among the key criteria, based on which the IOC makes 
a decision about applicant cities’ potential to successfully host the Games. Presently, the 
IOC makes its assessment against a set of 11 criteria: (i) government support, legal issues, 
and public opinion; (ii) general infrastructure; (iii) sports venues; (iv) Olympic Village(s); 
(v) environmental conditions and impact; (vi) accommodation; (vii) transport concept; (viii) 
safety and security; (ix) experience from past sport events; (x) finance; and (xi) overall 
concept. (The IOC, 2011b). As the case of Sochi 2014 has shown, so far governments’ 
financial reliability and commitment outweigh sustainability considerations. If the Games 
are to become more sustainable in the future, the IOC should carefully assess each candidate 
city’s potential and capacity to integrate sustainability considerations in Olympic planning. 
Applicant cities’ previous record of implementing urban sustainability policies should be an 
important factor in the IOC’s decision to award the Games. In the IOC’s two-stage host city 
selection process, the sustainability criterion could be used as a screening test to promote 
applicant cities to the candidate status.  
Second, while evaluating applicant cities’ questionnaires and candidate cities’ bid 
books, the IOC should keep a closer eye on ungrounded and superficial “green Games” 
language. Sochi’s experience clearly demonstrates that the use of green building 
technologies in the construction of Olympic venues cannot compensate for the damage 
inflicted on the natural environment and communities of the Caucasus Nature Preserve and 
Imeretinskaya Bukhta. While visiting candidate cities, the IOC Evaluation Commission 
should ensure that host cities have the necessary expertise, experience and internal capacity 
to live up to its sustainability commitments. For example, the Commission could check 
whether sustainability plans presented in host city bid books are in line with their longer-
term urban development strategies and are supported by administrative, institutional and 
financial resources. Ensuring that host cities are sincere about their urban sustainability 
commitments raises the probability of good sustainability outcomes of the Games. 
Third, the IOC should use the OGGI project to assist host cities in formulating their 
long-term sustainability goals. As it stands now, the Games Impact project is underutilized 
as a tool that can aid in host city sustainability policy-making. It merely requires OCOGs to 
measure 126 environmental, social and economic indicators several times before, during and 
after the Games and is designed to help the IOC to better understand complex impacts of the 
Olympic Games on local development. The OGGI host city reports represent invaluable, 
expensive and hard-to-get data that can inform urban sustainability policymaking and goal 
setting. Moreover, the IOC could require the use of the OGGI baseline indicators in setting 
medium to long-term urban sustainability targets. The IOC could use subsequent OGGI 
reports to monitor the performance of host city sustainability policies. The requirement of 
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using the OGGI indicators in sustainability planning will induce host cities to be more 
proactive and strategic in pursuing the Games’ urban sustainability legacies.  
Forth, the IOC could develop its internal sustainability expertise, as well as 
organizational capacity to provide host cities which are less advanced in terms of urban 
sustainability with top-quality technical assistance throughout the Olympic planning 
process. Olympic Games Knowledge Services Office, Transfer of Olympic Knowledge 
Program, and/or Olympic Games Study Commission could serve as potential platforms for 
developing sustainability expertise within the IOC.  Alternatively, the IOC could outsource 
this task to a reputed private consultant. Having sustainability experts appointed by the IOC 
to work closely with host city governments and OCOGs will help the IOC to better enforce 
the Olympic Movement’s Agenda 21, as well as monitor the preparation process more 
closely and forestall potential risks of severe budget overruns, environmental damage, 
displacement and eviction. Cooperating with the technical assistance body designated by the 
IOC could be spelled out as one of the conditions of the Host City Contract. It could be 
mandatory for cities with little to no expertise in sustainability planning and optional for 
cities with a proven record of successful implementation of urban sustainability policies.  
Fifth, the IOC could require the establishment of independent watchdog 
organizations to oversee the Olympic planning process in host cities. Finally, the IOC should 
penalize Olympic organizers for failing to comply with the sustainable development policies 
outlined in Agenda 21. For example, a major failure to cooperate with the designated 
technical assistance team or watchdog organization could be penalized by restrictions on 
future host city applications from that country.  
 
5.4. Implications for the Field 
 
This thesis has the potential to contribute to the Olympic Games research field in a 
number of ways. In particular, it has:   
 
1. Begun to unpack a complex, multilayered concept of Olympic sustainability and 
distinguished between the different visions of sustainability as held by the IOC, 
OCOGs and host cities. A buzzword in the Olympic Games discourse, the term 
“sustainability” has been used without explanation of what exactly it means in relation to 
the Games and what it involves for various Olympic stakeholders. Importantly, this 
thesis has identified that the notion of Olympic sustainability for host cities is 
inextricably linked with the concept of Olympic legacies. Better understanding of what 
sustainability means for different Olympic stakeholders at international and local levels 
is important from the point of view of better targeting and tailoring sustainability policy 
advice depending on specific authorities, mandates, goals, roles, tasks and agendas of 
different Olympic stakeholders with regards to planning and staging the Games.  
2. Provided a triple-bottom line assessment of the Olympic Games’ impacts. This 
research has attempted to look holistically at the mix of economic, environmental and 
social impacts of the 2010 Games in Vancouver, as opposed to focusing on specific 
aspects of Olympic outcomes in separation from others. This thesis has made early 
attempts to analyze trade-offs, synergies and clashes among economic, environmental 
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and social dimensions of the Games outcomes and tease out long-term urban 
sustainability value of the Games for Vancouver.  
3. Focused on leveraging the Games to achieve desired social and policy outcomes. 
Building on VanWynsberghe’s findings (2012), this research sees the Games as an 
important opportunity and vehicle for host city governments to pursue its goals and 
generate new policies and programs. In the Olympic research field, this thesis has 
contributed to a shift from Olympic impacts to Olympic opportunities and leveraging 
thinking. The former focuses on retrospective analysis of the “aftermath” of the Games, 
invoking a negative, passive and reactive connotation, whereas the latter involves a more 
proactive, motivated and positive approach to Olympic Games planning and conveys an 
important idea that it is possible to steer it towards desired outcomes, including greater 
post-Olympic urban sustainability. This is a very important shift, especially in the 
context of sustainability planning, which is always long-term, forward-looking, 
purposeful and motivated.  
4. Focused on the role of host city governments in Olympic sustainability planning. 
The literature on the Olympic Games has been primarily focused on the role of Olympic 
family members, such as the IOC and OCOGs, in delivering a “sustainable” Games. 
This thesis begins to explore the relationships and unearth the tensions between the 
Olympic movement members, OCOGs in the first place, and host communities in 
formulating sustainability visions and strategies. In particular, this thesis provides a 
number of recommendations for host cities to effectively promote and pursue their long-
term urban sustainability goals, while successfully cooperating with OCOGs on 
delivering short-term Games production goals.  
 
5.5 Potential for Further Research 
 
Further analysis of Vancouver’s case is important from the point of view of 
improving understanding of how the Games can be planned in ways that are not only 
environmentally responsible, but also socially equitable. Learning about Vancouver’s 
pioneer experience of meaningfully integrating social justice in the Games planning would 
be useful for future hosts of the Olympics and other large-scale sports events. Therefore, any 
research that explores in more detail social equity policies in the Vancouver Olympics, 
factors of success and reasons for failure and provides policy advice to host cities and 
OCOGs would be very useful.  
Further investigation of the relationship between urban sustainability and holding 
Games in compliance with sustainable development principles is also needed. It is important 
to understand the implications of sustainable Olympic operations for urban environment and 
whether staging a “sustainable” Olympic Games leads to greater urban sustainability beyond 
the Games. In this regard, it is particularly useful to examine the role of the IOC and 
OCOGs in shaping urban sustainability outcomes and to provide further policy advice on 
how the interface between the Olympic family and host cities could be improved to ensure 
greater post-Olympic urban sustainability.  
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Appendices 	  
Appendix 1. Emergence and Evolution of Sustainability Discourse in the 
Olympic Movement 
 
Year Event 
1964 Tokyo citizens raise concerns about pollution caused by Olympics-related 
infrastructure and real estate developments 
1972 Colorado citizens vote against hosting the 1976 Winter Games for environmental 
and economic reasons   
1991 Organizers of Lillehammer Games declare that a special attention will be paid to 
environmental issues and the first “ecological” Games will be pursued 
1992 Special measures to protect nature reserves are taken by the organizers of the 
Winter Games in Albertville  
 
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) signs the “Earth Pledge” during the 
1992 Games in Barcelona 
1994 Lillehammer holds the first “Ecological Games”  
 
The IOC formally adopts environmental protection as the third pillar of the 
Olympic Movement along with sport and culture and introduces the need to 
protect environment and ensure sustainable development in the Olympic Charter  
 
UNEP and IOC sign an agreement on sport and environment 
1995 IOC establishes the Sport and Environment Commission charged with the 
promotion of and raising awareness about the goals of environmental protection 
and sustainable development among the members of the Olympic Movement and 
host cities 
 
UNEP and IOC hold the 1st World Conference on Sport and Environment 
1997  UNEP and IOC hold the 2nd World Conference on Sport and Environment 
2002 Olympic candidate cities are evaluated based on their environmental protection 
plans for the first time 
1999 IOC adopts Olympic Agenda 21 
2000 Sydney sets new standards of “Green Games” 
2001 IOC undertakes Olympic Games Global Impact Study project (OGGI), designed 
to assess the Games’ impact on host cities on the basis on 126 economic, 
environmental and social indicators 
 
The IOC establishes Olympic Games Study Commission 
2002 The First IOC Symposium on the Legacy of the Olympic Games from 1984 to 
2000 
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The IOC incorporates the positive legacy principle into the Olympic Charter, the 
Host City Contract and the IOC “Manual for Candidate Cities”.  
2003 Vancouver is selected to host the first “Sustainability” Winter Games in 2010 
2005 London is selected to host “One Planet” Summer Olympics in 2012 
 
Beijing signs an agreement with UNEP pledging to hold the “greenest” Games 
ever 
2006 Turin holds Winter Games noteworthy for their strong emphasis on 
environmental quality and sustainable development 
2007 UNEP proclaims IOC and its President Jacques Rogge as “Champions of the 
Earth 2007” and cites Turin as a “shining example” 
2010 Vancouver hosts “Sustainable Olympics 2010” 
2011 Global Reporting Initiative releases sustainability reporting guidelines for events, 
including Olympic Games (Event Sector Supplement), used by both Vancouver 
and London 
 
The IOC supports and encourages Games organizers to use Sustainable Sport and 
Event Toolkit (SSET) Platform, developed by VANOC and International 
Academy of Sports Science and Technology, AISTS.  
2012 London is completing preparations for the “2012 One Planet” Olympics starting 
on July 27th 
 
In run-up to the Olympic Games in Londong, ISO is to issue ISO 20121 
“Sustainability in Event Management”.  
 
Sources: Gold and Gold 2011; Taradellas 2003; Holden et al 2007; Furrer 2002; www.globalreporting.org; www.ubc-
ogi.ca; http://sustainable-sport.org/; http://css.ubc.ca/2012/01/31/gri-releases-event-sector-supplement/; 
http://www.iso.org/iso/pressrelease.htm?refid=Ref1281 	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Appendix 2. List of Interviewees 
 
Name Position 
Rachel Moscovich The City of Vancouver Sustainability 
Department, Manager 
Am Johal The Impact on Community Coalition, 
Chairperson 
Bruce Dewar 2010 Legacies Now, Executive 
Director 
Lon LaClaire The City of Vancouver Strategic 
Transportation Planning Department, 
Manager 
Tom Laviolette  PHS Community Services Project, 
Director 
Carli Edwards  The City of Vancouver Inspection 
Services, Manager. Formerly in the 
City Manager’s Olympic 
Coordination Team 
Judy Rogers Former City Manager 
Karis Hiebert The City of Vancouver Planninng 
Department Senior City Planner 
Chris Baber The City of Vancouver Neighborhood 
Utility Project Manager 
Celine Mauboules The City of Vancouver Social 
Department, Manager 
Robert VanWynsberghe UBC Professor, board member of the 
IOCC 
Daniel Naundorf The City of Vancouver Social 
Department, Manager 
Ann Duffy VANOC Sustainability Office 
Jim Godfrey/ Sharon 
Fugman 
Former Municipal Administrator of 
Whistler 
Linda Coady/Donna 
Wilson 
VANOC Sustainability VP 
Hugo Haley The City of Vancouver Sustainability 
Department 
Scot Hein The City of Vancouver Planning 
Department, Senior Planner 
Linda Mix The IOCC board member 
Robin Petri The City of Vancouver Olympic 
Project Office, Manager of 
Engineering 
Geoff Meggs City Councilor 
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Appendix 3. Research Instruments: Sample Semi-Structured Interview 
Questions 
 
1. In your view, how did the 2010 Olympic Games change Vancouver?  
2. How would you define i) a sustainable Olympics and ii) Olympic sustainability 
legacy?  
3. What are the examples of Olympic sustainability legacy in Vancouver? 
4. Did hosting the Olympics cause any burdens or challenges for the city (e.g. financial, 
environmental, economic, social)? 
5. What problems did the Olympic and the Olympic planning process helped the City to 
address? 
6. How is sustainable Olympics different from environmentally friendly/ “green” 
Olympics in Torino and Salt Lake City, for instance? 
7. How was planning for sustainability in Vancouver different from other Olympic 
cities?  
8. Controlling the economic, social and environmental outcomes of the Games: 
a. Were you able to control the outcomes of the Games? How so?  
b. If yes, what levers (policymaking, communication, etc.) did the City use to 
gear the changes brought about by the Olympics towards a more sustainable 
outcome?  
c. What challenges did you face along the way? What are some potential 
pitfalls?  
d. What were the critical decisions in the 7-year preparation process that proved 
to shape the sustainability outcome?  
e. How did you ensure consistency in making sustainability decisions 
throughout the preparation process? 
9. Governance:  
a. How was governance set up to ensure sustainable Olympics and legacy? In 
particular, please, speak to the issues of:  
i. Leadership 
ii. Decision-making  
iii. Public participation 
iv. Regulation and voluntary standards 
v. Stakeholder engagement 
vi. Partnerships 
vii. Roles, division of tasks, coordination (among levels of government, 
departments and stakeholders). 
viii. Inclusivity 
ix. Openness and transparency 
x. Monitoring and reporting, etc.  
b. What were the most important factors of success? 
c. What could have been done better? 
d. Given your knowledge  of the difference in governance among BC 
municipalities that were involved in preparing and hosting the Olympics, in 
what way was sustainability outcome different? 
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e. How this experience might be different in other host cities given the 
differences in approach to governance.  
10. Triple bottom line: 
a. What is possible to achieve lasting positive outcomes in all the three Es?  
b. What were the trade-offs in the planning process?  
c. What are the trade-offs/compromises in the outcomes?  
11. Role of the IOC, UNEP and international community? 
a. What was their contribution to sustainability planning? 
i. Are you satisfied with your cooperation with the Olympic Movement?  
b. Was their vision of sustainability different from Vancouver’s?  
c. What changes would you introduce in the international governance around 
sustainable Olympics? 
12. Looking back on the planning process, what would you do differently? What didn’t 
work and why? 
13. What advice would you give to London 2012 and Sochi 2014 to ensure a long-
lasting Olympic sustainability legacy? 
 
Specific Questions to the City of Vancouver Sustainability Group 
 
1. How did the Olympics fit in the long history of sustainability planning in 
Vancouver?  
2. How did the Games changed sustainability planning process? (e.g. did they enable 
something that for some reason was not possible before?) 
3. What did you/your team learn as a result of the holding sustainable Olympics that 
you will apply in the future sustainability planning efforts? (e.g. policy lessons, 
experiential knowledge, professional skills, etc.) 
 
Specific Questions to the Impact on Community Coalition, the main watchdog 
organization 
 
1. What is your experience of cooperating with the government?  
2. Did you feel that your voice on how the Olympics should be prepared and held, was 
heard by the government and VANOC? How so? 
3. How did you participate in and contribute to the Olympic planning?  
4. Do you think that benefits from Olympic projects and investments were equitably 
distributed? If not, which categories of citizens/urban areas benefitted more? 
5. What else did you find problematic about Olympic projects (e.g. environmental 
impacts, etc.) 
6. What would you change in the way the planning process was set up and held? 
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Appendix 4. Sustainability Outcomes of the 2010 Vancouver Olympic 
Games  
 
Type of 
Outcome 
Bid 
Commitments 
Public 
Expectations 
and Concerns 
Planned 
Games-time 
Outcomes 
Sustainability 
Co-benefits 
not envisioned 
in the bid book 
Lasting Urban 
Sustainability 
Legacies 
Environmental Outcomes 
The Olympic 
Village 
“The Village 
will be located 
on land 
historically used 
for industrial 
purposes that 
will be 
rehabilitated and 
developed as a 
model 
sustainable 
community” 
 
“Locating the 
Village here will 
contribute 
significantly to 
revitalizing this 
underdeveloped 
part of the City 
and will serve as 
a catalyst for 
sustainable 
community 
development”. 
 
“The Council 
directed that the 
area should be 
developed to 
incorporate the 
principles of 
energy 
efficiency 
community 
design” 
 
“In the interest 
of testing new 
technologies for 
application on a 
wider basis, 
demonstration 
projects in 
advanced 
technologies for 
In line with the 
Bid 
commitments 
 
The Games 
critics were 
skeptical about 
the need for all 
the most 
advanced 
urban green 
technologies in 
an athletes’ 
village and 
were 
concerned with 
the project 
costs.   
Bid 
commitments 
delivered with 
outstanding 
success and 
expectations 
exceeded.  
 
LEED ND 
Platinum, the 
most 
sustainable 
neighborhood 
in the world 
according to 
USGBC thanks 
to multiple 
innovative 
green 
technologies 
and measures 
installed and 
sustainable 
community 
design 
approaches 
used.  
Innovations in 
district energy 
system, green 
building, urban 
agriculture, 
urban loop 
systems are 
being applied in 
other 
developments 
across the city.  
 
 
 
1. 
Establishment 
of 
Sustainability 
Group within 
the City 
government, as 
well as a formal 
system of 
sustainability 
governance.  
 
2. Urban 
sustainability 
learning that 
came out of the 
project. 
 
3. Improved 
expertise and 
capacity of the 
City to 
formulate and 
implement 
urban 
sustainability 
policies, as well 
as better design 
and planning 
practices 
generated by 
the learning 
from Olympic 
Village 
development; 
 
3. 
Transformation 
of Vancouver’s 
building design, 
development 
and 
construction 
sector towards 
greener, more 
sustainable 
1. 
Reconsideration 
of existing 
regulatory 
environment to 
remove barriers 
to greater 
sustainability of 
the built 
environment 
 
2. Adoption of 
ambitious long-
term goals 
within the 
framework of 
the Greenest 
City 2020 
initiative 
 
3. A surge and 
acceleration in 
urban 
environmental 
sustainability 
policies and 
regulations in 
the areas of 
energy 
efficiency, green 
design and 
building, district 
energy, urban 
design and 
agriculture, etc. 
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renewable 
energy supply, 
water 
management, 
green building 
design and 
urban 
agriculture  may 
be explored in 
some areas of 
the Olympic 
Village” 
practices 
generated by 
learning from 
the Olympic 
Village 
development; 
 
4. Improved 
dialog and 
cooperation 
between the 
City and 
building design, 
development 
and 
construction 
sector in the 
development of 
Greener City 
2020, goals, 
policies and 
regulations; 
 
5. “Can-do” 
attitude towards 
urban 
sustainability 
developed by 
the City as a 
result of the 
successful 
Olympic 
Village 
development 
and realization 
of the Host City 
Olympic 
Transportation 
Plan 
 
Transportation “2010 Games 
will based on a 
sustainable, 
multi-modal 
transportation 
system in which 
the use of the 
automobiles will 
be actively 
discouraged” 
 
Canada Line is 
mentioned as 
“proposed” 
project.  
In line with the 
Bid 
commitments 
Bid 
commitments 
delivered with 
outstanding 
success. 250% 
growth in 
transit ridership 
in the Games-
time and 19% 
growth in 2010 
overall 
compared to 
2009. Vehicle 
trips to 
Downtown 
1. An 
unprecedented 
sustainable 
transportation 
and traffic 
reduction trial 
 
2. The Host 
City 
Transportation 
Monitoring 
system put in 
place to 
monitor the 
progress of the 
1. Sustained 
increase in 
transit ridership. 
In 2011, 
Vancouver saw 
a 5% increase in 
transit use over 
the abnormal 
2010 
 
2. Valuable 
ridership and 
occupancy data 
generated by the 
Host City 
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decreased by 
almost 30% 
compared to 
2009. 
 
Canada Line 
built. During 
the Olympics it 
carried 
200,000-
250,000 
passengers per 
day – a great 
success for a 
brand new 
transit line.  
Host City 
Transportation 
Plan 
 
3. “Can-do” 
attitude to the 
challenge of 
urban 
sustainable 
transportation 
developed by 
the City 
transportation 
authorities 
  
4. Improved 
citizen 
perception of 
public transport 
 
 
Transportation 
Monitoring 
system allowing 
to better analyze 
effects of modal 
shifts 
 
3. Learning 
generated by the 
Olympic 
sustainable 
transportation 
and traffic 
reduction trial  
 
4. Development 
of the new, long-
range 
transportation 
plan with targets 
up to 2040 based 
on the success of 
the Olympic 
transportation 
plan and data 
collected during 
the Olympics. 
Venues “The new 
buildings and 
infrastructure 
required for the 
2010 Games 
will be a 
showcase of the 
best in green 
building design 
and construction 
techniques[…] 
LEED will be 
used as a 
standard for all 
new facilities” 
 
In line with the 
Bid 
commitments 
Commitments 
delivered:  
1. Olympic 
Center at 
Hillcrest Park – 
LEED Gold.  
 
2. SEFC OV 
Community 
Center – LEED 
Platinum 
 
3. Trout Lake 
Rink – LEED 
Silver 
 
4. Killarney 
Rink – LEED 
Gold 
 
  
Public Space 
and Pedestrian 
Experience 
   Street events 
and gatherings, 
outdoor 
celebrations 
and 
entertainment 
during the 
Games 
1. The Summer 
Spaces, Open 
Streets, and 
Rediscover 
Granville street 
closing 
programs 
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transformed 
citizens’ 
perception of 
streets and 
public spaces  
2. Several other 
walking and 
public realm 
strategies that 
are a part of the 
Greenest City 
2020 Plan 
Social Outcomes 
Share of 
affordable 
housing in the 
Olympic 
Village 
“Vancouver 
City Council  
has approved 
policies for the 
development of 
housing at the 
Olympic Village 
site that include 
a provision for 
non-market 
housing, with 
the goal that 
non-market 
housing will 
comprise 20% 
of the residential 
housing. It is 
proposed to 
build 
approximately 
three quarters of 
the total non-
market housing 
requirement as 
part of the 
Olympic 
Village”.  
 
Until 2007, the 
Official 
Development 
Plan of SEFC 
OV had the 
following 
targets: 1/3 
“deep core” 
housing, 1/3 
non-market 
housing, 1/3 
market housing 
(affordable 
housing share 
requirement is 
20% in new 
developments 
in Vancouver). 
1/3-1/3-1/3 
apportion 
would mean 
“model” 
sustainable 
community, a 
new 
sustainability 
standard for 
future 
developments.  
66% affordable 
housing target 
was at the 
basis of public 
support of the 
bid and set 
high 
expectations 
for the social 
housing legacy 
of the Games 
The Bid Book 
commitment 
delivered: 20% 
or 252 units of 
affordable 
housing 
delivered, 116 
of which are 
“core need”. 
However, the 
citizens were 
left frustrated 
because the 
government 
broke its initial 
1/3-1/3-1/3 
promise, which 
had been 
critical to their 
support in the 
plebiscite. 
Furthermore, 
public 
disappointment 
had to do with 
the fact the City 
was considering 
a possibility of 
selling off all 
affordable 
housing units at 
market prices to 
make up for the 
financial losses 
incurred in the 
2008 crisis.  
 
 252 units of 
affordable 
housing.  
The Inner City 
Inclusivity 
Commitments 
(ICICs) 
37 commitments 
to create 
opportunities 
and mitigate 
potential 
impacts from 
hosting the 
Community 
groups had 
high 
expectations 
for 3,200 units 
affordable 
housing legacy 
Rental housing 
stock largely 
protected, as 
reported by the 
City, with 
occasional 
displacement 
200 affordable 
housing units in 
Woodwards 
Building 
leveraged by 
Jim Green in 
2002 in 
Sustained multi-
stakeholder 
engagement 
process and 
municipal-level 
partnership 
around 
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Games in 
Vancouver’s 
inner-city 
neighborhoods:  
-protection of 
existing rental 
stock; 
-prevent 
displacement 
-ensure 
affordable 
housing legacy 
 
Declarative 
nature of 
commitments 
involving no 
hard numbers  
and fully 
protected 
rental stock, 
demanded by 
the Housing 
Sector Table. 
The public 
attached a lot 
of importance 
to the ICICs as 
a means to 
improve the 
quality of life 
of inner-city 
residents and 
house the 
City’s 
homeless.  
cases reported 
by the 
Watchdog. 
 
No significant 
affordable 
housing legacy 
built, causing a 
lot of 
dissatisfaction 
and criticisms.  
  
exchange for 
the support of 
the Olympic 
bid by the City 
Council 
 
Stronger and 
more organized 
civil society  
 
Better dialogue 
among 
affordable 
housing 
stakeholders 
 
Greater 
responsiveness 
on the part of 
the City 
 
Media scrutiny 
and public 
dismay have 
potentially 
contributed to a 
greater City’s 
and Province’s 
attention to 
affordable 
housing issues 
 
 
-the City has 
convened a task 
force on 
affordable 
housing 
affordable 
housing issues 
(Mayor’s Task 
Force on 
affordability)  
 
 200 units of 
affordable 
housing in the 
Woodwards  
development  
 
-the Province 
has bought 22 
SRO hotels to 
prevent 
gentrification 
 
-the City have 
allocated 14 
sights for 
affordable 
housing projects, 
for which the 
Province has 
started to 
provide funding 
 
-the Federal 
government 
pledged $380 
million for 
homelessness 
and housing 
programs in 
2009-2014 
 
 
Potential for 
more affordable 
housing to be 
built in the 
future 
Economic Outcomes 
Post-Olympic 
Venue Use 
(excluding the 
Olympic 
Village) 
“All proposed 
facilities meet a 
set of underlying 
principles:  
[…]  
-encourage and 
maximize use 
during the 
winter and 
summer 
-be adaptable to 
In line with the 
Bid 
commitments 
Commitments 
delivered: 
 
1. Olympic 
Center at 
Hillcrest Park 
(renovated, 
expanded): 
community 
center, branch 
library, skating 
 Venues will 
serve 
community 
purposes for 
years and 
decades to come 
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recreational as 
well as high-
performance use 
-fit with the 
long-term vision 
of the 
community” 
  
rink, aquatic 
facility, curling 
club 
 
2. Britannia 
Training Venue 
(renovated): 
local school 
children’s 
hockey training 
center 
 
3. Killarney Ice 
Rink (new): 
rink for 
Vancouver’s 
speed, figure 
and recreational 
skaters, and 
local hockey 
leagues  
 
4. Trout Lake 
Ice Rink (new): 
community 
center, 
recreational 
rink 
 
5. The Pacific 
Coliseum 
Skating Venue 
(restored): short 
track speed and 
figure skating 
events and 
training 
 
6. GM Place 
(restored): 
hockey events 
and training 
 
7. Thunderbird 
Arena 
(refurbished 
and expanded): 
to be used by 
University of 
British 
Columbia for 
sports 
competitions 
and training 
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Source: Author 
 
  
8. SEFC OV 
Community 
Center: 
multipurpose 
use, including 
childcare, 
restaurant, 
boating center, 
meeting space 
The Olympic 
Village 
$171 million to 
be invested in 
the project by 
the City, 
Province and the 
private sector.   
Public 
expectations 
were based on 
the 2005 ODP: 
-the City 
would invest a 
mere $47 
million in a 
$950 million 
project to be 
developed by a 
private 
company and 
receive $193 
million from 
selling the land 
As a result of 
the 2008 crisis 
and the main 
financier 
pulling out of 
the project, the 
City had to step 
in and take on a 
$1billion debt  
Green business 
development 
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